

**Center for Responsible Lending
National Consumer Law Center (on behalf of its low income clients)
Americans for Financial Reform Education Fund
Consumer Action
Consumer Federation of America
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
NAACP
National Association of Consumer Advocates
National Association for Latino Community Asset Builders
National Coalition for Asian Pacific American Community Development (National CAPACD)
U.S. PIRG**

**Comments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Federal Interest Rate Authority
12 CFR Part 331
RIN 3064-AF21**

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Submitted via email to comments@fdic.gov

The **Center for Responsible Lending (CRL)** is a nonprofit, non-partisan research and policy organization dedicated to protecting homeownership and family wealth by working to eliminate abusive financial practices. CRL is an affiliate of Self-Help, one of the nation's largest nonprofit community development financial institutions. Over 37 years, Self-Help has provided over \$7 billion in financing through 146,000 loans to homebuyers, small businesses, and nonprofits. It serves more than 145,000 mostly low-income members through 45 retail credit union locations in North Carolina, California, Florida, Greater Chicago, and Milwaukee.

Since 1969, the nonprofit **National Consumer Law Center® (NCLC®)** has used its expertise in consumer law and energy policy to work for consumer justice and economic security for low-income and other disadvantaged people, including older adults, in the United States. NCLC's expertise includes policy analysis and advocacy; consumer law and energy publications; litigation; expert witness services, and training and advice for advocates. NCLC works with nonprofit and legal services organizations, private attorneys, policymakers, and federal and state government and courts across the nation to stop exploitive practices, help financially stressed families build and retain wealth, and advance economic fairness.

Americans for Financial Reform Education Fund (AFREF) works in concert with a coalition of more than 200 consumer, investor, labor, civil rights, business, faith-based, and community groups to lay the foundation for a strong, stable, and ethical financial system. Through policy analysis, public education, and outreach, AFREF works for stronger consumer financial protections and against predatory practices.

Consumer Action has been a champion of underrepresented consumers since 1971. A national, nonprofit 501(c)3 organization, Consumer Action focuses on financial education that empowers low to moderate income and limited-English-speaking consumers to financially prosper. It also advocates for consumers in the media and before lawmakers and regulators to advance consumer rights and promote industry-wide change particularly in the fields of consumer protection, credit, banking, housing, privacy, insurance and utilities.

The **Consumer Federation of America** is a nonprofit association of more than 250 national, state and local consumer groups that was founded in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and education. For over 50 years CFA has been at the forefront of consumer protection with a broad portfolio of issues including product safety, banking, telecommunications, investor protection, energy, housing, insurance, privacy and saving. CFA's non-profit members range from large organizations such as Consumer Reports and AARP, to small state and local advocacy groups and include unions, co-ops, and public power companies.

The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights is a coalition charged by its diverse membership of more than 200 national organizations to promote and protect the civil and human rights of all persons in the United States. Through advocacy and outreach to targeted constituencies, The Leadership Conference works toward the goal of a more open and just society - an America as good as its ideals. The Leadership Conference is a 501(c)(4) organization that engages in legislative advocacy. It was founded in 1950 and has coordinated national lobbying efforts on behalf of every major civil rights law since 1957.

Founded in 1909, the **National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (hereinafter NAACP)** is our nation's oldest, largest and most widely known grassroots civil rights organization. The principal objectives of NAACP are to ensure the political, educational, social and economic equality of all

citizens; to achieve equality of rights and eliminate racial prejudice among the citizens of the United States; to remove all barriers of racial discrimination through democratic processes; to seek enactment and enforcement of federal, state and local laws securing civil rights; to inform the public of the adverse effects of racial discrimination and to seek its elimination; to educate persons as to their constitutional rights and to take all lawful action to secure the exercise thereof.

The **National Association of Consumer Advocates (NACA)** is a national nonprofit association of private and public sector attorneys, legal service attorneys, law professors and law students committed to representing consumers' interests. NACA's mission is to promote justice for all consumers by maintaining a forum for information-sharing among advocates across the country and to serve as a voice for its members in its work to curb unfair and abusive business practices, including predatory lending and other conduct that adversely affect consumers.

National Association for Latino Community Asset Builders (NALCAB) represents and serves a geographically and ethnically diverse group of more than 120 non-profit community development and asset-building organizations that are anchor institutions in our nation's Latino communities. Members of the NALCAB Network are real estate developers, business lenders, economic development corporations, credit unions, and consumer counseling agencies, operating in 40 states and DC.

National Coalition for Asian Pacific American Community Development (National CAPACD) is a progressive coalition of local organizations that advocate for and organize in low-income AAPI communities and neighborhoods. We strengthen and mobilize our members to build power nationally and further our vision of economic and social justice for all. Our members include more than 100 community-based organizations in 21 states and the Pacific Islands. They implement innovative affordable housing, community development and community organizing strategies to improve the quality of life for low-income AAPI communities.

U.S. PIRG, the federation of state Public Interest Research Groups, is a consumer group that stands up to powerful interests whenever they threaten our health and safety, our financial security, or our right to fully participate in our democratic society. It is part of The Public Interest Network, which operates and supports organizations committed to a shared vision of a better world and a strategic approach to getting things done.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction and Overview	6
II.	The FDIC lacks authority under Section 27 or 24(j) of the FDIA to establish permissible rates for non-banks.....	8
	A. FDIA Section 27 does not provide the FDIC the authority to establish permissible rates for non-banks.....	8
	B. Section 27 does not incorporate a right of assignment that allows a bank to assign the bank’s statutory rate exportation privileges to a non-bank.	10
	C. The oversimplification in the proposed rule highlights the FDIC’s lack of authority.....	14
	D. The FDIA’s preemptive force is limited.....	16
	E. Dodd-Frank limits on the OCC’s authority reinforce the FDIC’s lack of authority to regulate interest rates of non-banks.	17
	F. Section 24(j) is unambiguously limited to state banks, not non-banks, and does not extend to assignees.	19
III.	The FDIC wholly fails to show that preempting state usury law is necessary for the stability or liquidity of loan markets or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the FDIA.....	20
	A. Introduction	20
	B. Sales to debt buyers.....	22
	C. Securitization of bank loans.....	23
	D. Assignment to online lenders otherwise subject to state law.....	25
IV.	The FDIC’s claim that this proposal will benefit consumers through access to credit is both irrelevant to the FDIC’s authority to regulate non-banks, and misguided and dangerous.	26
V.	The proposal usurps the States’ historical and constitutional role in our federalist system.	28
VI.	The proposal fails to consider the risk it poses to consumers and small businesses.	31
	A. The proposal fails to consider that bad actors are already engaged in predatory rent-a-bank schemes, which the FDIC and OCC are not restraining.	32
	B. The FDIC is supporting predatory rent-a-bank lending in the small business area.	34
	C. The proposal fails to consider payday lenders’ explicit plans in California to broadly expand rent-a-bank schemes, as well as other potential schemes that the proposal would embolden.....	38
	D. The proposal fails to consider the impact of auto title lending through rent-a-bank schemes.....	42
	E. The proposal’s statement that it does not address “true lender” is cold comfort as the proposal effectively encourages, rather than guards against, evasion of state law through rent-a-bank schemes.	43
	F. The proposal fails to consider that it could encourage short-term payday lenders to return to rent-a-bank lending.....	44

G. The proposal fails to consider that high-cost lenders that are or will be engaged in rent-a-bank lending make loans that severely harm financially vulnerable consumers.....	46
1. Harm in general.....	46
2. Particular harm to communities of color.....	60
H. The proposal is inconsistent with the agency’s obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act.	62
VII. The FDIC fails to consider the risks the proposal poses to the safety and soundness of State-chartered banks, despite having long acknowledged the risks of predatory lending.	62
VIII. The FDIC fails to consider the proposal’s impact on market participants that comply with state law.....	65
IX. Conclusion.....	65

Appendix A: NCLC Fact Sheet: Stop Payday Lenders’ Rent-a-Bank Schemes

Appendix B: Individual Borrower Experiences with Payday and Car Title Loans (Short- and Longer-Term Loans)

I. Introduction and Overview

We, the consumer and civil rights groups named above, write to strongly oppose the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)'s proposed rule on Federal Interest Rate Authority (proposal or proposed rule).¹ The proposed rule would allow predatory non-bank lenders to route their loans through banks to evade state interest rate caps. The proposal is outside the FDIC's statutory authority; it is not justified by any evidence of problematic impact on legitimate bank operations; and the FDIC has failed to consider the strong likelihood that the proposal will unleash a torrent of predatory lending. The proposal will take away powers that states have had since the time of the American Revolution to protect their residents.

Our concerns are not speculative. The FDIC has directly supported the claim that a predatory non-bank lender, World Business Lenders, can charge 120% APR on a \$550,000 loan despite Colorado law to the contrary. In that context, the FDIC used the same Chicken Little claims and revisionist history it uses to justify this proposal. The FDIC failed to restrain FDIC-supervised Bank of Lake Mills from fronting for WBL on similarly abusive loans. In the consumer space, predatory rent-a-bank lending is happening through several FDIC-regulated banks: payday installment lending at rates of 99-160% APR, and auto title lending through one bank at rates up to 222% APR. More FDIC-supervised banks are likely to follow if this proposal is finalized.

Some online lenders are responsible market participants, complying with applicable law, not evading state interest rate limits, and succeeding through efficiencies in operations, customer acquisition, and underwriting. But others seek competitive advantage by avoiding state usury laws. Some flood the market with loans at interest rates and fees of 60% to 180% APR or higher that most states ban. State-regulated lenders are increasingly looking to federal bank regulators to help them avoid state laws against high-cost loans and predatory lending.

This proposal comes as non-bank lenders have been clamoring for ways to avoid state interest rate limits.² It follows on the heels of the OCC's attempt, which has failed to date, to allow non-bank lenders to evade state rate caps through a special purpose charter under the National Bank Act (NBA).³ The OCC and FDIC are now offering non-bank lenders another approach to avoiding state law, namely the so-called "bank partnership model," which this proposal threatens to endorse by broadly validating a wide array of arrangements by which a non-bank might assert a bank's exemption from state usury law.

The loans this proposal would encourage by facilitating rent-a-bank schemes are among the most exorbitantly priced, irresponsible, ugly loans on the market. These include the loans currently being

¹ 84 Fed. Reg. 66845 (Dec. 6, 2019).

² See, e.g., Jeremy T. Rosenblum, *FDIC seeks comment on small-dollar lending*, Ballard Spahr's Consumer Finance Monitor, Nov. 15, 2018, <https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/11/15/fdic-seeks-comments-on-small-dollar-lending/> (noting that the "most significant[]" outcome of the FDIC's 2018 Request for Information on Small Dollar Lending would be its explicit approval of non-bank/bank arrangements "despite 'true lender' and *Madden* arguments to the contrary"); Comments to FDIC on its Request for Information on Small Dollar Lending from the Online Lenders Alliance (Jan. 2019) ("The FDIC Should Address existing Legal Impediments to the Bank-Fintech Partnership Model in Order to Facilitate Small Dollar Lending").

³ See *Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency* (No. 18-cv-8377) (ruling in favor of the NY Dept. of Financial Services in striking down the OCC's special purpose charter for "fintechs"). The OCC is appealing the decision.

peddled through these schemes: high-cost installment loans and lines of credit, typically directly accessing the borrower's checking account on payday; car title installment loans; subprime business loans; and mortgages masquerading as business loans. In addition, the proposal could bring back the rent-a-bank balloon-payment payday and car title loans that have not used rent-a-bank schemes since the mid-2000s but that used the same legal arguments and similar arrangements to justify their schemes. This risk is particularly great if the FDIC weakens or rescinds its 2005 and 2013 guidances addressing payday lending.

Our comment makes the following points in turn:

- The FDIC lacks authority under Section 27 or 24(j) the FDIA to establish permissible rates for non-banks.
- The FDIC wholly fails to show that preempting state usury law is necessary for the stability or liquidity of loan markets or to avoid frustrating the purpose of the FDIA.
- The FDIC's claim that the proposal will benefit consumers through access to credit is both irrelevant to the FDIC's authority to regulate non-banks, and misguided and dangerous.
- The proposal usurps the States' historical and constitutional role in our federalist system.
- The FDIC fails to consider the risks the proposal poses to consumers and small businesses:
 - Bad actors are already engaged in predatory rent-a-bank schemes, which the FDIC and OCC are not restraining.
 - The FDIC is supporting predatory rent-a-bank lending in the small business area.
 - Payday lenders in California have explicitly stated plans to broadly expand rent-a-bank schemes; the proposal would embolden these and other new schemes.
 - The proposal would embolden additional auto title lending through rent-a-bank schemes.
 - The proposal's statement that it does not address "true lender" is cold comfort, as the proposal effectively encourages, rather than guards against, evasion of state law through rent-a-bank schemes.
 - The proposal could encourage short-term payday lenders to return to rent-a-bank lending, especially if the FDIC weakens or rescinds its 2005 and 2013 guidances addressing payday lending.
 - The proposal fails to consider that high-cost lenders that are or will be engaged in rent-a-bank lending make loans that severely harm financially vulnerable consumers.
 - The proposal is inconsistent with the agency's obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act.

- The FDIC fails to consider the risks the proposal poses to the safety and soundness of state-chartered banks.
- The FDIC fails to consider the proposal’s impact on market participants that comply with state law.

II. The FDIC lacks authority under Section 27 or 24(j) of the FDIA to establish permissible rates for non-banks.

A. FDIA Section 27 does not provide the FDIC the authority to establish permissible rates for non-banks.

Section 27 does not provide the FDIC the authority to establish permissible interest rates for non-banks. Rather, it unambiguously sets interest rates only for “State-chartered insured depository institutions, including insured savings banks, or insured branches of foreign banks.”⁴ It says nothing whatsoever about rates that any non-bank entity may charge or that the assignees of a bank may charge. As the interest rate that a State-chartered depository may charge is not at issue in the proposal, Section 27 provides no authority here. (Indeed, Section 27 does not even give the FDIC the authority to regulate the interest rates that banks may charge; the statute sets that rate based on two external measures over which the FDIC has no discretion: the state’s home state rate or a federal benchmark.)

The Third Circuit and numerous other courts have observed that the application of Section 27 of the FDIA is limited to banks themselves in the context of rejecting arguments that the FDIA either completely preempts⁵ or provides a substantive defense⁶ to usury claims against non-bank assignees. Yet that is exactly what the FDIC is trying to achieve here: preemption of state usury claims against non-bank assignees.⁷ Courts have rejected similar arguments that Section 85 of the NBA provides complete preemption or a substantive preemption defense of state law claims against non-bank assignees.⁸ As the

⁴ 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a). *See also* 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g) (preempting state usury laws regarding the interest “a savings association may charge”).

⁵ *In re Community Bank*, 418 F.3d 277, 296 (3d Cir. 2005); *Community State Bank v. Knox*, 523 Fed. Appx. 925 (4th Cir. 2013) (no complete preemption where consumer asserts claims against parties other than the bank, here payday lenders who claimed to be agents of an out-of-state bank); *Flowers v. EZPawn Okla., Inc.*, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (“The question of whether plaintiff’s state law claims would be preempted by DIDA if brought against County Bank, however, is not the issue before the Court The state action claims are asserted against EZPawn and EZCorp, neither of which is a state-chartered, federally insured (or national) bank.”).

⁶ *See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker*, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), *reh’g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006); *Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc.*, 2016 WL 183289 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016).

⁷ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66849 (“Through the proposed regulations implementing section 27, the FDIC would reaffirm the enforceability of a loan’s interest rate by an assignee of a State bank and reaffirm its position that the preemptive power of section 27 extends to such transactions.”).

⁸ *Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc.*, 188 F.Supp.2d 1281 (D. Colo. 2002) (no complete preemption because “the NBA ‘regulates national banks and only national banks’” (quoting *Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia*, 358 F.Supp.684, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1973))); *Eul v. Transworld Sys.*, 2017 WL 1178537 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2017) (denying motion to dismiss; “it is not so clear that NBA preemption applies to assignees of loans originated by national banks The Court is not persuaded that NBA preemption applies here as a matter of law.”); *Goleta*

Third Circuit stated: “Sections 85 and 86 of the NBA and Section 521 of the DIDA apply only to national and state chartered banks, not to non-bank purchasers of second mortgage loans.”⁹ Even where courts find preemption, it is because the facts show that the bank is the real party in interest.¹⁰

Further, in the very same legislation that created Section 27, Congress explicitly preempted state law for non-banks in the context of first lien mortgages, including when non-banks are assignees of bank loans.¹¹ Congress’s specific action in this context indicates a lack of authority for the FDIC to act more broadly under Section 27. It also makes clear that, had Congress subsequently or otherwise intended to preempt state law for non-banks in other contexts, it would have. The NBA and FDIA have no such provision and there is no evidence that the purported “valid-when-made” theory, discussed below in section B, was incorporated into interest rate provisions that are strictly about banks.

Even to the extent that, as the FDIC proposal observes, Section 27 of FDIA “is patterned after and interpreted in the same manner as Section 85” of the NBA,¹² Section 85 of the NBA does not give the OCC the authority to regulate non-banks.¹³ Likewise, Section 27 cannot confer upon the FDIC the authority to regulate non-banks.

That Section 85 does not extend to non-banks is reinforced by other statutory provisions. After federal preemption played a major role in creating the financial crisis of 2008, Congress amended the NBA to add 12 U.S.C. § 25b, which makes clear that Section 85 does not extend to bank affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents. It defies logic that Congress would have intended it to extend to unaffiliated non-banks.¹⁴ While Section 25b does not alter or affect the authority of a “national bank” to make loans under Section 85, the section makes no reference to any authority of non-bank assignees to charge interest.¹⁵ Indeed, the few courts that have found preemption of state usury laws in situations involving assignees

National Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D.N.C. 2002) (granting motion to dismiss action by payday lender, who claimed to be bank agent, seeking to enjoin state enforcement action because “the NBA patently does not apply to non-national banks”).

⁹ *In re Community Bank*, 418 F.3d 277, 296 (3d Cir. 2005).

¹⁰ See *Krispin v. May Department Store*, 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); *Discover Bank v. Vaden*, 489 F.3d 594, 601 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding bank is real party in interest, but if it is not, “the FDIA does not apply because [the named defendant] is not a bank”), *rev’d and remanded*, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); see also *CashCall, Inc. v. Morrissey*, 2014 WL 2404300 (W. Va. May 30, 2014) (noting that the parties agree that the claims against the purported bank agent would be preempted if the bank were the true lender but it was not).

¹¹ 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C)(v). See also S. REP. 96-368, 1980 U.S.C.A.N. 236, 254-55 (1980) (“It is the committee’s intent that loans originated under this usury exemption will not be subject to claims of usury even if they are later sold to an investor who is not exempt under this section.”).

¹² FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66845; *id.* at 66847 (“courts and the FDIC have consistently construed section 27 *in pari materia* with section 85.”).

¹³ See Comments of the undersigned groups to the OCC on its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, Jan. 22, 2020, https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/comment_to_occ_on_rent_a_bank_plan_with_appendices.pdf.

¹⁴ 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2), (3), and (h)(2).

¹⁵ 12 U.S.C. § 25b(f).

generally did so in a context where the assignee was related to the bank *and* before Congress overturned preemption for subsidiaries, affiliates and agents.¹⁶ Thus, to the extent the FDIC looks to Section 85 as analogous, Section 85 is limited by Section 25b and does not support a broad interpretation of Section 27 to reach interest charges by non-banks.

Section 85 and Section 27 have nothing to do with non-banks. Further, federal preemption is part and parcel with the obligation to submit to federal supervision. Once a loan is assigned, there is no federal bank supervision of the assignee. The legislative drafters certainly did not contemplate non-banks as beneficiaries of interest rate preemption.

B. Section 27 does not incorporate a right of assignment that allows a bank to assign the bank's statutory rate exportation privileges to a non-bank.

The FDIC proposal seeks to write into Section 27 a right for banks to assign to non-banks the right to charge rates permitted State banks under that section. The FDIC makes a number of dramatic leaps in its reasoning that far outstretch the meaning of the statute and overstate the agency's authority.

First, the FDIC claims that the power to make loans "implicitly" carries with it the power to assign loans, "and thus, a State bank's statutory authority under Section 27 to make loans at particular rates necessarily includes the power to assign the loans at those rates."¹⁷ But Section 27 has nothing to do with the right to assign loans or even the power to make loans; it is about what interest rates the *bank* can charge. State-chartered banks do have the power to assign loans, but it comes from their state charters, not from Section 27. The FDIC acknowledges as much, stating that the "inherent authority of State banks to assign loans that they make is consistent with State banking laws, which typically grant State banks the power to sell or transfer loans . . ."¹⁸ The FDIC seeks to transform power granted by state law into an "inherent authority" under an unrelated provision of federal law—and then to turn that power back on states by preempting their laws. The FDIC also cites the power of national banks under the National Bank Act, but that too has nothing to do with what Section 27 authorizes. The FDIC's resort to the "implicit" and "inherent" authority under Section 27 is essentially an admission that the authority does not reside in that section.

The FDIC claims that "[d]enying an assignee the right to enforce a loan's terms would effectively prohibit assignment and render the power to make the loan at the rate provided by the statute illusory."¹⁹ Even if this were true, it would only prohibit assignment—a right not governed by Section 27—not the right to charge the rates authorized by Section 27. But the claim that limiting the rate that a non-bank assignee may charge would completely prevent assignment is absurd. Enforcing the state law to which the non-bank is subject may affect the price of the sale, but it would not "effectively prohibit" it, as discussed in section III.C below.

The FDIC then states that the "ability of a non-bank assignee to enforce interest-rate terms is also

¹⁶ See, e.g., *Krispin v. May Department Stores*, 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000).

¹⁷ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66848.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

consistent with fundamental principles of contract law.”²⁰ Again, even if this were true as applied to a situation where the assignee is subject to different laws, that does not mean that the common law of assignment is incorporated into Section 27. Nor do state contract law principles give the FDIC any authority to issue the proposed rule or to preempt state usury laws. The FDIC acknowledges as much, stating that the “FDIC’s interpretation of Section 27 . . . is not based on the common law ‘valid when made’ rule”²¹

The FDIC’s view of the so-called “valid-when-made” rule is thus irrelevant to this rulemaking or to the FDIC’s authority. But to the extent the FDIC somehow relies on it, we will address the issue.

The proposal asserts that, since common law generally allows assignment of contract rights, common law provides banks the right to assign their *status* derived from a federal statute. This is not so. The common law governs only rights under the contract, not rights under the law that are outside the contract. The bank’s status as a depository institution and its exemption from state law is not an assignable contract right. It is a privilege State-chartered banks enjoy, provided by Section 27 of the FDIA, because they are federally insured banks. OCC Comptroller Hawke described the nature of this privilege in 2002; though he was discussing national banks, his point applies to State-chartered banks as well—particularly in light of Section 27’s being “patterned after and interpreted in the same manner as section 85”²²:

The benefit that national banks enjoy by reason of [preemption] cannot be treated as a piece of disposable property that a bank may rent out to a third party that is not a national bank. Preemption is not like excess space in a bank-owned office building. It is an inalienable right of the bank itself.²³

Just because something is legal under a contract for one party does not mean that it is legal for an assignee:

- Banks may accept deposits, but they could not assign a deposit agreement to a non-bank and thereby give it the legal right to accept deposits and receive deposit insurance.
- A doctor may sell her medical practice in State A, but a doctor from State B would not be able to exercise his rights to the practice if he does not have a license in State A.
- Someone who is ineligible for or has failed to follow the requirements for a license to run a food service business cannot get into that business by purchasing a restaurant contract with a mall and arguing that the contract gives them the right to run the restaurant.
- State-licensed lenders typically have the authority to charge interest rates above the baseline usury rate, but that privilege may come with the requirement of state approval, due diligence vetting, bonding requirements, state supervision, and reporting requirements. States will not

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Id.*

²² FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66845.

²³ Remarks by John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Women in Housing and Finance at 10 (Feb. 12, 2002), <https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech-2002-10.pdf>.

necessarily allow a licensed lender to simply originate and then assign a loan to an unlicensed entity that does not have authority to lend, collect or service loans in the state.²⁴

And just because a contract has a term, and contracts are generally enforceable, does not mean that every contractual term is enforceable. Usury laws exist to protect borrowers from lenders' overreaching regardless of the rate at which the parties could otherwise contract.²⁵

The cases that the FDIC cites in support of "valid-when-made" are interpreting state usury law, which the FDIC lacks the authority to interpret—not federal banking law. There is not the slightest bit of evidence that Congress incorporated those principles into the rate exportation provisions of the NBA or FDIA, which, as discussed above, are strictly limited to the rates that banks can charge. Indeed, the preemption caselaw mentioned above says the opposite: that the NBA and FDIA are limited to the interest rates that banks can charge, not their assignees.

Moreover, the purported valid-when-made cases the agency cites as support do not even stand for the principle that the FDIC claims. Two 19th Century Supreme Court cases interpreting state usury laws, *Nichols v. Fearson* and *Gaither v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank of Georgetown*, merely hold that the interest rate on a loan will not be *recalculated*—potentially resulting in a higher, usurious rate—based on subsequent transactions.²⁶ This means, for example, that a loan at a legal rate will not become usurious later if it is sold at a discount (so that the effective rate of return for the purchaser is higher than for the original lender) or if a note is pledged as security for a second, usurious transaction.²⁷

Neither of those cases addresses the situation where the assignee is subject to a different set of laws—and whether that differential legal treatment can be assigned—much less whether a state-regulated lender governed by state usury law may be assigned a loan at the rate permitted only to the assignor. Indeed, this situation would have rarely existed prior to the enactment of the NBA and, in practice, did

²⁴ Indeed, in the OCC's proposal, it acknowledged three exceptions to this "normal" rule of assignability, one of which is where the contract involves "obligations of a personal nature." OCC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 64239 (citing Williston on Contracts § 74:10 (4th ed.)). The other two exceptions noted are where the assignment would materially change the duty of the obligor or materially increase the obligor's burden or risk under the contract. *Id.* Though the bank's preemptive status is a right of the bank and not an obligation, the notion is informative. It is a right "personal" to the national bank derived exclusively from its status as a national bank, and it may not be assigned.

²⁵ Indeed, longstanding common law and usury jurisprudence holds that, in any event, contracts designed to evade state interest rate limits are unenforceable. *Miller v. Tiffany*, 68 U.S. 298, 307–10, 17 L. Ed. 540 (1863) (holding that while contractual choice of law provisions for usury are enforceable, when done with intent to evade the law, the law of the contract location applies). *See also Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co.*, 274 U.S. 403, 408, 47 S. Ct. 626, 628, 71 L. Ed. 1123 (1927) (echoing holding in *Miller v. Tiffany* that "the parties must act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction must not 'disguise its real character'"); *Stoddard v. Thomas*, 60 Pa. Super. 177, 181 (1915) (noting that in deciding choice of law provisions, "[a] person may contract to pay at the rate of interest of the place of the contract or the place of performance unless the place is fixed to escape the usury laws").

²⁶ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. 66848, n.35 (citing *Nichols v. Fearson*, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) and *Gaither v. Farmers & Mechs. Bank of Georgetown*, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 37, 43 (1828)).

²⁷ For a longer discussion, see Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Adam J. Levitin In Support Of Appellant, *Rent-Rite Super Kegs West., Ltd.*, No. 1:19-cv-01552-REB (D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2019).

not become an issue until the 1978 *Marquette* decision; before then, banks were subject to state interest rate laws in the states where they made loans.

Two more recent cases the FDIC cites in support of its “valid when made” proposal similarly shed no light on the ability to assign immunity from the law. *FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.*²⁸ dealt only with whether a choice of law provision in the contract becomes invalid as the result of a partial assignment of a note to a national bank. The court applied the “normal choice of law rules.”²⁹

The cited portion of *FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr. Co.* merely states that a borrower’s voluntary action in delaying payment does not make the loan usurious.³⁰ The loan in *Tito* “was at all times below the Puerto Rico usury ceiling.”³¹ Another case the FDIC cites involving an assignee is an interpretation of one particular state law, not an interpretation of the NBA or FDIA, and does not support the FDIC’s assertion of authority to preempt state usury law through the instant rule.³²

Indeed, despite the hysteria over *Madden* supposedly overturning a cardinal rule of usury, the Second Circuit in *Madden* did not even address what state usury law permits or whether New York usury applied (as opposed to Delaware law, which does not limit interest rates, as specified in the contract).³³ Rather, it addressed whether, under *federal* law, national bank interest rate preemption applied to assignees (holding it does not) and whether the preemption standard that otherwise applies to national banks (NBA Section 25) was met in the context of debt buyers (holding it was not). The valid-when-made issue, on the other hand, is one of the interpretation of state law, not federal.³⁴

²⁸ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. 66848, n.35 (citing *FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.*, 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1981)) (“a contract which in its inception is unaffected by usury can never be invalidated by any subsequent ... transaction.”).

²⁹ *Lattimore*, 656 F.2d at 148.

³⁰ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. 66848, n.35 (citing *FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr. Co.*, 548 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (D.P.R. 1982)). The court states: “[I]t was only as a consequence of defendant’s election to delay in repaying the principal amount of those [demand] notes that an effective rate of interest in excess of the Puerto Rico statutory ceiling may have resulted.” *FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr. Co.*, 548 F. Supp. at 1226.

³¹ *Id.*

³² *Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C.*, 431 F.3d 285, 286, 289 (7th Cir. 2005) (interpreting Illinois law). In *Rent-Rite Super Kegs West. Ltd.*, 603 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019), the court, like the FDIC, relied on cases interpreting state laws; misinterpreted the older usury cases that do not address whether an assignee is subject to a different set of laws; cited pre-Dodd-Frank cases dealing with subsidiaries; and relied on other inapposite cases. In *Phipps v. F.D.I.C.*, 417 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2005), the bank itself, and not the non-bank, was the entity that charged the interest. *FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp.*, 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1981), held that state usury laws are not preempted when the bank is an assignee, not the originator.

³³ In *Madden*, after finding that the NBA did not preempt state usury laws as applied to debt buyers, the Second Circuit remanded to the district court to address the usury law issue of whether the account’s choice of law provision (Delaware law) determined the relevant state usury cap or whether New York’s criminal usury statute applied. 786 F.3d at 254. The Seventh Circuit allowed a debt buyer to charge the rates allowed for its assignor, but did so as a matter of Illinois law, not rate exportation. See *Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C.*, 431 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2005).

³⁴ The Second Circuit asked, first, does the NBA’s preemption provision address the interest rates that non-bank assignees may charge? The answer under the NBA, and also under the FDIA, is clearly no. The court next,

Finally, the FDIC claims that it is filling a “statutory gap” because “Section 27 does not state at what point in time the permissibility of interest should be determined in order to assess whether a State bank is taking or receiving interest in compliance with section 27.”³⁵ The FDIC notes that situations may arise after a contract has been made, such as a change of usury laws in the state in which the bank is located, or a change in the Federal commercial paper rate. This reasoning shows the extent to which the FDIC is grasping at straws. The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from impairing the obligation of contracts,³⁶ so a state could not reduce its usury rate and then apply the lower rate retroactively to existing contracts.

To the extent that the FDIC is merely addressing what rate a *bank* may charge under Section 27, it may look to the interpretation of state usury laws in coming up with a reasonable interpretation of Section 27 as to the bank. But the only relevant statutory gap in Section 27 for purposes of this rulemaking is a complete gap in the FDIC’s authority to set the rates for non-banks. Contrary to the FDIC’s claim, it is quite clear under Section 27 at what point in time the Section 27 rate ceases to determine the permissible rate: once the bank is no longer charging the interest.

C. The oversimplification in the proposed rule highlights the FDIC’s lack of authority.

As proposed, even the part of proposed 331.4(e) not addressing sale or assignment is an oversimplified and overbroad attempt to distill centuries of common law in a number of different contexts into a single sentence with a single conclusion: “Whether interest on a loan is permissible under section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act is determined as of the date the loan was made.”

As proposed, the rule would seem to suggest that the interest rate is permissible even if the bank later raises it above the usury rate. But this should not be permitted. For example, in a low rate environment, a bank may peg a loan’s adjustable interest rate to an index with no cap; if an increase in that index later raises the rate on the loan above the rate permitted under federal law, the bank should not be permitted to charge interest in excess of that usury limit.

Or, what if the bank later charged a fee that was determined, under the law of the bank’s home state, to be “interest” and thus to push the rate above the state usury cap? Some of the so-called “valid-when-made” cases are really about whether a fee such as a late fee is interest. States may say it is not, and that a consumer’s later choice to pay late does not make a loan, valid at its inception, usurious. But in some states, or in some situations—i.e., when a late fee is planned and is really an evasion³⁷—a late fee

addressing the preemption standard that otherwise applies to national banks, asked if applying state usury laws to the non-bank assignees in *Madden* (debt buyers) would significantly interfere with the powers of a national bank. The answer is clearly no. As discussed below, there are even fewer grounds to extend preemption to a state-chartered bank as *Barnett Bank* preemption does not apply. Third, the Second Circuit asked what does state usury law and state choice-of-law law permit. Those are state law issues outside the FDIC’s authority.

³⁵ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66848.

³⁶ U.S. Const’n, Art. I, Section 10, Clause 1.

³⁷ S.D. Dep’t of Labor & Reg’n, Div. of Banking, *In the Matter of Dollar Loan Center of South Dakota, LLC*, Order No 2017-2, Cease and Desist and License Revocation Order (finding payday lender’s late fee, which accounting for 90.22 percent of the income from the loans, to be interest violating the state’s new usury cap), https://dlr.sd.gov/news/releases17/nr091317_dollar_loan_center_order.pdf; *Metro Hauling, Inc. v. Daffern*, 723 P.2d 32 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (addition of a default interest rate to a contract after the consumer has already

or some other type of fee charged later may in fact be interest that must fall under the usury cap. What if the contract says that the consumer has the option of paying a fee in the future—so that the fee is not deemed to be interest—but later facts show that the fee was really required?³⁸

Case law provides real examples of loans that were found usurious due to subsequent events. For example, one court stated the general rule that “the contract must in its inception require a payment of usury or it will not be held a violation of the statute and it may not be judged after some default of the borrower, which default alone authorizes penalties or forfeitures which, if exacted in the beginning, would have been a violation of the statute.”³⁹ But the court also noted that a later payment of accelerated interest “does not invalidate the note *unless* the clause is so used or abused as to make the charge for the use of the money greater than the rate of interest allowed by the statute.”⁴⁰ That is, in some circumstances a later event or charge *can* make a loan usurious that was not usurious at inception.

Similarly, another court stated the general rule—one of the situations covered by the principle that later events do not make a loan usurious—that a contingent payment generally does not make a loan usurious even if a later contingent payment gives the creditor a higher rate than the usury rate.⁴¹ But the court noted that because the contingency in the instant case—inflation—was likely, not remote, and because the inflationary charges did in fact push the rate above the usury rate, then an extra charge pegged to applying inflation to the loan principal was usurious: “Because the stated interest rate of the loan was the maximum allowed under the Pennsylvania usury law,... this extra charge was usurious.”⁴²

These are just a few of the myriad of situations that courts—when interpreting state usury laws— have grappled with. In many of those cases, courts have recited the principle that the FDIC labels “valid-when-made.” But the result is not always to find that a loan is not usurious.

The FDIC does not have the authority to reduce all of these complicated scenarios under state law to a single federal rule that says that no matter what happens in the future, no matter what how the bank changes the rate or no matter what rates or fees it imposes in the future, there is never usury.

defaulted is usury if rate exceeds usury cap, as there is no contingency at that point); *Loigman v. Keim*, 594 A.2d 1364 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (dicta) (usury statute does not apply to interest on defaulted obligations, but that narrow exception does not apply where default is expected); *see also Souden v. Souden*, 844 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (finding evidence insufficient to determine whether sporadically imposed charges were late charges or interest).

³⁸ *See, e.g., Penny Crosman, A payday lender in disguise? New York investigates the Earnin app*, American Banker (April 3, 2019) (New York Department of Financial Services investigating Earnin for disclosing that it charges no fees or interest, while restricting users’ credit limits when they do not pay “tips”).

³⁹ *Unity Plan Fin. Co. v. Green*, 179 La. 1070, 1083, 155 So. 900, 905 (1934) (quoting *Sharp v. Mortgage Security Corporation of America*, 215 Cal. 287, 9 P.2d) 819, 820 (1932)).

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 1087 (emphasis added).

⁴¹ *Olwine v. Torrens*, 2344 A.2d 665, 667 (Pa. 1975).

⁴² *Id.*

Indeed, the proposed federal rule is especially overreaching given that state-chartered banks are governed by their *home state's usury laws*, not the FDIC's. The FDIC has no authority to preempt the home state's usury laws if those laws make subsequent events relevant in some situations.

D. The FDIA's preemptive force is limited.

The FDIA's regulation of federally insured state-chartered depositories is limited and has a narrow preemptive scope.⁴³ Federal regulation of state-chartered depositories is minimal.⁴⁴ The FDIA created the FDIC for the purpose of protecting consumers from failed banks by making deposit insurance available.⁴⁵ That purpose is unlikely to conflict with state law, and courts have been reluctant to find that the FDIA preempts state law because states retain primary authority over state banks and savings associations.⁴⁶

Courts have also held that the FDIC's opinions on matters of preemption are not entitled to deference,⁴⁷ a conclusion that is all the more sound in light of Congress's decision to clarify that the OCC's preemption determinations are not entitled to deference. In discussing the FDIA's rate exportation provisions, a number of courts have discussed the limited nature of FDIA preemption in concluding that the FDIA does not completely preempt state law claims.⁴⁸

⁴³ *Thomas v. US Bank*, 575 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding "a close examination of the statutory language indicates Congress very clearly intended the preemptive scope of DIDA to be limited to particular circumstances"); *BankWest, Inc. v. Baker*, 411 F.3d 1289 (2005), *reh'g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006); *see also* FDIC General Counsel Letter 02-06 (Dec. 19, 2002) (Michigan retail installment act was not preempted except for the interest rates), <https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-10180.html>.

⁴⁴ *See, e.g.*, FDIC Senior Deputy General Counsel Letter (Sept. 12, 2003), *available online in supplemental materials to NCLC*, Consumer Credit Regulation (2d ed. 2015), *updated at* www.nclc.org/library, <https://library.nclc.org/sites/default/files/FDIC-ltr-06.pdf> ("The FDIC, however, does not routinely examine institutions for compliance with state laws, and the enforcement of state laws is not a primary focus of the FDIC's supervisory activities.").

⁴⁵ *BankWest, Inc. v. Baker*, 411 F.3d 1289, 1301-02 & n.22 (2005), *reh'g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006); *Griner v. Synovus Bank*, 818 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2011).

⁴⁶ *See, e.g.*, *BankWest Inc.*, 411 F.3d at 1301-02 & n.22, *reh'g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006); *Griner*, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.

⁴⁷ *BankWest, Inc.*, 411 F.3d at 1301-02 & n.22; *Griner*, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.

⁴⁸ *Thomas v. US Bank*, 575 F.3d 794, 798-99 (8th Cir. 2009) (Missouri law claims involving fees on second mortgages charged by California-chartered bank not preempted; both the substantive and remedy provisions of DIDA "clearly indicate[] the limited nature of the federal statute's preemption of state law"); *Robinson v. First Hawaiian Bank*, 2017 WL 3641564 at *6 (D. Haw. Aug. 24, 2017) (no complete preemption of overdraft fee claims because under DIDA "state law is preempted *only if* and when a specific interest rate comparison test is met" (original emphasis)); *Griner v. Synovus Bank*, 818 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (finding no complete preemption of claims involving overdraft fees where the language of DIDA "underscores the narrowness of the preemptive effect"), *appeal after remand*, 739 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no substantive preemption). Complete preemption is a doctrine that converts a plaintiff's state law claim into one under federal law for purposes of federal court jurisdiction.

In addition, the FDIA's rate exportation provision applies only to interest rates and related fees, and not to licensing laws, loan terms unrelated to the interest rate, or most other state consumer credit laws.⁴⁹ Thus, federal authority to export rates "does not prevent states from enforcing consumer protection and lending laws other than interest-rate related limitations."⁵⁰ It is possible that a state's own usury laws may give a non-bank assignee of a state-chartered bank the right to charge the contract rate.⁵¹ But the FDIC has no power to compel that result.

E. Dodd-Frank limits on the OCC's authority reinforce the FDIC's lack of authority to regulate interest rates of non-banks.

It is especially inappropriate for the FDIC to assert broad preemption powers—or to extend preemption to non-bank assignees—in light of Congress's rebuke in 2010 of the OCC's preemption activities, "which [Congress] believed planted the seeds 'for long-term trouble in the national banking system.'⁵² "[T]he simple failure of federal regulators to stop abusive lending"⁵³ had been "a major cause" of "a financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. economy."⁵⁴ In the years leading up to the crisis, the OCC continued to staunchly defend preemption while ignoring the writing on the wall, clear to so many others: that foreclosures on predatory, unaffordable mortgage loans would bring the economy to its knees.⁵⁵ States had been preempted from regulating *any* mortgage lender (bank or non-bank) on the very terms that made many mortgages dangerous: balloon payments, negative amortization, variable rates, and other nontraditional terms.⁵⁶ A total of over \$700 billion in risky loans were made by entities that states could not touch. By enacting Section 25b, Congress aimed to "address an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish without State controls."⁵⁷

⁴⁹ See *BankWest, Inc.*, 411 F.3d at 1289.

⁵⁰ FDIC Chairman Powell Letter to North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper (Apr. 27, 2005), available online in supplemental materials to *NCLC*, Consumer Credit Regulation (2d ed. 2015), updated at www.nclc.org/library, <https://library.nclc.org/sites/default/files/fdic-payday-lending-042705.pdf>.

⁵¹ See, e.g., *Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C.*, 431 F.3d 285, 286, 289 (7th Cir. 2005).

⁵² *Lusnak v. Bank of America*, 883 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010)).

⁵³ *Lusnak*, 883 F.3d at 1189 (quoting The Creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency to Be the Cornerstone of America's New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 82 (2009) (Statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America)).

⁵⁴ *Lusnak*, 883 F.3d at 1189 (quoting S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010)). See also Testimony of Eric Stein, Center for Responsible Lending, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Hearing (2008), <https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/STEINTestimony101608Final.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Testimony of Martin Eakes, Center for Responsible Lending, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Hearing On The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers (2004), <https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/eakes.pdf>.

⁵⁶ See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, *The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report*, pgs. xxiii, 111-113, 126.

⁵⁷ *Lusnak*, 883 F.3d at 1189 (quoting S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 17).

Section 25b provides that “[s]tate consumer financial laws are preempted only if . . . [the law] prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”⁵⁸ It requires “substantial evidence” of that interference,⁵⁹ and imposes clear procedural requirements for reaching such conclusion.⁶⁰

But it also makes clear that OCC preemption does not extend beyond national banks. Putting the matter beyond any conceivable doubt, Congress enshrined into statute, no fewer than three separate times, the principle that state laws, including state consumer laws governing the cost of credit, apply to bank *affiliates and subsidiaries*—except for those that are themselves chartered as banks—to the same extent they apply to any other non-bank entity. Congress made clear that this is true “notwithstanding” Section 85. For example, Section 25b(e) states:

Notwithstanding any provision of [Title 62 of the Revised Statutes (which includes Section 85)]...a State consumer financial law shall apply to a subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank (other than a subsidiary or affiliate that is chartered as a national bank) to the same extent that the State consumer financial law applies to any person, corporation or other entity subject to such State law.

Section 25b(b)(2) is to similar effect:

[Title 62]...[does] not preempt, annul, or affect the applicability of any State law to any subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank (other than a subsidiary or affiliate that is chartered as a national bank).

Section 25b(h) extends this same clarification to “agents” of national banks:

Clarification of law applicable to nondepository institution subsidiaries and affiliates of national banks...

No provision of [title 62]...shall be construed as preempting, annulling, or affecting the applicability of State law to any subsidiary, affiliate, or agent of a national bank (other than a subsidiary, affiliate, or agent that is chartered as a national bank).⁶¹

Three times Congress declared this rule, and three times it articulated its sole exception (for subsidiaries or affiliates chartered as national banks).

Had Congress intended to add an exception for assignees, it would have done so—as it did in another part of the FDIA, discussed above in section II.A.⁶² The clear language of Section 25b forecloses the

⁵⁸ 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added); *see also Lusnak*, 833 F.3d at 1191-92 (Dodd-Frank made clear that *Barnett* is the legal standard for NBA preemption).

⁵⁹ 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c) (emphasis added).

⁶⁰ 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(1)(B); 25b(b)(3).

⁶¹ 12 U.S.C. § 25b(h)(2).

⁶² As noted above, under the *same* legislation that enacted Section 27 of the FDIA, Congress *did* extend mortgage preemption to nonbank entities including assignees. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f-7, 1735f- a. In fact, Section 1735f-

OCC's, and the FDIC's, attempt to write into the statute an additional exception for assignees. This would produce the nonsensical result of privileging mere contractual counterparties of national banks—or State banks—over subsidiaries, affiliates and agents of national banks—even those that are wholly owned by a national bank. No reading of the NBA or FDIA, together or apart, would support this outcome.

Thus, while Section 85 exempts *banks* from state usury limits without such a showing under 25b, it does not exempt non-banks. Moreover, Section 25b makes clear that Congress does not intend preemption to extend to any entity other than a bank. Even assuming *arguendo* that the OCC could theoretically preempt state law for some aspects of the sale of loans, there is no basis for doing so in this context of usury laws. The OCC did not engage in the required procedural requirements, and the substantive evidence would not show substantial interference with a power necessary to the business of banking. The limits on the OCC's preemptive authority reinforce the FDIC's lack of authority to promulgate the proposed rule.

F. Section 24(j) is unambiguously limited to state banks, not non-banks, and does not extend to assignees.

In addition to citing Section 27 as authority for the proposed rule, the agency also cites Section 24(j) of the FDIA. To be sure, Section 24j does not provide the FDIC with any independent authority to preempt state law or issue the proposed rule. The OCC is the only agency with the authority (limited though it is) to determine what state laws are preempted by the NBA. If those laws regard community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, or the establishment of intrastate branches are preempted, then out-of-state branches of state banks need not comply with them. But it is not within the FDIC's authority to promulgate a rule determining what laws are preempted as to national banks and thereby, by extension, to certain state bank branches.

No reading of the NBA and FDIA Section 24(j) support that the federal interest rate preemption or rate exportation should extend to non-bank assignees. Section 24(j), like Section 85 of the NBA, unambiguously does not apply to assignees, and its preemptive effect is limited by Section 25(b) just as Section 85 is.

Section 24(j)(1) provides the following, unambiguously limited to banks:

(1) Application of host State law

The laws of a host State, including laws regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate branches, shall apply to any **branch** in the host State **of an out-of-State State bank** to the same extent as such State laws apply to a branch in the host State of an out-of-State national bank. To the extent host State law is

7a(a)(1)(C)(v) refers to the specific circumstance in which a mortgage loan is sold to a nonbank investor. *See also* S. REP. 96-368, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 254-55 (1980) ("It is the committee's intent that loans originated under this usury exemption will not be subject to claims of usury even if they are later sold to an investor who is not exempt under this section."). Congress knew how to preempt usury rates for nonbank assignees, and it chose not to do so in Section 1831d.

inapplicable to a **branch of an out-of-State State bank** in such host State pursuant to the preceding sentence, home State law shall apply to such **branch**.⁶³

Congress does not address assignees in this provision, even while it did address assignees in the limited context of first lien mortgages, as discussed above. Moreover, any preemptive right a State bank derives from Section 24(j) is limited by Section 25(b)'s clarification that Section 85 does not extend to bank affiliates, subsidiaries, or agents—much less unrelated, non-bank assignees.

Finally, with respect to Section 24(j), to whatever extent the FDIC asserts that its authority to promulgate the proposed rule derives from the OCC's finalization of the OCC's proposal, the FDIC's proposal is premature.

III. The FDIC wholly fails to show that preempting state usury law is necessary for the stability or liquidity of loan markets or to avoid frustrating the purposes of the FDIA.

A. Introduction

The FDIC makes an almost casual argument that “[r]estrictions on assignees’ abilities to enforce interest rate terms would result in extremely distressed market values for many loans, frustrating the purpose of the FDI Act.”⁶⁴ The FDIC’s reference to “frustrating the purpose of the FDI Act” appears to be an attempt to make a preemption argument based on the FDIA.

Yet the FDIC does not cite to any section or purpose of the FDIA that would be frustrated. The only sections of the FDIA that it cites as authority for this rule are Sections 24(j) and 27, in addition to the general rulemaking authority of Section 10(g), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(g). But the FDIC’s general rulemaking authority must be employed to implement a provision of the FDIA. It does not give the FDIC *carte blanche* to write rules untethered to the Act—much less to preempt state law. Yet the FDIC does not cite any such provision, nor does the agency produce any evidence that any purpose of the FDIA is actually being frustrated by a state law. (The FDIC does not even cite any state law—it only focuses on the *Madden* decision, which was an interpretation of the NBA, not of a state law.)

The FDIC does have the authority to ensure the safety and soundness of the banks that it supervises and to protect the deposit fund and depositors. But the FDIC offers no remotely compelling case that the proposal or the preemption of state usury laws is necessary to protect safety and soundness.

The FDIC does not even produce any evidence of distressed markets for any loans. The FDIC’s assertion that this proposal is necessary for bank operations is based on claims that are not only irrelevant to its authority but also either clearly erroneous or plainly unsupported.

The FDIC generally notes the importance of loan sales to State banks’ operations, including liquidity and risk diversification.⁶⁵ It claims that “[u]ncertainty regarding the enforceability of interest rate terms may hinder or frustrate loan sales, which are crucial to the safety and soundness of State banks’

⁶³ 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j) (emphasis added).

⁶⁴ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66848.

⁶⁵ *Id.* at 66845.

operations.”⁶⁶ Yet despite its claim that the proposal is needed to address this uncertainty,⁶⁷ and the nearly five years since the *Madden* decision, the proposal does not claim that the *Madden* decision has had any significant impact on banks’ relationships with debt buyers or with any other market participants, let alone one that impacts safety and soundness. To the contrary, the FDIC states that it “is not aware of any widespread or significant negative effects on credit availability or securitization markets having occurred to this point as a result of the *Madden* decision.”⁶⁸

The proposal suggests that *Madden* has negatively impacted marketplace lending, but critically offers zero evidence that *Madden* has negatively impacted *banks* in the context of marketplace lending (or in any other context). The proposal notes that an analyst predicted that the Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal of *Madden* would be “generally credit negative” for marketplace loans and related asset-backed securities because it would “extend uncertainty” about the applicability of state law to these platforms.⁶⁹ But this was merely a prediction made in 2016.

The proposal states that research has found reductions of marketplace credit to “higher risk borrowers,” citing two studies.⁷⁰ One study showed a drop in marketplace lending for subprime borrowers by three lenders in the Second Circuit after the *Madden* decision, especially for those borrowers with FICO scores below 644. Again, that study does not suggest any impact on banks, as the FDIC’s proposal already acknowledges no significant impact on securitization markets. Moreover, that finding was about a tiny part of the marketplace loan market; the study showed that these lenders offered only miniscule amounts of credit in the low FICO range even before the *Madden* decision.⁷¹ To the extent that *Madden* made it harder to offer high-cost loans in the tens of thousands of dollar range typical of marketplace lenders to borrowers already overburdened with credit, that is probably a good result from a policy perspective. And it is certainly no evidence of an impact on bank safety and soundness or other legitimate FDIC grounds for preempting state law.

The second study the proposal cites also finds a drop in marketplace lending in New York and Connecticut post-*Madden*, and particularly to lower income borrowers, yet also finds no impact on banks.⁷² Moreover, the study does not support its claimed showing of harm, bankruptcy or otherwise, as it suffers from clear methodological and interpretive errors. The study does not adjust for debt, which biases the analysis and findings, even as prior research makes clear the flaws of modeling the

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 66849.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 66850; see also *id.* at 66845 (“The FDIC is not aware of any broad effects on credit availability having occurred as a result of *Madden*.”).

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 66850 (citing Moody’s).

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 66850, n. 46.

⁷¹ See Colleen Honigsberg, Robert Jackson and Richard Squire, *How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer lending? Evidence from a Natural Experiment*, *Journal of Law and Economics*, vol. 60, Fig. 4 (Before and After *Madden* Charts) (Nov 2017).

⁷² 84 Fed. Reg. at 66850, n.46 (citing Piotr Danisewicz and Ilaf Elard, *The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy* (July 5, 2018)).

bankruptcy decision without adjusting for debt, assets, and overall net-worth.⁷³ In addition, loan volume does not include mortgages, even as they relate to personal bankruptcy decisions, or other debts, despite prior marketplace loan studies finding that other debts play an important role in default.⁷⁴ Moreover, the study's use of raw numbers in the parallel trends comparisons (Figure 1) across geographic units with unequal population sizes is not suitable; per-capita measures are the appropriate unit of comparison.⁷⁵ In reality, credible research suggests that marketplace lending may deepen debt burden and lead to increased defaults on that or other debt, particularly for those who are already credit constrained.⁷⁶

Particularly in light of the lack of evidence supporting any need for the proposal, it is extraordinarily broad. Without limitation as to the parties involved, the means by which the party came to possess the debt, the purposes and circumstances surrounding the party's acquisition of the debt, the outrageousness of the interest rate, or the impact on the bank, the proposal would exempt any holder of a bank-originated debt from otherwise applicable state law. An analysis of the potential impact on different markets, which the FDIC fails to conduct in any meaningful way, shows that state usury laws as to non-bank assignees do not create any safety or soundness problems or otherwise frustrate the purposes of the FDIA.

B. Sales to debt buyers

For all of the focus on the *Madden* case, the FDIC fails to discuss the case's specific context and finding. The Second Circuit directly addressed the impact on national banks of applying state usury laws to debt buyers. The court specifically found that "state usury laws would not prevent consumer debt sales by national banks to third parties," and although "it is possible that usury laws might decrease the amount a national bank could charge for its consumer debt in certain states (i.e., those with firm usury limits like New York), such an effect would not 'significantly interfere' with the exercise of a national bank power."⁷⁷

The FDIC does not take issue with this finding. There is no evidence that the FDIC's proposal is necessary to sustain banks' business with debt buyers or their sales of debt as a liquidity and risk management

⁷³ See Fay, S., Hurst, E., and White, M., *The Household Bankruptcy Decision*, American Economic Review, 92 (3): 706-718, (2002).

⁷⁴ See Chava, S., Paradkar, N., & Zhang, Y., *Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence from Borrower Credit Dynamics* (2017); see also Wang, H., & Overby, E., *How Does Online Lending Influence Bankruptcy Filings? Evidence from a Natural Experiment*, Academy of Management Proceedings (1) : 15937 (2017).

⁷⁵ The paper suffers from additional methodological flaws, as well as inaccurate summation of findings. For example, it interprets post-*Madden* trends into the third year, but it includes no third year data.

⁷⁶ See Chava, S., Paradkar, N., & Zhang, Y., *Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence from Borrower Credit Dynamics* (2017) (finding that over time, borrowers from one large marketplace lender increased their risk of defaulting on consumer credit, and particularly so for credit constrained borrowers); see also Wang, H., & Overby, E., *How Does Online Lending Influence Bankruptcy Filings? Evidence from a Natural Experiment*, Academy of Management Proceedings (1) : 15937 (2017) (finding that state approval of one large marketplace lender leads to an increase in bankruptcy filings by leading some borrowers to overextend themselves financially, leading to increases in bankruptcy of 4-10%).

⁷⁷ *Madden v. Midland Funding, L.L.C.*, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).

tool, and certainly no evidence that limiting the interest that debt buyers can charge would impact the safety and soundness of state-chartered banks. And it is not even clear that the *Madden* ruling has meaningfully altered the price at which banks sell their defaulted debts, or even the price at which they can do so. Debt buyers already purchase at a steep discount, often not more than 10 cents on the dollar, based on a wide range of factors, most far more significant than the additional interest added to a principal that will never be collected in full. Indeed, the only impact of adding additional interest at high rates on top of already unaffordable debt is to bury struggling consumers under a load they may never escape. Thus, the FDIC's decision to attempt to overturn the Second Circuit's decision as to debt buyers lacks any support and is far outside the agency's authority.

C. Securitization of bank loans

The FDIC discusses the benefits of banks' ability to securitize loans on the secondary market, including to comply with risk-based capital requirements and manage their liquidity.⁷⁸ Securitization of loans and revolving credit agreements can be a tool that banks use in the furtherance of their own legitimate bank lending programs that are not fronting for a third party. But securitization can also be an aspect of an operation that is designed to evade state usury law.

The questions that the FDIC has left unanswered are (1) whether the *Madden* decision is having any impact on legitimate, non-evasive bank securitization markets in a way that impacts the FDIC's authority over safety and soundness, and (2) even if there are safety and soundness concerns, whether those concerns justify a complete exemption from state usury laws for every securitization vehicle and every assigned loan, in every conceivable circumstance.

The FDIC quotes one law firm's *projection*, published the year *Madden* was decided, predicting that "[d]epository institutions will likely see a reduction in their ability to sell loans originated in the Second Circuit due to significant pricing adjustments in the secondary market."⁷⁹ But the proposal offers zero evidence that this has in fact occurred. Rather, as noted earlier, the FDIC states it "is not aware of any widespread or significant negative effects."⁸⁰ The OCC, as well, offered no evidence to the contrary.

In reality, the *Madden* ruling has had, and will likely have, limited if any impact,⁸¹ and the proposed rule is not necessary for bank liquidity. The largest securitization market by far is the mortgage market. State usury laws are already preempted for almost all first mortgages. And there is no evidence of any impact on the market for second mortgages by banks. (Yet, as discussed in section VI below, the proposed rule could legitimize predatory rent-a-bank second mortgages of the sort made by non-bank World Business Lenders, which has used FDIC-supervised Bank of Lake Mills and Liberty Bank Inc. as a front and to make home-secured loans at rates of 73% APR or higher.)

The second largest securitization market is the auto loan market. Most auto loans are originated by dealers, not banks, and thus are subject to state usury laws. Auto loans originated by depositories

⁷⁸ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66851.

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 66850, n.44 (citing "Madden v. Midland Funding: A Sea Change in Secondary Lending Markets," Robert Savoie, McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, p.3).

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 66850.

⁸¹ We are aware of no evidence that *Madden* has negatively impacted any bank's stock price, for example.

generally are not securitized. To the extent they are or are otherwise sold on the secondary market, there is no evidence that *Madden* has impacted the health of any aspect of the auto loan market.

Some private student loans are securitized, but those loans are typically at low rates that do not exceed state usury caps. There is no evidence of any impact on the student loan market.

There are questions about the impact of *Madden* on the credit card securitization market in light of the recent suits filed alleging that the *Madden* decision requires the interest on credit cards to follow state law if the receivables are sold to a non-bank securitization trust. The FDIC appears to allude to these cases in its proposal.⁸²

However, these are mere allegations early in a lawsuit with an uncertain impact—certainly insufficient to justify an overbroad rule that will have tremendous far reaching impacts and harms to consumers. There is no evidence of any broader impact to date on the credit card markets. Moreover, in one of these cases, a magistrate judge has now recommended that the court rule in favor of the securitization trust. While we have concerns about the breadth of the magistrate’s reasoning,⁸³ the initial ruling for the bank does highlight that it is premature to broadly preempt centuries-old usury laws without any evidence that they are impacting banks.

We take no position here on whether or not state usury laws apply to credit cards once the receivables are assigned to a credit card securitization trust.⁸⁴ But even if state usury laws do apply to a specific securitization, the mere fact that a bank might have to restructure some securitization vehicles or consider other secondary market options does not mean that it would have a significant enough impact on the safety and soundness of state-chartered banks to give the FDIC the authority to preempt state usury laws. In addition to presenting no evidence that banks have been impacted by *Madden*, the proposal fails to consider that a significant option for State banks seeking liquidity and diversification of risk for high-cost loans is to securitize and sell them to other depository institutions that likewise benefit from their own interest rate-exportation privilege. The FDIC has adduced no evidence that this option is insufficient to avoid any safety and soundness impacts related to bank liquidity or risk diversification.

⁸² FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66845 (“Moreover, the [*Madden*] decision continues to cause ripples with pending litigation challenging longstanding market practices.”).

⁸³ *Petersen v. Chase Card Funding, LLC et al.*, Case 1:19-cv-00741-LJV-JJM, Report and Recommendation (Jan. 22, 2020) (W.D. N.Y. filed June 6, 2019).

⁸⁴ As discussed above, under the FDIC’s interpretation of “valid-when-made,” state usury laws would allow the initial contract rate to continue. Moreover, even if “valid-when-made” does not encompass the right to step into the legal shoes of an entity subject to different laws, courts might well view the bank as the true and continuing lender even after assignment of receivables to a passive securitization vehicle. That is, courts might conclude that the bank is continuing to charge the interest as either a matter of federal rate exportation or as a matter of exemptions for depositories under state law. In a far cry from the high-cost rent-a-bank market or even the marketplace loan market, the banks in the credit card cases appear to market, offer, take applications for, underwrite, approve, issue and set the terms of the credit and have a continuing interest in the credit by owning and servicing the accounts (and, likely, having a significant interest in the interest paid). No one of these factors is determinative; in some high-cost rent-a-bank schemes, as well, the bank may claim to “own” the account and “charge” the interest through its agent. But the credit card securitization trusts, unlike rent-a-bank lenders, are not independent lenders and do not appear to have a significant role or economic interest in the lending programs other than in securitizing the receivables. The banks that offer the credit cards already have the right to charge the rate permitted by their home state and have no need to create vehicles to evade usury laws.

D. Assignment to online lenders otherwise subject to state law

A third context to which the proposed rule would apply is lending programs in which a non-bank company that would otherwise be subject to state law has a significant role in the loan program but uses a bank to originate its loans. Typically the non-bank is involved both on the front end—designing the loan program, marketing the loans to consumers or small businesses, taking and processing applications—and on the back end, servicing and collecting the loans and owning or benefiting from the assigned loans or receivables. The bank nominally makes underwriting decisions, but often using criteria, software, or analysis primarily designed or provided by the non-bank company. In more recent incarnations, the bank may claim to retain ownership of the “loan” or “account” and only to sell receivables. The bank may retain a share of the receivables, but the non-bank company typically has the larger share of the economic interest in the program.

Sanitized as a “bank partnership model,” these arrangements can be used by companies that charge rates that, while below 36%, are still high and may, for some loans, exceed what states allow, especially for larger loans. Or these models can be used by predatory lenders charging extraordinary rates.

Some of these models operate with brazen openness about the centrality of evasion of state usury laws. Publicly available documents, like a presentation by a prominent fintech law firm, eliminate any doubt as to how the “bank partnership” model works: the bank originates the loan; the loan acquires the bank’s right to ignore usury laws in all states but the bank’s home state; and the non-bank handles the marketing, consumer interactions, servicing and/or other tasks associated with the loan.⁸⁵

One slide from the presentation provides:⁸⁶

How Do Bank Partnerships Work?

- Non-bank entity partners with a state FDIC-insured chartered bank or a federally chartered bank to help the bank originate the loan;
- Federal law gives the bank the ability to charge the interest rate permitted to it by its home state to people in every state (“rate exportation”);
- Non-bank partner provides marketing and loan processing assistance up front, as well as purchasing, servicing, and collections activities on the back end.

Another states:⁸⁷

How Do Bank Partnerships Work?

- 1) A non-bank partner enters into a contractual relationship with a Bank.
- 2) Under the terms of the relationship, the Bank originates the loans, applying its own credit underwriting guidelines.
- 3) The non-bank partner, through its employees, may act as an agent for the bank in the states where the borrowers are located.

⁸⁵ *Bank Partnership and the Valid-When-Made Doctrine: an Update on Madden v. Midland*, Catherine M. Brennan, Meghan Musselman and Joseph Vitale, Hudson Cook, Thirteenth Annual Consumer Financial Services Conference (April 2016), <https://catherinembrennan.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/madden-panel.pdf>.

⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁷ *Id.*

- 4) The non-bank partner may receive the borrower's loan application and forward it, usually by electronic means, to the Bank.
- 5) The Bank approves or rejects the application. If approved, the Bank funds the loan from its location.
- 6) After the Bank makes the loan, the non-bank partner who acted as the bank's agent for purposes of loan origination may purchase it. The purchase usually takes place within seconds of the loan being made and the entire transaction is usually handled electronically.
- 7) By agreement with the non-bank partner, the Bank often retains a small (perhaps 5%) participation interest in the loan or sells the whole loan.
- 8) By agreement, the non-bank lender often guarantees or indemnifies the bank for the risk it assumes in originating the loans.

Whatever the merits of the lending programs, these are programs predominantly run by non-bank companies that are and should be subject to state law. While the bank purportedly applies its own credit underwriting guidelines and approves lending decisions, in practice key decisions are led by the non-bank.⁸⁸

It does not support the safety and soundness of state-chartered banks to prevent evasion of state law. (As discussed in section VII below, it *threatens* safety and soundness.) This is not a legitimate FDIA purpose protected by the Supremacy Clause or supported by any other federal law. These bank-partnership programs are not designed primarily to help banks with their liquidity or their own businesses. The FDIC has no authority to preempt state law in order to help banks monetize their rate exportation privileges. By no stretch is the safety and soundness of State-chartered banks impacted by an inability to engage in these schemes. And the FDIC has identified no other aspects of federal law under its authority that conflict with the application of state usury laws to a non-bank assignee when the bank's role in the lending program is minor compared to that of the non-bank entity.

The FDIC not only wholly fails to justify any need for its proposal. It also fails to consider the vast implications of its proposal—the impact on state laws, and the consequences for consumers and small businesses, State-chartered banks, and non-banks that operate in compliance with state law. We address these in turn in the following sections.

IV. The FDIC's claim that this proposal will benefit consumers through access to credit is both irrelevant to the FDIC's authority to regulate non-banks, and misguided and dangerous.

The proposal makes the following deeply troubling assertion in its discussion of the proposed rule's expected effects:

Particularly in jurisdictions affected by *Madden*, to the extent the proposed rule results in the preemption of State usury laws, some consumers may benefit

⁸⁸ As but one indication of the lender's control over the business, note Elevate's discussion of its control over its products' APRs: "We aim to manage our business to achieve a long-term operating margin of 20%, and do not expect our operating margin to increase beyond that level, as we intend to pass on any improvements over our targeted margins to our customers in the form of lower APRs. We believe this is a critical component of our responsible lending platform and over time will also help us continue to attract new customers and retain existing customers." Press Release: 10Q, Elevate Credit, Inc. (Aug.10, 2018).

from the improved availability of credit from State banks. For these consumers, this additional credit may be offered at a higher interest rate than otherwise provided by relevant State law. However, in the absence of the proposed rule, these consumers might be unable to obtain credit from State banks and might instead borrow at higher interest rates from less-regulated lenders.⁸⁹

As an initial matter, even if this statement were true, it should not be mistaken, by the FDIC or others, as a basis of authority for the FDIC to preempt state law--much less usury laws, which are a core consumer protection law.

Moreover, this statement is grossly unfounded, and in fact runs counter to the trove of evidence showing that usury limits are the single greatest protection against predatory lending. We know of no compelling evidence showing that consumers in states with lower interest rate caps are worse off by not having access to higher-rate loans. As described below, the high-cost rent-a-bank lending that the proposal would encourage is deeply destructive to consumers. And evidence indicates that even other lending aimed at those with substantial credit card debt may ultimately harm, rather than improve, their financial health.⁹⁰

At the same time, investors view this proposal as “a strong endorsement” of Enova and Elevate⁹¹—predatory high-cost lenders who are charging sky-high rates, several-to-many times higher than that state rate caps they are evading. The consumer complaints in section VI of these comments, along with over 150 borrower experiences in Appendix B, offer some evidence of the wrongheadedness of the FDIC’s assertion here.

The FDIC’s assertion, which essentially encourages off-balance sheet lending by banks, is particularly striking given the enactment of NBA Section 25b in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. The foreclosure crisis that gave rise to the broader financial collapse demonstrated that when banks hold loans on their balance sheets, they are less likely to put borrowers into loans that the borrowers ultimately will be unable to repay. Higher-cost loans are more likely to produce this outcome because borrowers who struggle to repay loans at lower interest rates generally find it even more difficult to cover higher costs. Originators tend to better assess borrower ability to repay when they plan to hold onto the loans themselves, than when they plan to off-load the loans to investors.

⁸⁹ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66850.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Sudheer Chava et al, *Winners and Losers of Marketplace Lending: Evidence from Borrower Credit Dynamics* (September 30, 2017). Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business Research Paper No. 18-16, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3178322> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3178322> (finding that compared to comparable peers with unmet credit demand, marketplace loan borrowers initially improved their credit card balances and credit scores but in the next two years, they had higher indebtedness and higher default likelihood, with the effects more pronounced for constrained borrowers); AnnaMaria Andriotis, Wall Street Journal, “FICO Changes Could Lower Your Credit Score” (Jan. 23, 2020), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/fico-changes-could-lower-your-credit-score-11579780800> (rising debt levels—i.e., access to more credit—could lead to lower credit scores),

⁹¹ On file with National Consumer Law Center.

V. The proposal usurps the States' historical and constitutional role in our federalist system.

States have a long-standing, well-recognized interest in determining the policies best suited to prevailing conditions and priorities within state borders. As compared with the federal government, States are more familiar, accessible and accountable to their constituencies and can more nimbly develop policies to address the problems they face.⁹² With good reason, the Constitution preserves the rights and role of States within our federalist republic. And as the Supreme Court made plain soon after the NBA's enactment, and reiterated many times since, banks are "governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the States than of the nation."⁹³

The proposal fails to recognize States' historical and primary role in regulating and enforcing usury and the way that the proposal would undermine that role. The FDIC's authority is State-chartered banks, non-bank lenders. In our federalist system, states have always been the primary regulator of non-bank lenders. Yet the proposed rule threatens to deprive states of their historic power by allowing non-bank lenders to use banks as a fig leaf to avoid state consumer protection laws.

Interest rate limits are the simplest and most effective protection against predatory lending.⁹⁴ Since the time of the American Revolution, states have set interest rate caps to protect their residents from predatory lending.⁹⁵ In more recent years, a handful of states eliminated their rate caps, others carved out limited exceptions for short-term payday loans (some since reversed), and a combination of federal and state laws exempt most banks from interest rate limits.⁹⁶ But the vast majority of states retain interest rate caps for non-bank installment loans and lines of credit.⁹⁷

⁹² See *Gregory v. Ashcroft*, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that federalism "assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society" and "allows for more innovation and experimentation in government").

⁹³ *National Bank v. Commonwealth*, 9 Wall. 353, 362 (1870) ("[National banks] are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitutional."); see also *Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank*, 161 U.S. 275, 290 (1896) ("Nothing, of course, in this opinion is intended to deny the operation of general and undiscriminating state laws on the contracts of national banks, so long as such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of Congressional legislation"); *First Nat. Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri*, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) (national banks "are subject to the laws of a State in respect of their affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the paramount law of the United States"); *Atherton v. F.D.I.C.*, 519 U.S. 213, 223, 117 S. Ct. 666, 672, 136 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1997); *Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.*, 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007) ("Federally chartered banks are subject to state laws of general application in their daily business to the extent such laws do not conflict with the letter or the general purposes of the NBA."); *Epps v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 675 F.3d 315, 320 (4th Cir. 2012).

⁹⁴ See NCLC, *Misaligned Incentives: Why High-Rate Installment Lenders Want Borrowers Who Will Default* (July 2016), <https://www.nclc.org/issues/misaligned-incentives.html>.

⁹⁵ James M. Ackerman, *Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury*, 1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 61 (1981).

⁹⁶ See generally NCLC, *Consumer Credit Regulation* (2d ed. 2015), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

⁹⁷ *Id.*

At least 43 states and the District of Columbia (DC) impose interest rate caps on some consumer loans. Among those that cap rates, the median annual rate including all fees is 36.5% for a \$500, six-month loan, 31% for a \$2000, two-year loan, and 25% for a \$10,000, five-year loan.⁹⁸ While payday lenders are pushing hard at the state level to make high-cost long-term payday loans legal in more states, the large majority of state legislatures have rejected these efforts. In addition, sixteen states plus DC have interest rate caps that prevent short-term payday loans, a number that has grown by several over the last decade.

Notably, state laws often provide a comprehensive risk-based licensing and rate regime under which non-banks operate. For example, almost all states have a low usury limit at which even unlicensed, unsupervised lenders may lend, but permit a higher usury rate for licensed lenders. Essentially, in exchange for being allowed to charge a higher rate, the lender subjects itself to supervision and examination. As another example, as reflected in the prior paragraph, many states set lower rate limits on larger loans than they do on smaller loans, in light of the higher overall costs involved.

States are typically successful in enforcing their interest rates against the products to which interest rate caps apply.⁹⁹ But the FDIC's proposal risks undermining these regulatory landscapes and severely hamstringing states' ability to enforce rate caps.

High-cost lenders are notoriously relentless in their efforts to evade state usury laws (and any other law intended to rein them in).¹⁰⁰ In the late 1990s and early 2000s, lenders attempted to evade the usury laws applying to balloon-payment payday loans through rent-a-bank schemes (see section VI.F below). The FDIC put an end to its supervisee-banks' involvement in these schemes, citing "inherent risks associated with payday lending activities"¹⁰¹ and unsafe or unsound practices, as well as unfair or

⁹⁸ See Carolyn Carter et al., NCLC, *Predatory Installment Lending in 2017: States Battle to Restrain High-Cost Loans* (Aug. 2017), <http://bit.ly/2vRZkEf>; Carolyn Carter et al., NCLC, *A Larger and Longer Debt Trap? Analysis Of States' APR Caps For A \$10,000 5-year Installment Loan* (Oct. 2018), overview <http://bit.ly/2QOp6AG> and full report, <http://bit.ly/instloan18>; see also NCLC, *State Annual Percentage Rate (APR) Caps for \$500, \$2,000, and \$10,000 Installment Loans* (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/fact-sheet-apr-caps-for-installment-loans.pdf.

⁹⁹ See Diane Standaert and Brandon Coleman, *Ending the Cycle of Evasion: Effective State and Federal Payday Lending Enforcement* (2015), Center for Responsible Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/crl_payday_enforcement_brief_nov2015.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ For example, high-cost lenders evaded the 2006 federal Military Lending Act until its more comprehensive regulations in 2015, and they schemed to evade the CFPB's payday lending rule as it was being developed. For a fuller discussion of the myriad ways high-cost lenders have engaged in evasion, see Comments of CRL, NCLC, CFA, and additional consumer and civil rights groups to CFPB on its Proposed Rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, Oct. 7, 2016, at 35-40, https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl_payday_comment_oct2016.pdf.

¹⁰¹ See Republic Bancorp, Inc., SEC Form 8-K (Feb. 24, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921557/000110465906011951/a06-5812_18k.htm (where Republic Bancorp discloses that its Indiana bank has exited the payday loan arrangement after the FDIC cited "inherent risks associated with payday lending activities"); see also Robert Schoenberger, *Republic to Get Out of Payday Loans; FDIC Urged Bank to Exit Business*, The Courier-Journal, Mar. 3, 2006.

deceptive practices, involved in a supervisee’s “rent-a-BIN” arrangement.¹⁰² Other federal regulators ultimately shut down these schemes for payday loans as well.¹⁰³

With that option foreclosed, payday and other high-cost lenders turned to a similar sham whereby they claimed that a Native American tribe, which they argued was not subject to state law, was the true lender.¹⁰⁴ Notably, one such lender was Think Finance and its CEO Ken Rees, who were sued by the State of Pennsylvania in 2014 for violating the state’s usury law by peddling 448% APR loans through a sham partnership with a Native American tribe. In 2019, Think Finance settled that lawsuit by agreeing to pay 80,000 Pennsylvanians \$130 million.¹⁰⁵ CFPB also sued Think Finance for pursuing payments and collecting on loans that violated state usury laws and were thus void under state law.¹⁰⁶

Back in 2014, Think Finance spun off its loan portfolio to a new company, Elevate¹⁰⁷—which, undeterred by the exposure of one ruse, quickly and brazenly entered into a rent-a-bank scheme with FDIC-supervised Republic Bank for its Elastic product, and later entered into a scheme for its Rise product as well, with FinWise Bank. The FDIC’s proposal plays right into the hands of high-cost lenders and their unceasing efforts to evade interest rate and other consumer protection laws.

Maxine’s story, which she shares in the documentary film *Let My People Go*, illustrates the relevance of state usury law in the lives of individuals and families:

I was like, “Collateral? Isn't my paychecks enough?” They said, “Sometimes, if you lose your job, we'll lose our money. So, we need something more.” So, that's whenever my husband said, “Well, we have our vehicle.” He was working, so my check paid for the loan and then we kind of lived off of his. So, I was a day late, 243.60, and I paid it anyways. I thought everything was okay, came up to Rapid to the celebration for Black Hills Powwow. My son . . . and his cousin were outside, and they said, “Mom, there’s some men by the Suburban.” And I said, “For what?” “I

¹⁰² See *In the Matter of First Bank of Delaware, and CompuCredit Corporation*, Notice of Charges for an Order to Cease and Desist and For Restitution, FDIC, FDIC-07-256b, FDIC-07-257k, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/FBD_Notice_of_Charges.pdf (finding that the bank had operated in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act (addressing unfair or deceptive practices) and “without effective oversight” of third-party lending programs, and ordering the termination of the “rent-a-BIN” . . . arrangement).

¹⁰³ In 2000, the OCC and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued guidance that by 2003 stopped national banks and federal thrifts from participating in these schemes. See OCC Advisory Letter No. AL 2000-10 (Nov. 27, 2000), <https://occ.gov/news-issuances/advisory-letters/2000/advisory-letter-2000-10.pdf>. See also Office of Thrift Supervision, Letter P-2000-4 (Feb. 3, 2000) (OTS will conduct examinations of the thrift’s partner in payday lending to the same extent as it will of the thrift).

¹⁰⁴ See *Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. CashCall, Inc.*, 2016 WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).

¹⁰⁵ Pa. Attorney General Announces Payday Loan Relief Settlement, KDKA 2CBS Pittsburgh, July 24, 2019, <https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2019/07/24/think-finance-payday-loan-settlement/>.

¹⁰⁶ CFPB, *CFPB Sues Think Finance For Collecting On Debts That Consumers Did Not Legally Owe*, Nov. 15, 2017, <https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-think-finance-collecting-debts-consumers-did-not-legally-owe/>.

¹⁰⁷ *Think Finance Announces Business Restructuring and Spinoff of New Company, Elevate*, BusinessWire, May 1, 2014, <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140501006196/en/Finance-Announces-Business-Restructuring-Spinoff-New-Company>.

don't know. They want to see you and dad." . . . So, we went out there and, here it was, a tow truck, and they came and they said, "Your car is being repossessed." I said, "For what? I paid down." And the man said, "Apparently [] you didn't pay them." And I said, "But all of our things are here. My whole family, I brought my whole family," and he said, "That's not our problem. You people should pay your bills."

*Maxine's family witnessed around 30 vehicle repossessions at the powwow.*¹⁰⁸

Maxine lives in South Dakota, which in 2016 voted to cap rates at 36%, and car title lenders left the state. The FDIC's proposal would embolden their return. The FDIC fails to consider the proposal's impact on millions of consumers like Maxine, residing not only in South Dakota, but in all states with interest rate caps aimed at high-cost lending, and in all states who might like to enact those caps in the future.

VI. The proposal fails to consider the risk it poses to consumers and small businesses.

The FDIC's proposal fails to consider the devastating impact it could have on consumers and small businesses, even as the risk is clear. Indeed, predatory lenders have long hoped for the banking regulators to issue this very proposal. After the proposal was released, one investment advisor wrote in its investment notes:

*"Enova received a strong endorsement from banking regulators in support of its bank partnership model, which is a key aspect of its California growth strategy moving forward (Elevate Credit [ELVT, MP] is also a beneficiary of these developments)."*¹⁰⁹

Similarly, when the FDIC issued its Request for Information on small dollar lending in late 2018, an attorney who represents payday lenders wrote:

*"[P]erhaps most significantly, this RFI could serve as a vehicle for the FDIC to confirm that, in a properly structured loan program between a bank and a non-bank marketing and servicing agent, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act authorizes state-chartered banks to charge the interest allowed by the law of the state where they are located, without regard to the law of any other state, despite "true lender" and Madden arguments to the contrary."*¹¹⁰

High-cost products currently using rent-a-bank schemes are longer-term installment payday loans, lines of credit, vehicle title installment loans, subprime business loans, and mortgages masquerading as

¹⁰⁸ *Source: Let My People Go*, a 30-minute documentary from the Center for Responsible Lending and South Dakotans for Responsible Lending, illuminating the harms that payday and vehicle title borrowers experienced in South Dakota and the 2016 ballot initiative that led to these lenders' exit from the state. A full transcript of the documentary was submitted to the docket to the CFPB's proposed repeal of the ability-to-repay provisions of its Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans rule, ID CFPB-2019-0006-51897, <https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2019-0006-51897>; the documentary may be viewed here: <https://www.capheratesd.com/let-my-people-go/>.

¹⁰⁹ On file with National Consumer Law Center.

¹¹⁰ Jeremy T. Rosenblum, *FDIC seeks comment on small-dollar lending*, Ballard Spahr's Consumer Finance Monitor, Nov. 15, 2018, <https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/11/15/fdic-seeks-comments-on-small-dollar-lending/> (emphasis added).

business loans. The proposal would also clearly embolden a return of short-term balloon-payment payday loans and balloon-payment vehicle title loans.

A. The proposal fails to consider that bad actors are already engaged in predatory rent-a-bank schemes, which the FDIC and OCC are not restraining.

The proposal fails to consider that rent-a-bank schemes are already underway with several FDIC-supervised banks, in addition to a predatory small business lender scheme with an OCC-supervised bank. In these comments, we focus on the most egregious examples of lenders making loans far in excess of 36%. But even 36% is a very high rate, and most states limit large loans well below that level. For example, the median rate cap in the states on a \$10,000, 5-year loan is 25% APR, and New York limits loans over \$25,000 to 16% APR. The limits on mortgage rates are often lower than that. Efforts to evade state usury caps are inappropriate even if the rates do not reach the triple digits.

With respect to consumer loans, we are aware of four FDIC-supervised banks engaging in rent-a-bank schemes that include high-cost payday installment loans, lines of credit, auto title loans, or auto repair loans.

FDIC-supervised **Republic Bank & Trust** (chartered in Kentucky) and **FinWise Bank** (chartered in Utah) are helping three high-cost lenders, **OppLoans**, **Elevate**, and **Enova**, make installment loans or lines of credit in excess of 100% APR in a total of at least 30 states and the District of Columbia (DC) that do not allow such high rates.¹¹¹

OppLoans offers \$500 to \$4,000 installment loans through FinWise Bank at 160% APR in 24 states and the District of Columbia (DC) that do not allow that rate.¹¹² FinWise sells the receivables back to OppLoans or a related entity. OppLoans makes loans directly through a state license in states that allow high rates.

Elevate Credit uses FinWise Bank to originate **Rise** installment loans at 99% to 149% APR in 16 states and DC that do not allow those rates and in other states through a state license.¹¹³ FinWise sells a 95% interest in the loans to an entity controlled by Elevate for which Elevate is the primary beneficiary.¹¹⁴

Elevate also offers a line of credit called **Elastic** that carries an effective APR of up to 109% in 14 states and DC that do not allow that rate on a line of credit.¹¹⁵ Elevate uses Republic Bank & Trust of Kentucky

¹¹¹ For details on rent-a-bank lending, see NCLC, *Fact Sheet: Stop Payday Lenders' Rent-a Bank Schemes!* (Dec. 2019), <http://bit.ly/StopRent-a-BankSchemes> ("Rent-a-Bank Fact Sheet"), also attached as Appendix A, and NCLC, *Issue Brief: FDIC/OCC Proposal Would Encourage Rent-a-Bank Predatory Lending* (Dec. 2019) ("Rent-a-Bank Issue Brief"), <http://bit.ly/FDICrent-a-bankproposal> (providing links to lenders' websites).

¹¹² See <https://www.opploans.com/rates-and-terms/>.

¹¹³ See <https://www.risecredit.com/how-online-loans-work#WhatItCosts> (select each state); Rent-a-Bank Issue Brief, *supra*.

¹¹⁴ See Elevate Credit, Inc., Form 10-Q for the period ending Sept. 30, 2019, S.E.C. file no. 001-37680 at 22, 43, <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1651094/000165109419000048/elevate10-qxq22019.htm> ("Elevate 10-Q").

¹¹⁵ Elevate 10-Q at 46; Rent-a-Bank Issue Brief, *supra*.

to originate the Elastic product. Republic sells a 90% interest in the loans to an entity controlled by Elevate for which Elevate is the primary beneficiary.¹¹⁶

Enova's NetCredit brand recently began using Republic to fund \$1,000 to \$10,000 installment loans with APRs up to 99.99% in 22 states and DC that do not allow that rate.¹¹⁷ Enova or a related entity likely purchases the loans or receivables shortly after origination.

FDIC-supervised **Capital Community Bank** (of Utah) is helping car title lender **LoanMart** evade state law in a number of states. LoanMart's loans range from 60-222% interest; a typical loan is \$2,500, 18-month loan at 90%, totaling \$2,136 in interest.¹¹⁸

In addition, we recently learned of a rent-a-bank arrangement between **EasyPay Finance** and FDIC-supervised **Transportation Alliance Bank, dba TAB Bank** (chartered in Utah)¹¹⁹ to make predatory auto repair loans, including a \$1,500 loan at a rate of 188.99%, with bi-weekly payments of \$129 for 26 months. The marketing the mechanic provided the borrower was for EasyPay Finance. The loan documents indicate that EasyPay Finance is the "servicer" and refer to it as the "agent" of TAB Bank.

In the small business area, two other banks—FDIC-regulated **Bank of Lake Mills** in Wisconsin and OCC-regulated **Axos Bank**—have helped **World Business Lenders (WBL)** originate loans. For example, WBL used Bank of Lake Mills to originate a 120% APR \$550,000 loan¹²⁰ and a 74% APR mortgage,¹²¹ and WBL uses Axos Bank to originate a mortgage that exceeded 138% APR.¹²² The loans appear to be resold to a WBL-related entity.

In summary, loans currently being made through rent-a-bank schemes include:

- 160% APR, \$400 to \$5,000 loans (OppLoans's product)
- 99% to 149% APR, \$500 to \$5,000 loans (Elevate's Rise product)
- Up to 109% effective APR, \$500 to \$4,500 lines of credit (Elevate's Elastic product)

¹¹⁶ Elevate 10-Q at 21.

¹¹⁷ See <https://www.netcredit.com/> (bottom of page); <https://www.netcredit.com/rates-and-terms>.

¹¹⁸ See <https://www.800loanmart.com/> (accessed Jan. 20, 2020).

¹¹⁹ See <https://www.easypayfinance.com/privacy-policy/> ("Not available to customers in NY. Financing offered to residents in AL, AR, CO, CT, FL, GA, HI, IA, IN, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MS, MT, NC, NE, NJ, OH, OK, RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, VT, WV, WY and District of Columbia is made by Transportation Alliance Bank, Inc., dba TAB Bank, which determines qualifications for and terms of credit. Financing in all other states is administered by EasyPay Finance.").

¹²⁰ See *Rent-Rite Super Kegs West, Ltd., v. World Business Lenders, LLC*, 603 B.R. 41 (Bk. Ct. D. Colo. 2019).

¹²¹ See Complaint, *Deramo et al. v. World Business Lenders, LLC, et. al*, No. 8:17-cv-01435-RAL-MAP (Cir. Ct. of 12th Jud'l Cir., Sarasota Co., FL June 16, 2017), available at https://www.nclc.org/images/Deramov.WBL_.pdf.

¹²² See *Adoni, Harbor Park Realty, LLC v. World Business Lenders, LLC, Axos Bank f/k/a B-of-I Federal Bank*, filed Oct. 17, 2019 in Supreme Court of the State of N.Y., County of Suffolk, removed to E.D.N.Y on Dec. 12, 2019 as No. 2:2019cv06971-JMA-GRB, available at <https://www.nclc.org/images/Adoni-v.-World-Business-Lenders.pdf>.

- Up to 99.99% APR, \$2,500 to \$10,000 loans (Enova’s NetCredit product)¹²³
- Up to 222% APR, \$2,500 loans (LoanMart’s auto title loan)
- Up to 188.9% APR, \$1,500 loan (EasyPay Finance’s auto repair loan)
- 75% to 139% APR and higher small business loans, including disguised personal mortgages at rates up to 139% that are resulting in foreclosure.

A review of the CFPB Consumer Complaints data on those predatory lenders currently using rent-a-bank scams find several recurring themes:

- consumers puzzled and distraught that their large bi-weekly or monthly payments are not reducing principal due to the loan’s high interest rates;
- frequent inability to sustain the high payments;
- queries about how such loans can possibly be legal;
- distress caused by wage garnishment; and
- stress caused by relentless collection calls to a borrower’s home or workplace.¹²⁴

Having reviewed complaints about payday and other payday installment loans, these comment authors can attest that complaints about these loans are of the very same nature, replete with financial and emotional anguish at the hands of unaffordable high-cost loans. Dozens of examples of complaints about loans made by these lenders are provided in section G below, which discusses the harms of high-cost lending.

B. The FDIC is supporting predatory rent-a-bank lending in the small business area.

The rent-a-bank lending currently going on in the consumer area, as far as we know, is entirely with FDIC-supervised banks. Theoretically, the FDIC’s guidances that impact the use of third-party service providers could be used to put an end to these rent-a-bank schemes, and to prevent future ones. In 2016, the FDIC proposed a new Examination Guidance for Third-Party Lending but it has not been finalized.¹²⁵ That proposal does, however, incorporate and list a number of other FDIC guidances that are in effect, including those that cover third-party risk and safety and soundness standards.¹²⁶ The agency’s 2007 affordable small loan guidelines, which advise that interest rates not exceed 36%, could

¹²³ See <https://www.netcredit.com/rates-and-terms/california>.

¹²⁴ Complaints related to Elevate, OppLoans, Enova (NetCredit), Curo (SpeedyCash), and LoanMart, 2015 to present; downloaded from CFPB’s complaint database and on file with CRL.

¹²⁵ See FDIC Seeking Comment on Proposed Guidance for Third-Party Lending, FIL-50-2016 (July 29, 2016), <https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16050.html>. NCLC, CRL, and others had (and continue to have) a number of concerns about that proposed guidance, particularly the extent to which it appeared to legitimize partnerships with third parties used for the purposes of evading state interest rate limits. See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center et al. (Oct. 27, 2016), <https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/rulemaking/comments-fdic-3rdparty-lending.pdf>; Comments of the Center for Responsible Lending et al. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl_comment_fdic_thirdpartyguidance_oct2016.pdf.

¹²⁶ See Proposed Guidance for Third-Party Lending, FIL-50-2016, at 14-15, <https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16050a.pdf>.

also be used.

But the agency's will to use these guidances to prevent rent-a-bank schemes in recent years is uncertain at best. The FDIC has not stopped Republic Bank's long-time scheme with Elevate—highlighted in the 2016 comments of NCLC et al. on the proposed third-party lending guidance¹²⁷—nor FinWise Bank's schemes with Elevate and OppLoans, or Capital Community Bank's scheme with auto title lender LoanMart.

In addition, the evidence from the small business area shows that the FDIC is currently actively supporting a predatory rent-a-bank scheme despite a truly shocking fact pattern. In July 2019, the FDIC filed an amicus brief supporting World Business Lenders (WBL) in a district court bankruptcy case, *Rent-Rite Super Kegs v. World Business Lenders*.¹²⁸ The FDIC is defending WBL's ability to charge 120% APR on a \$550,000 loan despite Colorado's lower (but still hefty) 45% business interest rate cap because the loan was originated through a bank, FDIC-supervised Bank of Lake Mills (before the bank assigned the promissory note and the deed of trust to WBL).

Not one word of the FDIC's brief expresses any concern about the ridiculously predatory interest rate. The FDIC chose to side with a predatory lender in a case that is not at the appellate level, when the bank is not involved in the case, and where there is no argument that the bank would be impacted if WBL were limited to collecting 45% APR instead of 120% APR. The agency also supported this loan despite knowledge that Bank of Lake Mills has engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in recent years, the subject of an FDIC enforcement action involving harmed military servicemembers.¹²⁹

In the *Rent-Rite* case, the FDIC made the same arguments in support of the non-bank WBL's right to charge 120% APR as it raises to justify this rulemaking. The FDIC did not raise the possibility that the bank might not be the true lender or qualify its support for WBL or the application of the "valid-when-made" doctrine to WBL in any way.

The FDIC's decision to support WBL in the *Rent-Rite* case shows exactly the kind of abusive lending that will flourish if this rulemaking is finalized. The *Rent-Rite* case is shocking enough, and dispels any hopes that the FDIC has concerns about the valid-when-made theory being misused. But it is particularly disturbing in light of other public information available about WBL's predatory business model and its

¹²⁷ See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center et al. at 2-3, 7-8, 10 (Oct. 27, 2016), <https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/rulemaking/comments-fdic-3rdparty-lending.pdf>.

¹²⁸ See Amicus Brief of the [FDIC] and the [OCC] in Support of Affirmance and Appellee, *In Re: Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd.*, https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Amicus_Brief.pdf (Sept. 10, 2019); see also Letter to the OCC and FDIC from NCLC, CRL, and additional groups opposing the agencies' support of a predatory small business lender using a rent-a-bank scheme (Oct. 24, 2019), <https://www.nclc.org/issues/ltr-opp-rent-a-bank.html>; Complaint, *Rent-Rite Super Kegs West Ltd. v. World Business Lenders* (Bankr. D. Colo.) (filed March 14, 2018) available at https://www.nclc.org/images/Rent-Ritev.WBL_.pdf.

¹²⁹ See FDIC Press Release, *FDIC Announces Settlement with Bank of Lake Mills, Freedom Stores, Inc., and Military Credit Services, LLC, for Unfair and Deceptive Practices* (May 11, 2017) (The FDIC determined that Bank of Lake Mills and affiliates had violated federal law prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices by, among other things, charging interest on loans promoted as interest free).

use of an FDIC-supervised bank—information that was available prior to the agency’s decision to support WBL in court.

Several cases filed in court against WBL strongly suggest that the *Rent-Rite* case is not an aberration. This is a company with a predatory business model of approaching struggling businesses and charging exorbitant rates, using a bank as a front to escape interest rate limits. The loans are secured by personal residences, making the high rates truly shocking, and in some cases the business aspect of the transaction appears to be trumped up to disguise that these are loans for personal purposes and are covered by consumer laws. The bank, which in the cases below, and currently, is OCC-supervised Axos Bank, formerly known as Bank Of Internet (BOFI),¹³⁰ has little if anything to do with the loans, and **in more than one case, WBL appears to have use of a power of attorney for the bank.**

The facts described below are taken from the complaints as alleged. There is a striking similarity among them.

In *Speer v. Danjon Capital et al.*, filed in Connecticut in late 2019, Elissa Speer is facing a civil action in Nevada and a foreclosure of a residential property in Connecticut after taking out a \$30,000 loan alleged to be at 400% and a second loan of \$20,000, alleged to be at 121% APR.¹³¹ The loans were offered by Danjon Capital in collusion with World Business Lenders, but were purportedly on funds lent by Bank of Lake Mills. After executing the first note and mortgage, Danjon refused to release the funds unless Speer executed a lease agreement for “restaurant equipment” despite the fact that Speer was never in the restaurant business and she alleged that the equipment referenced, including two backpack leaf blowers, had no practical restaurant use. The complaint alleges that the defendants disguised residential mortgage loans made to consumers primarily for personal, family, or household uses, as commercial loans in order to avoid Connecticut’s licensure and other laws.

In *Vincent Deramo Jr. et al. v. World Business Lenders, LLC*, filed in Florida in 2017, a general contractor and his wife allege that World Business Lenders contacted them, saying they were an agent for Bank of Lake Mills, and offered a \$400,000 loan, secured by their home and later refinanced. Despite the promise of a 15% APR, they allege that WBL actually charged them 72-73% APR. The documents were prepared by WBL and were mailed to WBL and the plaintiffs had no contact with the bank. The mortgage was assigned from the bank to WBL through a signature of the vice president of WBL as power of attorney for the bank.¹³²

In *B&S Medical Supply et al v. World Business Lenders et al.*, filed in New York in 2017, WBL solicited Boris Simon, the owner of B&S Medical Supply, for a \$28,000 business loan at 73% APR, provided by Liberty Bank, that was secured by Simon’s home. The business loan application contained both the business logo and contact information of WBL and Liberty. The loan was immediately assigned from

¹³⁰ See <https://www.wbl.com/>.

¹³¹ Complaint, *Speer v. Danjon Capital et al.*, No. 3:19-cv-01778 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 12, 2019), available at <https://www.nclc.org/images/Speerv.DanjonCapital.pdf>.

¹³² Complaint, *Vincent Deramo Jr. et al. v. World Business Lenders, LLC and WBL SPE II, LLC* (filed May 16 2017 in Cir. Ct., Sarasota, FL, removed to federal court June 16, 2017 as No. 8:17-cv-1435-RAL-MAP), available at https://www.nclc.org/images/Deramov.WBL_.pdf.

Liberty to WBL. WBL corresponded with Simon, referring to itself as the “Lender” and saying that it would service the loan and have the right to collect payments.¹³³

In *Kaur et al. v. World Business Lenders et al.*, filed in Massachusetts in April 2019, a married couple was threatened with foreclosure after borrowing \$175,000 at 92% APR from World Business Lenders for their business, New England Distributors, secured by a mortgage on their house.¹³⁴ The loan paperwork listed BOFI/Axos Bank as the lender, but the loan was presented by WBL, all the forms were WBL forms, and the application discussed WBL’s role including ordering a valuation of the collateral. The mortgage was assigned from BOFI to WBL and that assignment by BOFI “was signed by World Business Lenders, LLC, as attorney-in-fact for BOFI Federal Bank.”¹³⁵

In *Adoni et al. v. World Business Lenders, LLC, Axos Bank and Circadian Funding*, filed in New York in October 2019, Jacob Adoni has been threatened with threats to foreclose on his home after receiving a \$90,000 loan at 138% APR secured by his personal residence.¹³⁶ Adoni was contacted by Circadian Funding with an offer of a personal loan that would be funded by WBL and Axos Bank. He was told that the loan documents would be provided to him at 12:00 pm and he must execute them by 6:00 pm or the offer would no longer be valid. Adoni was told by Circadian that the loan was meant to be a personal loan to him but it was necessary for the loan documents to make reference to his business. The defendants “have inundated Mr. Adoni with multiple threats to foreclose on his home and on the mortgage.”¹³⁷

The FDIC’s supervision of Bank of Lake Mills does not appear to be stopping the bank from letting itself be used—up to the point of handing over a power of attorney—by a predatory lender in order to evade state interest rate limits. The bank itself has been named in some of these lawsuits, so the bank’s supervisors should surely know about them. These practices have been going on for some time. A 2014 article describes how WBL employs some of the worst actors and practices from the foreclosure crisis for its predatory lending practices towards small businesses.¹³⁸

The FDIC’s direct support for World Business Lenders on the same grounds used to justify the proposed rule shows exactly what should be expected to happen if the rule is finalized: predatory lending, which not only may leave people in financial ruin but jeopardizes their homes and businesses.

¹³³ Complaint, *B&S Medical Supply, Inc., N.Y. and Boris Simon v. World Business Lenders, LLC and Liberty Bank, Inc.*, No. 1:17-cv-03234 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 31, 2017), available at [https://www.nclc.org/images/BandSMedSupplyv.WBL .pdf](https://www.nclc.org/images/BandSMedSupplyv.WBL.pdf).

¹³⁴ Complaint, *Kaur et al v. World Business Lenders et al.* (removed to D. Mass. June. 19, 2019 as 1:19-cv-11364), available at [https://www.nclc.org/images/Kaurv.WBL .pdf](https://www.nclc.org/images/Kaurv.WBL.pdf).

¹³⁵ *Id.* at 21.

¹³⁶ Complaint, *Adoni et al. v. World Business Lenders, LLC et al* (removed to E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2019 as No. 2:19-cv-06971), <https://www.nclc.org/images/Adoni-v.-World-Business-Lenders.pdf>.

¹³⁷ *Id.* at 5.

¹³⁸ Zeke Faux, *Wall Street Finds New Subprime With 125% Business Loans*, Bloomberg (May 22, 2014), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-22/wall-street-finds-new-subprime-with-125-business-loans>.

C. The proposal fails to consider payday lenders' explicit plans in California to broadly expand rent-a-bank schemes, as well as other potential schemes that the proposal would embolden.

The proposal also fails to consider the entirely foreseeable growth of rent-a-bank schemes expected to occur.

On October 10, 2019, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law AB 539, effective January 1, 2020, which targets long-term payday loans, limiting the interest rates on loans of \$2,500 to \$10,000 to 36% plus the federal funds rate. Before now, there has been no rate cap in California on loans over \$2,500.

Three large high-cost lenders, which were charging from 135% to 199% APR on high-cost installment loans—rates illegal under the new law—indicated their plans to start or expand rent-a-bank arrangements into California, with the clear intent to evade the new interest rate cap. These lenders discussed with investors their plans even before it was enacted. These brazen declarations of their intentions make patently clear that the involved lenders would be forming these partnerships for the purpose of evading the law, and that the involved banks would be renting out their charters to these lenders. These lenders have been met with resistance,¹³⁹ and to our knowledge have not yet begun new schemes in California. But at least two of these lenders appear to be already making high-cost rent-a-bank loans elsewhere, and the FDIC's proposal would embolden these schemes—a fact the proposal fails to consider.

Elevate Credit, Inc. was offering high-cost installment loans in California through its **Rise** brand at rates of 60% to 225% APR for a \$2,600 to \$5,000 loan.¹⁴⁰ In other states, where that product would not be permitted by non-banks, Elevate currently uses FDIC-supervised **FinWise Bank** to originate its Rise loans at rates of 99-149% APR.

Elevate also uses FDIC-supervised **Republic Bank** to originate **Elastic**, an open-end line of credit with an effective APR of approximately 109%¹⁴¹ in about 33 states, including in states that do not permit that rate by non-banks.¹⁴²

¹³⁹ See Press Release, *Advocates Urge FDIC, OCC, Federal Reserve to Stop Banks from Helping Payday Lenders Evade State Interest Rate Limits* (Nov. 7, 2019) (discussing letters to the agencies from a coalition of 61 consumer, civil rights, and community groups, flagging the lenders' statements of intent to evade California law and urging the regulators to prevent rent-a-bank schemes in California and elsewhere), <https://www.responsiblelending.org/media/advocates-urge-fdic-occ-federal-reserve-stop-banks-helping-payday-lenders-evade-state-interest>. Those letters attached another letter from Californians for Economic Justice to the California Department of Business Oversight, the California Attorney General, and the Governor, flagging the same concerns. See also Letter from Rep. Katie Porter of California to FDIC, Dec. 20, 2019 and Tweet: "High-cost lenders announced during their earnings calls that they planned to target CA borrowers with abusive loan terms banned in our state. Today, I'm forwarding transcripts of those calls to federal watchdogs. I won't stand by while bad actors try to skirt our laws." <https://twitter.com/RepKatiePorter/status/1208039708095238145?s=20>.

¹⁴⁰ <https://www.risecredit.com/how-online-loans-work#WhatItCosts> (select California).

¹⁴¹ Elevate Sept. 2019 10-Q at 46.

¹⁴² See NCLC, Rent-a-Bank Fact Sheet, *supra*.

In its July earnings call, Elevate discussed its plans to expand its Rise arrangement through a bank partner to evade the new California rate cap:

“[Q:] So what does [the new California law] mean for Elevate? . . . [A:] [W]e expect to be able to continue to serve California consumers via bank sponsors that are not subject to the same proposed state level rate limitations. . . . [W]e are confident that we can make that transition And the effective yield that we are looking at on the product would be very similar to what we have on the market today. So we think the impact would be minimal and this transition would be pretty seamless.”¹⁴³

“Realistically, we will probably use a new bank to originate as we transition into California for Rise. It will be [] probably different than FinWise. So that will add to the diversification.”¹⁴⁴

Enova International, Inc., was offering two long-term high-cost loan products over \$2,500 in California that are now outlawed by the new law, NetCredit (up to 155% APR) and CashNetUSA (up to 191% APR). Last summer, Enova discussed plans to evade the California law, while touting how relatively little lenders must give up in margin to purchase the bank’s preemption rights:

“[W]e will likely convert our near-prime product [NetCredit] to a bank-partner program, which will allow us to continue to operate in California at similar rates to what we charge today”¹⁴⁵ “There’s no reason why we wouldn’t be able to replace our California business with a bank program.”¹⁴⁶

When asked the following on the call: “Do you have a bank partner in place already? Just remind me, that will allow you to make higher rate loans that is, kind of, pass the product through their regulator?,” the Enova spokesperson responded:

“We do have a bank program. We do have a bank partner that does higher interest rate loans, and kind of, we’ll have to do a couple of quick changes to our program with them to offer that in California, but we don’t see any reason why we couldn’t do that In terms of the conversion to a bank program, we give up a couple about percentages — a couple percent of margin to the bank partner, but other than that it’s largely like-for-like.”¹⁴⁷

So far, Enova has not yet rolled out rent-a-bank products in California. But as discussed above, NetCredit uses a rent-a-bank operation with Republic Bank in other states. The proposed rule would only give Enova more confidence to move into California and other states.

¹⁴³ Elevate Credit Inc., Earnings Call, pp. 5-6 (July 29, 2019) at SeekingAlpha.com.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.* at 6.

¹⁴⁵ Enova International Inc., Earnings Call, p. 3 (July 25, 2019) at SeekingAlpha.com.

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 9.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.* at 9, 10.

CURO Group Holdings Corp. currently offers both short-term and long-term payday loans through its **SpeedyCash** brand. Its website gives an example of a \$2,600 installment loan at 134% APR and a \$5,000 loan at 131% APR.¹⁴⁸

The following is an example of a SpeedyCash loan made in California before the new rate cap: \$2,600 loan at 135% APR, repayable over 3.5 years with payments of \$138 every two weeks, or approximately \$276 monthly, totaling **\$12,560** in total payments.¹⁴⁹

ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE The cost of your credit as a yearly rate	FINANCE CHARGE The dollar amount the credit will cost you	Amount Financed The amount of credit provided to you or on your behalf	Total of Payments The amount you will have paid after you have made all payments as scheduled
135.211%	\$9,960.35	\$2,600.00	\$12,560.35

Your Payment Schedule will be:

Number of Payments	Amount of Payment	When Payment is Due
90	\$138.09	Every 14 days , beginning 28 Feb 2014

CURO discussed plans to evade the California law, noting discussions with the national bank **MetaBank**, while praising the economics of the bank partnerships:

“In terms of regulation at the state level in California, we expect a new law . . . [to make] our current installment products no longer viable . . . “[W]e continue to talk to Meta[Bank] and we continue to talk to other banks about partnership opportunities” “I think we feel very good about being able to find products and partnerships that will serve our, the customer base in California that wants this longer, longer term, larger installment loan or possibly as a line of credit product And I think from a margin standpoint [] the bank partnerships are great. You have to sacrifice a little bit of the economics there because you have a, you have a bank partner there that’s going to need a good rev share And I think . . . with bank partnership opportunities [] we feel . . . we’ve got a good, a really good opportunity to do that.”¹⁵⁰

We note that in April 2018, CURO announced plans to offer a line of credit product “through a relationship with MetaBank” which would not contribute to its financial results until 2020,¹⁵¹ and that in its November 2019 10Q, it announced that it had discontinued that agreement in September 2019.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ <https://db4nnybic3xty.cloudfront.net/pdf/SRC/2018/california/store/california.pdf> (See “Installment Bank Line Loan Price Disclosure” at the bottom).

¹⁴⁹ Loan document on file with CRL.

¹⁵⁰ CURO Group Holdings Corp., Earnings Call, pp. 3, 7-8 (July 30, 2019) at SeekingAlpha.com.

¹⁵¹ CURO 2018 10K at 46.

¹⁵² CURO 10Q, Nov. 2019, at 44, <https://fintel.io/doc/sec-curo-10q-curo-group-holdings-2019-november-04-18209>. Notably, MetaBank has a history of working with payday lenders and helping third parties offer predatory products and evade the law. MetaBank issues prepaid cards sold by ACE Cash Express and other payday lenders, and those payday lender prepaid cards were the only major prepaid cards with overdraft fees until new rules from the

LoanMart has already disclosed that it in fact has begun making rent-a-bank loans in California. In January 2020, LoanMart added California to the list of states where it uses FDIC-supervised Capital Community Bank to originate loans. In December 2019, prior to the effective date of California’s new law, California was not included among those states on LoanMart’s website.¹⁵³

In addition, **OppLoans**, which makes 160% APR long-term payday loans, was previously originating some loans in California through FDIC-supervised FinWise Bank and other loans directly through a California state license, and now appears to be lending entirely through FinWise Bank.¹⁵⁴

These publicly disclosed rent-a-bank operations and expansions are most likely in addition to others that have not yet been revealed. Other state-regulated payday lenders that are not publicly traded may well be in talks to begin rent-a-bank schemes to evade the will of California’s legislature.

The immediately pending threat of brazen expansion of rent-a-bank schemes in California—and the risk to other states that already had strong rate caps—should have been considered by the FDIC. Notably, FDIC Chairman McWilliams testified at a December 2019 Congressional hearing, following the issuance of both agencies’ proposals, that she was unaware of these developments,¹⁵⁵ despite letters having been sent to her intended to alert her to these developments.¹⁵⁶

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau went into effect. See NCLC, Payday Lender Prepaid Cards: Overdraft and Junk Fees Hit Cash-Strapped Families Coming and Going (2015), <https://www.nclc.org/issues/payday-lender-prepaid-cards.html>. And MetaBank now issues the “ACE Flare Account by MetaBank”—effectively a prepaid card sold by ACE and other payday lenders—which purports to be a bank account in order to evade the new prepaid rules and continue charging overdraft fees. See Press Release, National Consumer Law Center, “No Fooling! New Prepaid, Payroll, and Government Benefit Card Protections Take Effect April 1” (March 28, 2019), <https://www.nclc.org/uncategorized/no-fooling-new-prepaid-payroll-and-government-benefit-card-protections-take-effect-april-1.html>. MetaBank was also sanctioned in 2010, when under the supervision of the OTS, in connection with another prepaid card offered by a third party, iAdvance. The OTS shut down the line of credit offered on that prepaid card, finding that bank had engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in connection with it. Form 8-K filed by Meta Financial Group, Inc. with the Securities and Exchange Commission, October 6, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/907471/000110465910052100/a10-19319_18k.htm.

¹⁵³ “Loans **for certain California residents**, and residents of Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington residents are made by Capital Community Bank, a Utah chartered bank located in Provo, UT, Member FDIC. Loans made by Capital Community Bank will be governed by Utah law and serviced by LoanMart.” <https://www.800loanmart.com/> (accessed Jan. 20, 2020) (emphasis added). The authors accessed LoanMart’s website on December 19, 2019, and California was not listed at that time; the other states were already listed.

¹⁵⁴ See <https://www.opploans.com/rates-and-terms/#california>.

¹⁵⁵ House Financial Services Committee hearing on Oversight of Prudential Regulators, Dec. 5, 2019:

Rep. Porter: “[A]re you aware of statements made on earnings calls by lenders in California in the wake of California’s new lending law, several payday lenders announced on their earnings calls that they plan to use rent-a-bank schemes to evade California’s new law that outlaws 100 to 200 percent installment loans.”

Chairman McWilliams: “I’m not and I frankly don’t listen to payday lender’ investor calls. I just don’t have the time.”

¹⁵⁶ At the time of the hearing, and prior to the FDIC’s proposed rule on “federal interest rate authority,” two letters, both publicized through press releases, had been sent to Chairman McWilliams, with copies to her staff,

D. The proposal fails to consider the impact of auto title lending through rent-a-bank schemes.

As noted above, one of the markets where rent-a-bank lending has started to happen is the auto title loan market. Yet the proposed rule fails to consider the impact of legitimizing a rent-a-bank model for this market plagued not only by unaffordable high-cost loans but also by the risk of losing the vehicle.

LoanMart, which lends under a state license in states that permit its high rates, is using FDIC-supervised **Capital Community Bank (of Utah)** to evade state law in a number of states. LoanMart’s website now says at the bottom:

Loans for certain California residents, and residents of Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington residents are made by Capital Community Bank, a Utah chartered bank located in Provo, UT, Member FDIC. Loans made by Capital Community Bank will be governed by Utah law and serviced by LoanMart.¹⁵⁷

LoanMart’s website directs borrowers from these states to a page for “ChoiceCa\$h serviced by LoanMart,” where the fine print indicates the loans are made Capital Community Bank.¹⁵⁸ That webpage indicates that loans are installment loans up to three years, and “The Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is 170% with a repayment period of 36 months. A loan example: a 3-year \$3,000 loan with an APR of 170% has 36 scheduled monthly payments of \$428.64,” for a total cost of \$15,431.04.¹⁵⁹

The language indicating that for “certain California residents,” loans are made through a bank, appeared for the first time in January 2020. That is when California’s interest rate caps on loans up to \$10,000 went into effect (as discussed in section C above). It is not clear which California residents receive loans originated by LoanMart; those may be loans of \$300 or less, for which rates are not capped.

Most of the other states where LoanMart uses a bank to originate the loans are also ones that impose interest rate caps far lower than 170% APR on auto title loans or have other restrictions on auto title loans.¹⁶⁰ For example, in Florida, interest rates on auto title loans are capped at 30% per year on the first

notifying the agency of lenders’ stated intentions to evade the new California law through rent-a-bank schemes: an Oct. 24 letter opposing the agencies’ support of WBL in the Rent-Rite case (<https://www.nclc.org/issues/ltr-opp-rent-a-bank.html>), and a Nov.7 letter addressing the California statements in detail (<https://www.responsiblelending.org/media/advocates-urge-fdic-occ-federal-reserve-stop-banks-helping-payday-lenders-evade-state-interest>).

¹⁵⁷ <https://www.800loanmart.com/> (last accessed Jan. 20, 2020).

¹⁵⁸ <https://www.800loanmart.com/choicecash/>.

¹⁵⁹ *Id.* The website also indicates that the interest rate and monthly payment will drop each month if certain conditions are met.

¹⁶⁰ See generally National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Credit Regulation, Chapter 12 (2d ed. 2015), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

\$2,000, 24% per year on the principal amount exceeding \$2,000, and 18% per year on the remainder.¹⁶¹ In Kentucky, interest rates on auto title loans are capped at 36% per year on amounts less than \$3,000 and 24% per year on loan amounts greater than \$3,000.¹⁶² Some other jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia and Washington State, do not have specific statutes governing auto title lending but generally cap interest rates at 36% or less.¹⁶³

The dangers of allowing auto title lenders to charge otherwise usurious rates on loans originated by banks are especially great given the serious repercussions of losing one's car. For further discussion of the harm caused by auto title loans, see section G below.

E. The proposal's statement that it does not address "true lender" is cold comfort as the proposal effectively encourages, rather than guards against, evasion of state law through rent-a-bank schemes.

The FDIC's discussion of its proposed rule notes that the agency is not addressing the question whether the bank is the real party in interest or the "true lender" on a loan.¹⁶⁴ It also states that it "will view unfavorably entities that partner with a State bank with the sole goal of evading" state interest rate caps.¹⁶⁵ While the proposal would be even farther outside the FDIC's authority if it purported to limit interest rates when the true lender that originates the loan is not a bank, this statement does little to mitigate the dangers of the proposed rule. This is particularly true when considered in the context of other recent and immediately relevant FDIC and OCC statements and actions. In fact, the agency's proposal has the effect of inviting, rather than guarding against, evasion of state law through rent-a-bank schemes.

First, the proposed rule would eliminate the clean line established by the *Madden* case that is simple to enforce and is consistent with the FDIC's limited authority): The rate exportation provisions of federal banking law only preempt state usury laws as applied to interest that the bank charges, not interest charged by a non-bank assignee. It is simple for state regulators, enforcement officials, and consumers to see what interest rate a non-bank is charging. The true lender doctrine, on the other hand, requires review of the totality of the circumstances and can require years of litigation and facts that are not immediately publicly available—such as what relative share of the economic interest the non-bank has or whether the non-bank is immunizing the bank for the risk. Forced arbitration clauses will block consumers from bringing true lender cases on a classwide basis. And consumers cannot count on states to bring these cases, as enforcement and regulator resources are limited and in some parts of the country the state officials do not have a strong track record on consumer protection. Indeed, in a number of states today, consumers are being harmed by ongoing rent-a-bank schemes. Thus, the true lender doctrine alone cannot be expected to provide adequate defense against evasion of state law through rent-a-bank schemes.

¹⁶¹ Fla. Stat. § 537.011.

¹⁶² Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 286.4-530(1) (West).

¹⁶³ See generally National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Credit Regulation, Chapter 12 & Appx. D (2d ed. 2015), updated at www.nclc.org/library.

¹⁶⁴ FDIC Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 66846.

¹⁶⁵ *Id.*

Second, the FDIC's unfavorable view of some rent-a-bank schemes appears to be toothless. It is clearly so narrow as to invite abuse. By limiting itself to cases where evasion is the "sole" purpose, it risks green-lighting schemes where evasion is one of the purposes—perhaps even the dominant purpose. Lenders can always concoct additional rationales for their arrangements with banks. Moreover, the FDIC has shown no indication that it "views unfavorably" the several rent-a-bank schemes ongoing under its nose, including the Republic Bank/Elevate scheme that has been going on for years and the WBL one the agency is actively supporting. Indeed, when pointed questions were directed at Chairman McWilliams at a December 2019 hearing, she had no real explanation for the agency's failure to act.¹⁶⁶

Third, the FDIC has already directly demonstrated how the proposed rule should be expected to work: to support predatory rent-a-bank lenders like World Business Lenders. As noted above, the FDIC filed an amicus brief promoting the purported "valid-when made" theory this proposal promotes *to defend the validity of a predatory loan made through a rent-a-bank scheme*, without even suggesting that the bank might not be the true lender.

The proposal was made in the context of ongoing rent-a-bank schemes, including one the agency explicitly supported, with no indication that the agency will crack down on future schemes beyond one toothless sentence. The proposal can only be read to invite these schemes. Predatory lenders will use the proposed rule to justify their arrangements and hope they are not challenged or that they can use forced arbitration clauses or other means to defeat challenges. As the rent-a-bank schemes become increasingly complex, courts, for their part, may find it easier to reject true lender challenges and instead simply enforce a rule that the assignee may charge whatever interest the bank can charge.

F. The proposal fails to consider that it could encourage short-term payday lenders to return to rent-a-bank lending.

Some of the lenders that offer or are threatening to offer high-cost rent-a-bank installment loans also offer short-term payday loans. Enova's CashNetUSA offers both balloon-payment payday loans and long-term payday loans. CURO's SpeedyCash also offers short-term payday loans.

Currently, to our knowledge, rent-a-bank schemes are not being used to offer short-term loans, as they were 20 years ago. This is little consolation, however, as larger, longer high-cost loans are often an even bigger, deeper, more intractable debt trap than short-term loans.

¹⁶⁶ "Oversight of Prudential Regulators: Ensuring the Safety, Soundness, Diversity, and Accountability of Depository Institutions?," US House Committee on Financial Services, Dec. 4, 2019

<https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=404855> (See in particular Chairman McWilliams's exchanges with Rep. Tlaib, where Chairman McWilliams expresses no intent to address the FinWise Bank rent-a-bank scheme Tlaib raises; and with Rep. Porter, where Chairman McWilliams references a public enforcement action against one bank engaged in a rent-a-bank scheme. We believe Chairman McWilliams was referring to a 2018 action against Republic Bank & Trust that addressed a disclosure violation under the Truth In Lending Act in connection with Elevate's Elastic product, while in no way addressing the unsafe and unsound product itself (e.g., Elastic's default rates exceed 50% of revenues) or that Republic Bank is renting its charter to non-bank lender Elevate to enable evasion of state laws. The enforcement action is available here: https://www.bankersonline.com/sites/default/files/penalty-files/FDIC_RBT_CMP.pdf.)

Moreover, it is important to note that the arrangements between payday lenders and banks 20 years ago, and the arguments they made, were not that different from today's rent-a-bank lending. If the proposed rule is finalized, there is little other than the self-restraint of banks that would prevent short-term rent-a-bank lending from returning.

In 2000, the OCC itself described the older payday loan rent-a-bank arrangements in terms that are strikingly similar:

[S]ome national banks have entered into arrangements with third parties in which the national bank funds payday loans originated through the third party. In these arrangements, national banks often rely on the third party to provide services that the bank would normally provide itself. These arrangements may also involve the sale to the third party of the loans or the servicing rights to the loans.¹⁶⁷

In the older payday loan rent-a-bank schemes as in the newer ones, lenders argued that they were only the agent, service provider or assignee of the bank.¹⁶⁸ For example, as described in one case, Advance America was identified as "the fiscal agent and loan marketer/servicer." Advance America "procures the borrower and submits a loan application to BankWest. BankWest then approves (or denies) the application and advances all funds." The bank "used a separate third-party "loan processing agent" (an automated-consumer-information database that the payday lender itself used in other states) to electronically approve applications.¹⁶⁹

As described by the OCC in 2000, decades ago the payday lenders not only performed services as an agent of the bank but also were assignees of loans that banks chose to sell to the secondary market: "BankWest 'owns' all the loans initially, but retains the right to sell a loan to any third party; Advance America, as the payday store has a right of first refusal on any loan the BankWest chooses to sell."¹⁷⁰ For

¹⁶⁷ OCC Advisory Letter No. AL 2000-10 (Nov. 27, 2000), <https://occ.gov/news-issuances/advisory-letters/2000/advisory-letter-2000-10.pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ *BankWest, Inc. v. Baker*, 411 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005) ("To avoid this direct prohibition, however, payday stores have entered into agency agreements whereby the stores procure such payday loans for out-of-state banks ..."), *reh'g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006); *Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc.*, 307 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1196, 1205 (2004) ("Defendants assert that they acted as servicers for the loan made by County Bank... Defendants submit that County Bank developed the loan product at issue, approved and made the extension of the loan to the Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, funded the loan ..."); *Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express*, 188 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D. Colo. 2002) ("Defendant admits that it is a 'loan arranger/agent.'"); *Commonwealth v. Think Finance, Inc.*, 2016 WL 183289 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016).

¹⁶⁹ *BankWest, Inc. v. Baker*, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) ("To avoid this direct prohibition, however, payday stores have entered into agency agreements whereby the stores procure such payday loans for out-of-state banks ..."), *reh'g granted, op. vacated*, 433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005), *op. vacated due to mootness*, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006).

¹⁷⁰ *BankWest*, 411 F.3d at 1295 n.6; see also *People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del.*, 45 A.D.3d 1136, 1137, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (2007) ("County Bank and TC [Telecash] entered into an agreement wherein County Bank agreed to make and TC agreed to market and service such payday loans....TC and CRA purchased a 95% participation interest in each and every loan made."); *Hudson v. ACE Cash Express*, 2002 WL 1205060, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226 (S.D.Ind. 2002) ("The Master Agreement provides that Goleta will sell an undivided

example, one lender made arguments reminiscent of the FDIC's that it stepped into the bank's shoes: "preemption applies to any challenge of interest or fees on a bank-issued loan ... [and] preemption rights do not disappear when a loan is assigned or transferred from the bank."¹⁷¹

The FDIC has failed to consider the abuse of payday loan rent-a-bank arrangements of the past and the reputation risk to banks that eventually drove the bank regulators to shut them down. Yet the core of the FDIC's argument—that a bank has a right to sell loans, and that when it does the assignee steps into the bank's shoes—can be applied no matter what the interest rate or term of the loan.

The FDIC's 2005 and 2013 guidances addressing payday lending should guard against bank involvement in these short-term loans. The 2005 guidelines advise that borrowers should not be kept in payday loans for more than three months in a 12-month period. This guidance precipitated the end of FDIC banks' involvement in rent-a-bank schemes because payday lenders' model is built on trapping borrowers in more than six loans a year. The 2013 guidance advised that banks determine borrowers' ability to repay deposit advance (i.e., bank payday) loans. At the time, no FDIC-supervised banks were making deposit advance loans, but when the OCC issued the same guidance, its supervisee banks stopped making the loans, likely because the borrowers did not in fact have the ability to repay them.

Repeal of these guidances would be damaging to banks and consumers alike, and if coupled with this proposal, would amount to an open invitation for rent-a-bank schemes for short-term loans.¹⁷²

For discussion of the harm consumers experience at the hands of short-term payday loans, see section G below.

G. The proposal fails to consider that high-cost lenders that are or will be engaged in rent-a-bank lending make loans that severely harm financially vulnerable consumers.

1. Harm in general.

In recent years, the harms of high-cost lending have been more comprehensively and thoroughly documented than ever before.¹⁷³ High-cost lending is a debt trap by design, exploiting the financially

participation interest in certain 'Bank Loans' to ACE [Cash Express].... At the time of Goleta's loan to Hudson, ACE was required to purchase an undivided 95% participation interest in these loans.").

¹⁷¹ *Think Finance*, 2016 WL 183289 at *13.

¹⁷² Indeed, the OCC's repeal of its 2013 guidance addressing bank payday loans (aka "deposit advance products") leaves national banks with no guidance against these pernicious short-term loans. Although the OCC's excuse for repealing that guidance was that the CFPB had finalized a rule governing payday loans, the CFPB has proposed to repeal that rule and it is currently stayed by a court.

¹⁷³ See CFPB, Rule Addressing Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, Final Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 54472 (Nov. 17, 2017) (CFPB Payday Rule) and Docket No. CFPB-2016-0025 associated with that rule; see CRL and NCLC's comments to that docket, filed with additional consumer and civil rights groups, https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl_payday_comment_oct2016.pdf (CRL, NCLC, et al., Comments on CFPB Payday Rule); see *id.* at §2, pp. 17-40 (discussing harm to consumers).

distressed and leaving them worse off, leading to a host of financial consequences that include greater delinquency on other bills,¹⁷⁴ high checking account fees and closed accounts,¹⁷⁵ and bankruptcy.¹⁷⁶

Across the board, borrowers of high-cost loans are already struggling to manage existing credit obligations. The credit scores of Elevate's borrowers typically range from 511 to 626.¹⁷⁷ Elevate's Elastic borrowers have a median income of \$39,500.¹⁷⁸ Its Rise customers also have modest, if somewhat higher, incomes averaging \$53,600,¹⁷⁹ but they are clearly struggling, as the stories described below attest. The profile of short-term payday loan and auto-title borrowers is even more dire: their median credit scores are deep subprime or subprime, averaging 525-530, with about 85% of borrowers with scores below 600.¹⁸⁰ They typically earn \$25,000-\$30,000 per year.¹⁸¹

A fundamental, perverse reality drives the high-cost loan market: Borrowers meeting this profile are not likely to have the ability to repay the loans high-cost lenders make to them; lenders know this and depend on it, as the interest rates are so high that they make money anyway. For short-term loans, borrowers cannot afford the large balloon payment without borrowing another loan to repay the first, and the long-term cycle of debt drives the business model for lenders. For longer-term loans, borrowers often cannot afford the still-large payments on payday, or, even if they make some payments, they cannot *sustain* those payments for the life of the loan and ultimately pay it off.¹⁸² NCLC has shown how

¹⁷⁴ See, e.g., B. Melzer, *The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday Lending Market*, (2011), Oxford University Press, available at <http://bit.ly/10M01tZ>; Agarwal, S., Skiba, P. M., & Tobacman, J., *Payday loans and credit cards: New liquidity and credit scoring puzzles?* NBER Working Paper (2009), available at <http://bit.ly/RtDsXx>.

¹⁷⁵ CFPB Payday Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 54564, 73; see also Dennis Campbell, Asis Martinez Jerez, & Peter Tufano, *Bouncing out of the Banking System: An Empirical Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures*, Harvard Business School, 12/3/08, available at www.bostonfed.org/economic/cprc/conferences/2008/payment-choice/papers/campbell_jerez_tufano.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman, *Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?*, Vanderbilt University and the University of Pennsylvania, 10/10/08, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266215.

¹⁷⁷ Elevate 10K, 2018, at 9.

¹⁷⁸ *Id.*

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*

¹⁸⁰ See CFPB Payday Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 54556-58.

¹⁸¹ *Id.*

¹⁸² Consider, for example, the debt burden of a member of Hope Credit Union, as reported in Hope's comments to this docket. This borrower of a high-cost loan made through a rent-a-bank arrangement in a Deep South state started the year with four outstanding consumer loans, including a high-cost rent-a-bank loan, which in total accounted for 32% of her take-home pay. By the end of the year, she was still paying on all four debts, plus two additional loans, with the six loans (none of which was an auto loan) consuming 60% of her take-home pay—before accounting for a housing payment or other basic living expenses. Comments of Hope Enterprise Corporation/Hope Credit Union (HOPE) to the FDIC on this docket (Feb. 3, 2020).

high interest rates on longer-term loans create misaligned incentives that lead lenders to want—and to profit off of—borrowers who will struggle and default at high rates.¹⁸³

The dangers of high-cost, longer-term loans have become apparent, as payday lenders have increasingly shifted to these loans, or offered them alongside short-term balloon-payment payday loans. These loans include so-called “fintech” loans that attempt to portray themselves as better alternatives to payday loans, but which, in most significant respects, are not distinguishable from loans by traditional, “non-fintech” payday lenders. All of these longer-term loans typically still carry extremely high interest rates, are still tied to repayment on payday, and are still made with little regard for the borrower’s ability to repay the loan while meeting other expenses.¹⁸⁴ These loans have the potential to inflict as much or more harm—creating a deeper, longer debt trap—for borrowers than two-week payday loans.¹⁸⁵

Just like short-term payday loans that have very high rates of refinancing and default, the performance of longer-term high-cost loans reflects distress. The CFPB found that for online payday installment loans, (the channel for most new “fintech” loans) refinance rates were very high,¹⁸⁶ and a full 55% of loan sequences ended in default.¹⁸⁷

Publicly available information about one high-cost lender already engaging in rent-a-bank schemes demonstrates this high-cost, high-default model. Elevate’s entire book of business carries an average APR of 129%.¹⁸⁸ Elevate’s nationwide charge-off rates as a percentage of outstanding loan volume in 2014 was over 50%.¹⁸⁹ Elevate’s net charge-offs as a percentage of revenues is 52%,¹⁹⁰ a metric that Elevate states it does not intend to drive down.¹⁹¹ Essentially, Elevate’s is a high-rate, high-default model that profits while making unaffordable loans.

¹⁸³ Lauren Saunders et al., NCLC, *Misaligned Incentives: Why High-Rate Installment Lenders Want Borrowers Who Will Default* (July 2016), <https://www.nclc.org/issues/misaligned-incentives.html>.

¹⁸⁴ CRL, NCLC, et al., Comments on CFPB Payday Rule at § 2.5 (pp. 31-34) and § 10.1-10.3 (pp. 165-172). See also CFPB Proposed Rule on Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, discussion of longer-term high-cost loans, 81 Fed. Reg. 47864, 47885-92 (July 11, 2016).

¹⁸⁵ *Id.*

¹⁸⁶ CFPB Supplemental Findings on payday, payday installment, and vehicle title loans (June 2, 2016) at 15 (35% for storefront, 22% for online).

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 22 (55% for online; 34% for storefront). On a per-loan basis, the default rate is 24%.

¹⁸⁸ Elevate Form 10K, 2018, at 78.

¹⁸⁹ As calculated by the CFPB, CFPB Proposed Payday Rule, 8c1 Fed Reg. 47886, n.246. CFPB’s calculation is consistent with rates calculated by NCLC using California data. Lauren Saunders et al., NCLC, *Misaligned Incentives: Why High-Rate Installment Lenders Want Borrowers Who Will Default* (July 2016), <https://www.nclc.org/issues/misaligned-incentives.html>.

¹⁹⁰ Elevate Form 10K, 2018, at 78.

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at 86.

Research CRL released recently documents the experience of focus group participants in Colorado, where high-cost longer-term payday loans averaging 129% APR often triggered significant additional financial hardships for borrowers.¹⁹²

Auto title loans can be particularly devastating. In addition to inflicting the same harms caused by payday and other high-cost installment loans, auto title loans put borrowers at substantial risk of losing their car. Research has found that an astounding one in five auto title borrowers have their car repossessed.¹⁹³ The consequences of losing one's vehicle are dire—both the loss of a valuable asset and the serious disruption of a borrower's ability to get to work, earn income, and manage their lives.¹⁹⁴ More than a third of auto title borrowers have reported pledging the only working car in their household as security for their auto title loan.¹⁹⁵

Mere statistics on the loan performance of high-cost loans, staggering as they are, do not do justice to the brutal financial, emotional, and physical turmoil these toxic products inflict. The distress can pervade every facet of a person's life, often extending to the borrower's family members as well. Growing research documents the links between high-cost loans and negative health impacts.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Center for Responsible Lending, *Sinking Feeling: Colorado Borrowers Describe Their Experiences With Payday Loans* (July 2018), <https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crl-sinking-feeling-jul2018.pdf>.

¹⁹³ CFPB Single-Payment Vehicle Title Lending at 4 (2016). CRL estimates that approximately 340,000 auto title borrowers annually have their car repossessed, well exceeding the population of St. Louis. For calculation, see CRL, Public Citizen, NCLC et. al comments on CFPB's proposed repeal of the ability-to-repay provisions of the payday rule at 26, n.90 (May 15, 2019), <https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/comment-cfpb-proposed-repeal-payday-rule-may2019.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ See CFPB Payday Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 54573, 93.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.*, n. 592 (internal citations omitted).

¹⁹⁶ One finds that access to payday loans substantially increased suicide risk—including by over 16% for those ages 25-44. Jaeyoon Lee, *Credit Access and Household Welfare: Evidence From Payday Lending* (SSRN Working Paper, 2017). Another finds that short-term loans, including payday loans, are associated with a range of negative health outcomes, even when controlling for potential confounders. Elizabeth Sweet et al., *Short-term lending: Payday loans as risk factors for anxiety, inflammation and poor health*, 5 SSM—Population Health, 114–121 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2018.05.009>. These outcomes include symptoms of physical health, sexual health, and anxiety, as well as higher levels of C-reactive protein, which is an indicator of many long-term diseases, including cardiovascular disease, and an indicator of psychological stress. *Id.* Another study finds that restrictions on payday lending reduced liquor sales. Harold E. Cuffe & Christopher G. Gibbs, *The Effect of Payday Lending Restrictions on Liquor Sales*, 85(1) J. Banking & Fin. 132–45 (2017). In one study of qualitative data, respondents revealed symptoms of “allostatic load,” a health psychology term that describes how compounding stress can lead to wear and tear on the body. Elizabeth Sweet et al., *Embodied Neoliberalism: Epidemiology and the Lived Experience of Consumer Debt*, 48(3) International Journal of Health Services (2018). The authors describe the respondents as having “embodied” their debt through idioms like “drowning in debt” and “keeping [their] head above water,” which illustrated that the participants “experienced debt as a bodily sensation, not only a socioeconomic position or emotional stressor.” *Id.* One payday borrower has reported that after being a “a pretty healthy young person,” she “became physically sick, broke out in hives . . . [and] had to go to urgent care” as a result of her high-cost loan. Health Impact Partners and Missouri Faith Voices, *When Poverty Makes You Sick: The intersection of health and predatory lending in Missouri* (Feb. 2019), <https://humanimpact.org/wp->

Below are narratives from the CFPB complaints database describing borrowers' experiences with high-cost installment loans by lenders currently engaging in rent-a-bank schemes (Elevate, OppLoans, Enova (NetCredit brand), and LoanMart), or who have stated that they intend to (CURO (SpeedyCash brand)). While many of these complaints so far do not involve rent-a-bank loans, they are illustrative of the type of loans these lenders make that they will bring to states that do not allow high-cost loans.

In addition, in light of the risk that the FDIC's proposal would promote growth of both short- and longer-term payday and car title loans through rent-a-bank schemes, attached at Appendix B are over 150 borrower experiences with short- and longer-term payday and car title loans from a variety of lenders.

Elevate

- I am a single mother who is living . . . below the poverty level. I have had my share of credit problems and have owed more than I make for quite some time. I was misled by Rise Credit to believe that they were unlike other predatory loan companies. By the time I understood what I had [signed], I had paid them thousands of dollars in interest. I have recently become temporarily unemployed and called them to ask for help during my time of financial hardship. They refused any solution and my account is headed to collections now [T]he total paid is far over the amount I initially borrowed from Rise This is robbery and all of the necessities I have for myself and my children are suffering because of it How is it that they can do this? I am asking for help for not only my family, but for all of the families targeted by these predatory loans meant to target those living in poverty and struggling to live paycheck to paycheck.¹⁹⁷
- [T]hey are charging me over \$6000.00 interest on a simple loan for only \$2600.00 i did not foresee such an impact on my monthly income for so long ... that \$500.00 is supposed to be the monies I have left over after bills and survive/live on after all my other bills. They have access to my bank account and automatically take it out I do not know how to stop this madness. How can they charge me over \$8000.00 for a \$2600.00 loan? Is this legal?¹⁹⁸
- My [] mother was solicited by a predatory lender, RISE for a personal loan. She agreed to \$1300.00 loan but was told the California law stated the minimum loan amount was \$2600.00. Her interest rate is 125 %, how is this legal? She is on a fixed income and RISE has set up an auto pay with her checking account with a monthly payment of \$470.00 This is elder abuse! Please shut this company down.¹⁹⁹
- To date I have paid well over \$6900.00, almost three times the principle. I still owe close to \$3000.00. Prior to accepting the loan I did read the " fine print " but it was not easy to understand. It was not explicit[ly] stated that the monthly payments would be going to the interest and not to paying down the principle, making the loan impossible to pay off quickly. I called . . . and asked specifically for an amnesty on the remaining balance because I am having a

content/uploads/2019/02/HIP-MFV_PayDayLending_2019.02fin1.pdf. Another expressed feeling, “[i]f I died, my debt would die with me. At least I could give my family that.” *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ #1487339 (California borrower)

¹⁹⁸ #1361463 (California borrower)

¹⁹⁹ #1584177 (California borrower)

hard time paying on this exorbitantly high interest loan for over 12 months. I also explained to her that to date I had paid almost three times the principle . . . in the end, the total paid before it is satisfied will be over \$9500.00! Paying \$7500.00 in interest for a \$2500.00 loan is outrageous and should be illegal.²⁰⁰

- I took a loan with rise credit . . . and I was unable to make timely payments. I expected to pay it once I received my tax return. However, it went to collections and then a lawyer and they added so many penalties and fees. Now I owe XXXX for a XXXX loan. Now, they are garnishing 25 percent of my paycheck and I 'm already struggling as it is.²⁰¹
- I am a visually impaired person, with a monthly income of less than \$900. I can surely say that I had no idea that the monthly installment would not be applied to the principal loan amount. After my aid read to me just a few days ago that I was not paying off the loan all of the money was going to interest and only {\$19.00} was applies to the principal. But I do not have that kind of money. I am requesting that you cease deducting {\$520.00} from my bank account . . . I have struggled for the last five moths giving RISE most of my income, and I can not make the rent, utilities, or food.²⁰²
- I have a high interest installment loan through Rise. I pay \$220.00 every 2 weeks with \$16.00 of that going to the principal. I had a medical procedure done that kept me out of work for just a little more than a month. I did not receive a paycheck during that time. This has put me a few payments behind on my loan as they come due every 2 weeks. I am trying to get this all worked out so I can catch up with them over time as I just started back to work today. My issue is when I came back today I was told by my coworkers that this number called (XXXX) so many times a day that they turned off the phone in our office. . . . I am willing to work something out with them but calling my work to harass me and doing multiple attempt debits to my bank account that has no money in it racking up a ton of fees. This is not helping their cause as I have to pay my bank now instead of putting that money towards catching up on my loan. They tried withdrawing twice within a few minutes during XXXX attempt which racked up an instant \$70.00 more to my bank account fees like the money was going to instantly appear in there after the first attempt a few minutes earlier.²⁰³
- We originally signed up for a \$3,000 [loan] with an interest rate of 208%. I have been paying \$520.00 every month and paid a total of \$5500.00 . . . This has been a burden for me and my family. As an [redacted] military member, i have reached out to my chain of command regarding this issue. I have been advised by financial counselors that in accordance with Military Lending Act says that you can't be charged an interest rate higher than 36 % on most types of consumer loans and provides other significant rights. I am currently working with my local Judge Advocate General 's Office to get some help with legal issues.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ #1962588 (California borrower)

²⁰¹ #2181870 (California borrower)

²⁰² #2202311 (California borrower)

²⁰³ #2303749 (Missouri borrower)

²⁰⁴ #2442651 (U.S. Armed Forces - Pacific borrower)

- I received a mail out stating that I was pre-approved for credit and to go online and apply. I did so and entered into a line of credit agreement in the amount of \$2500 The payments are bi-weekly and the second one jumped to \$240.00. My gross income is XXXX per month. I have XXXX child and simply can not afford this high of a payment. My father called . . . and tried to get the company to lower the payment. They said that they could do whatever they wanted to and refused to address my concerns. The APR on this loan was 199 %. I feel this company is operating on an unfair and deceitful basis.²⁰⁵
- Why are my payments not reducing my principal balance? My statement for month 1 states that my balance is \$3800.00. It said I owed \$430.00. I paid it. The next month my bill was \$540.00 and I paid it. After that payment was applied (?) my total balance owed wasn't \$3800.00. So I asked them why my balance was only reduced by \$3.00 even though I had paid them almost \$1000.00 please help me. This can not be right.²⁰⁶
- I have fallen on hard times I borrowed \$1200.00 and have paid back \$1100.00, however due to the interest rate being so high [I owe a] balance of over \$1000.00 still. I was told when I took this loan that after a period of time I would be able to refinance the loan and lower my payments. This was not true, I have attempted to refinance and the APR is the same 291 %. I would like to cancel my account and come to an agreement that works for both of us. I am a single mother and paying \$160.00 every time I get paid equaling to \$260.00 per month is unbearable. I have also [made] large payments over the past few months hoping this would decrease the balance and it has not.²⁰⁷
- On XX/XX/17 I needed to pay for a major repair on my vehicle and had to refinance an existing loan I had with Rise credit to an amount of \$2500.00. Since that date I have been making regular payments twice a month of \$230.00 and it has all been interest. I have made 21 payments, so over \$4000.00 in interest and my principal balance has not gone down at all. I am at a loss of what to do, because I was in a tight spot but had I known id be living this nightmare I never would have taken out this loan.²⁰⁸
- I would have rejected/not accepted the loan if I had realized it was a 238.36% interest rate. They set up ACH installment payments of \$410.00 a month which I can not afford I am on Social Security XXXX (Fixed income) with limited resources I can't believe that this is legal-this is more like loan sharking and preying on people who are not able to defend themselves. I am more than willing to pay the \$2000.00 back at a reasonable interest rate and reasonable monthly payments of \$200.00 a month (ie ... a credit card rate for people with limited resources perhaps 25-28 %?)[.] [N]ot 238.36 %[. H]ow can this even be legal?²⁰⁹

²⁰⁵ #2764858 (Kansas borrower)

²⁰⁶ #2816269 (Tennessee borrower)

²⁰⁷ #2858004 (Wisconsin borrower)

²⁰⁸ #2942998 (North Dakota borrower)

²⁰⁹ #3141291 (Wisconsin borrower)

OppLoans

- I am being contacted everyday, with the exception of Sunday, for a month. The[y] want the loan paid but, I am unemployed and a [] veteran. I have tried to explain this to the company. However, they continue to contact me. It's the same thing everyday.²¹⁰
- I have been paying this loan for more than a year and the principal has not changed. I borrowed \$2000.00 and have paid \$4600.00 into this loan to date....²¹¹
- I contacted this firm opp loans several times . . . regarding the high interest[] rates being charged on my loan. I informed them that [we are] military spouses and famil[ies] . . . that we are protected against high interest rates. They informed me that they needed proof to review my interest rate. They then informed me that spouse loans are not covered under the military lending act and was notified by their legal department. My current interest rate is 159 % on short term installment loan. Please assist²¹²
- This company calls me 6 times or more a day. I informed them . . . that I had lost my job and I would call them back when I start work again and get my finances back on track. They dont care they have been calling non stop. They have made it harder for my recovery.²¹³
- I had a loan with this company for about \$2000.00[,] now i went on short term [leave or disability] with my job and didn't get paid [and] called the company [and] explained why I couldn't make payment . . . I really dont know what to do but i have arrangements with other companies after they knowingly understood my dilemma. Im upset that i have to pay all the fees and loan with no arrangement and still be a single mom and live. Now they are emailing and calling me saying they will garnish my bank account for 20 years and my check and so on. Im very afraid and dont want to be homeless or behind over 4500 dollars.²¹⁴
- I work as an [] for my [daughter], who was in the Intensive care unit When my daughter is hospitalized I do not get paid. After being in the hospital for a month I signed an Opp loan for \$2600.00 I have paid them over \$3600.. Today they tell me that I owe them \$2800.00²¹⁵
- I . . . took out the loan[.] I am not disputing the loan[.] I had a downfall in life and defaulted I . . . received a " Notice of Intent to Assign Wages[.]" I spoke to [a representative] who refused to assist. [H]er only option was for me to pay \$560.00 now and make the original monthly payments. I stated to her I do not have that money[.] I really do not[.] I need help[.] [S]he

²¹⁰ #2812101 (Tennessee borrower) (appears to be a rent-a-bank loan)

²¹¹ #3106431 (Maryland borrower)

²¹² #3354050 (Michigan borrower) (appears to be a rent-a-bank loan)

²¹³ #3371847 (Arizona borrower) (appears to be a rent-a-bank loan)

²¹⁴ #3015405 (Illinois borrower)

²¹⁵ #3028087 (California borrower).

refused to offer me any solution. I currently have \$100.00 in my checking account. I asked to speak to a supervisor and she refused to allow me to speak to a supervisor . . . I think this company has no intentions to help anyone who is struggling.²¹⁶

- I took a payday installment loan for the sake of building my credits . . . I then told them I am not doing it through debit card anymore . . . as per contract, it doesn't say I have to use my debit card as a routing number was a condition for approval. This week . . . they contacted my employer and decided to garnish my wage. This is unfair to me as I wasn't informed and it is not my fault, I never refused to pay or change my account. They didn't do their responsibility to deduct money while I gave my account information (confirmed today they still have). This is unfair garnishment and punishment to me because of their fault (or their systems) . . . I urge your help to assist me to remove this unfair garnishment on me and let the company comply with their promises. I also ask you to judge this and make Opploans repair my damaged credits that were caused by this unfair transaction. I am not delinquent to this transaction.²¹⁷
- I emailed company . . . and then I also called and rescinded the wage assignment. I sent an email to the CEO office and also spoke to several representatives to try to reach a settlement for the principle amount of the loan. The amount when I asked for the settlement was XXXX. This would have had the company write off about 200 in interest only. There was a los[s] of income in my household. So to prevent a long term impact to my credit and finances, I asked to settle the account. I was informed that I had to be at least 61 days behind and that if I made a minimum payment of XXXX that I would stay in a positive balance. This did not make sense as this would also keep the account in a current status. This would also cause more interest to accrue over time. I wanted to settle the account, close the account and avoid negative impact on my credit, and more fees. The company refused to work with stating the contract was enforceable. This would benefit the company to continue to accrue more interest and fees over a period of time and impact the consumer in a negative light.²¹⁸

Enova (NetCredit brand)

- On XX/XX/2016 I was approved for a personal loan with NetCredit. I was unaware of the future circumstances and took out a very high interest loan, 99 % interest on a \$2000.00 [loan]. I have become a XXXX veteran and unemployed at the moment due to my condition. The total amount that I will be paying back on a \$2000.00 loan is \$7800.00. I have been paying on this loan since that date. [The complaint was filed on May 2, 2019.]²¹⁹
- Netcredit is a company that [is] not interest[ed] in listening to any complaint or trying to work with [] me to help because I can't pay the high amount of interest[,] and the very little amount going towards the principle [--] that is unfair and wrong for anybody to have to do. I am not trying to not pay them but I have a problem with them trying to lock me in a five year loan which they seek to collect three time the loan amount they gave me. I am a XXXX Veteran that

²¹⁶ #3027480 (Illinois borrower)

²¹⁷ #3190625 (Illinois borrower)

²¹⁸ #3407914 (Illinois borrower)

²¹⁹ 3229883 (South Carolina borrower)

gets a monthly check that all I have to live on[,] [F]or Netcredit to do this is shameful and disgraceful. PLEASE HELP!!²²⁰

- At the time, I had been struggling financially because . . . I lost the father of my [] children. I lost more than half of our income and could not keep up on my salary alone. I became in over my head with debt to many people I took out the loan through NetCredit for the amount of \$3700.00 . . . I was steadily making payments every two weeks on this loan for \$230.00 . . . I am a XXXX employee who was out of work and without pay for the duration of the XXXX . . . NetCredit deferred my payments without question or hesitation giving me the peace of mind that everything was going to be okay [M]y intent was to pay the balance in full. What NetCredit failed to tell me was that the payments I had made toward the loan did not go to the principle whatsoever By the time the XXXX was over, they had tacked on over \$1000.00 in interest to the loan. Despite almost paying the loan off, they still reported I owed \$3700.00 plus accrued interest at that time. They told me that since I had been in non-pay status for so long that if I didn't make a payment immediately they would send me to collections They have yet to close the account and are continuing to rack up interest and report the balance of the loan increasing every month. They are reporting that I owe 6600.00 I am a single mother of [] children who are not even old enough to be in school yet. I can not afford what they are putting on me and they are making it so I can not provide for my family by destroying my credit.²²¹
- I got a loan in the amount of \$2100.00. [D]ecided to login into my account to see how much principal was left on the loan and its \$2100.00. Only \$57.00 paid to principal in the last year. Ive made all my payments on time, \$58.00 every 2 weeks. Something can not be right with this loan. I feel as though Ive been getting robbed for the past year. I do not understand. My [fiancé] has a loan with NetCredit as well within the same timeframe . . . Loan amount \$3000.00 . . . principal is only down to \$2900.00. Her payments are \$78.00 every 2 weeks, never missed a payment. Please help!²²²
- I was contacted by netcredit advising that I was pre approved for an installment loan. As I am a single mother of XXXX and have been . . . behind on HOA fees and other bills and decided to take out the loan I checked an account that I used and realized that they were taking out the XXXX every 2 weeks I told them I could not afford the XXXX coming out every 2 weeks as this is not what I [anticipated]. This has brought my checking account seriously negative and my bank is giving me a hard time as well I feel this is very deceptive, [an] installment loan is supposed to be a monthly payment[,], a payday loan is a bi weekly payment. I really need help with this. I can [make] [monthly] payments[,], I can not make bi weekly payments of XXXX[,], that is too much and it is really creating a hardship for my family.²²³
- I took out a loan in 2014 with NetCredit for \$2600.00. I paid on the loan for 40 payments I ran into an inability to pay and wanted to work with Net Credit to settle the loan. I even hired a

²²⁰ #3251851 (Georgia borrower)

²²¹ #3370736 (California borrower)

²²² #3393212 (Virginia borrower)

²²³ #3053313 (Utah borrower)

firm to assist. Net Credit was not willing to work with the firm nor myself and an agreement was never reached. My fear is that they are holding back wanting to work with me while late fees and interest continue to accrue at an alarming rate.²²⁴

- I am disputing this loan based on that it is impossible to pay it off at 98.8 % . . . I will pay over \$7000.00 for a \$3900.00 loan at 98.8 % I have called and spoke with them about 10 times within the last 3 1/2 weeks. NETCREDIT WILL NOT WORK WITH ME OR DISCUSS ANY OPTIONS WITH ME. All I am asking for is to take the interest away from this loan and allow me to make monthly payments that I am able to handle. I understand my responsibility of the balance of the loan but they do not work with their consumers, instead make a profit with predatory lending practices.²²⁵
- I offered NetCredit a reasonable settlement amount which they dismissed and demand full payment which is completely insane. I had no idea after I paid \$3000.00 on \$3400.00 loan that I would have to pay an additional \$4000.00 to pay it off or continue making the payment and by the time it was paid off I would have paid many thousands of dollars.²²⁶
- I took a loan from NetCredit in the amount of \$1200.00. To date I have made 11 payments at the payment amount of \$100.00 each for a total paid of \$2000.00 plus a check payment of \$100.00 which has not been cashed or applied to my account. NetCredit states I still have fourteen more payments of \$100.00 each to make. For a \$1200.00 loan, I will end up paying \$3600.00, more than THREE TIMES the loan amount!!²²⁷
- [I] [b]orrowed \$1400.00 . . . Paid [x]payments of \$110.00 = \$1100.00 . . . balance is currently \$1400.0 . . . Was unable to keep up with payments due to XXXX income (was unemployed for 10 months- catching up on past debts and medical bills). Several attempts were made to set up payment agreements with NETCREDIT . . . but Net Credit didn't agree I was NOT aware the interest on \$1400.00 would be \$1200.00 (almost the amount of the loan). I would have NEVER agreed to this loan. I am a veteran and XXXX civilian on a tight budget. This interest charged on the loan is hideous. I could have borrowed that amount from a local bank/lender and not have that much in interest. This is a horrible way to take advantage of those that are in need!²²⁸
- NetCredit is a company that take advantage of people ... they approve your loan on line then hit you with 98 % interest I took a loan out for \$6000.00 ... once I found out the loan was to be taken out of my checking account 2x a month [] I called and asked them to adjust to 1x a month ... they said they couldn't do ... this was the biggest mistake I have ever made to take a loan out [] with them ... I was unable to pay and got in touch to work something out ... they sent gave me minimal options and then sent a letter saying that I can pay off the balance which now is \$7800.00 I had been paying the monthly for a year at least??? and now I owe XXXX

²²⁴ #2418022 (California borrower)

²²⁵ #2183667 (Virginia borrower)

²²⁶ #3270880 (California borrower)

²²⁷ #3324359 (South Carolina borrower)

²²⁸ #2144831 (Virginia borrower)

more??? This is a company that the government should look into ... they are sharks!!!! I would recommend that people stay away from this company!!!²²⁹

LoanMart

- I have this loan and ... being a senior citizen the payment[s] are [too] high[.] I am [p]aying \$420.00 each month[,] have not paid for this month[,] and they can take my car at anytime[.] I am trying to work with them[,] my health is now becoming poor as I can not sleep I want to pay them and I will but I need the payment to be [up to] \$320.00 per month[,] which would be a hardship but I could do that had I known I would not have take[n] this loan out and would have just gone homelessat least I would have had a car to sleep in and live not . . . on the street with no car or a place to live[.]²³⁰
- I have been paying monthly, often times after . . . my due date, but I get the payment in monthly. On two occasions I was given extensions, but I have paid way more than the \$1500.00 loan amount and expected to be paid off I was told because I was late many times, my loan has been extended for approx 20 more months, unless I can come up with the \$1500.00 original loan amount plus \$680.00 in late fees. Had I paid on time by the 11th if every month I would be paid off. When I told them that was ridiculous that it was still paid in the same month they told me too bad so now I have to pay another \$4000.00 plus dollars ({\$210.00} x 20) on time . . . or it may take longer I [will] never get my title back or get this loan paid off I will be paying over \$8000.00 on a \$1500.00 loan.²³¹
- My Loan charged off after i turned [in] the vehicle They auctioned off the vehicle and sent me a final charge off amount of \$2600.00 . . . I received a payment settlement request in XXXX of XXXX for \$1500.00 . . . As of today, they are reporting that i owe \$7700.00 as the interest is still being charged on a loan they have been " charged off ". They are . . . inflating the amount owed to well over 300 % of what the original loan was They already have my car, now they want to ruin my credit. They are predatory [and] overly punitive with high interest after the charge off.²³²
- I was in need of a loan to move and the television and radio were [inundated] with advertisements from "1-800- Loan-Mart XXXX[.]" I called and they offered me a " title loan " for \$10000.00 specific to my . . . Toyota Camry. The payment was and remains a staggering \$850.00 per month. Also, my ex-husband bounced a check to me . . . which prevented making a payment so I called for an extension [but] they repossessed my car . . . and charged me almost \$2500.00 to get the car back I have been paying the \$850.00 monthly for over two years and the principle balance or payoff remains just a [little] less than the original loan. What guidelines

²²⁹ #1998233 (California borrower)

²³⁰ #2894498 (California borrower)

²³¹ #3126449 (Wisconsin borrower)

²³² #1792457 (California borrower)

regulate the loan industry and why are they permitted to be rude, abusive and lend money like . . . loan sharks?²³³

- 1 800 Loan Mart has repeatedly called me 30 times a day for the last 7 months[,] also have incorrectly reported negative things on my credit report, also called and threatened me with imprisonment lawsuit . . . [A]fter I paid them \$4000.00 and they took my vehicle[,] now they're saying I still owe them \$5000.00[.] [T]he original amount of loan was \$2500.00.²³⁴
- I needed money to pay for my moving expenses. I took a title max car loan. I 've tried to keep up with the payments but fall short so my payments are late and include a hefty penalty payment in addition to interest My plan is to pay the entire bill with large lump sum payments. The problem is the amount that is added to the principal balance makes it difficult to pay the loan off. My car was reposed this morning. In order to get my car back, I must pay them \$900.00 which includes towing, paying for personal property left in the car and making a trip to the police department to obtain a [repossession] receipt. This is robbery.²³⁵
- I took out a loan in . . . 2014 for \$5700.00. I've made payments of \$450.00 since then [totaling] about \$8000.00. I just recently got a payment history to see my balance due and almost none of my payments have applied to principal balance, almost all of it has gone towards interest! I spoke with a customer service rep today and they still want \$7000.00 to close [the] account. I told them I no longer have a steady job or income and have been going through health/medical issues and have been in and out of the hospital. I just want to settle amount of another \$1000.00 to close account. I 've already paid back the \$5700.00 and interest of more than \$2000.00 and still going to give \$1000.00 to settle. I 'm trying to be honest with them and get a settlement and close my account.²³⁶ (This complaint was submitted on August 12, 2016).

CURO (SpeedyCash brand)

- Speedy Cash took money from my . . . debit card without my authorization. I receive my social security SSI payments in the amount of \$730.00 on this card . . . my card was debited by Speedy Cash for the amount of \$520.00. When I called them they stated that my account was past due . . . and that it had gone into collections They also said that there was nothing they could do because the third party collector was involved When I called [the third party], the representative told me that they were not involved in collecting on this account any longer because Speedy Cash had taken the loan back. I am confused by the back and forth. Now, I am in a horrible position. My account was basically drained which leaves me with no money for the entire month. No money for rent, utilities, doctor visit, or prescriptions. I . . . have no idea what I am going to do.²³⁷

²³³ #1867122 (California borrower)

²³⁴ #2356677 (California borrower)

²³⁵ #2157776 (Nevada borrower)

²³⁶ #2958482 (California borrower)

²³⁷ #2657445 (Missouri borrower)

- I have paid \$1600.00 on the account and all payments have gone towards the interest and late fees. I have given seven payments at \$220.00 each month since the loan and I owe at this time \$2800.00 at this rate the loan will cost more than I borrowed. I need help because this is a car title loan and I can't afford losing my car over this. I have called the corporate office and . . . they all say the same thing (--) there is nothing that can be done except keep making the payments . . . It's like I borrowed the monies from [someone] in a street alley.²³⁸
- I borrowed \$750.00First month repayment . . . \$240.00 Remaining balance over \$1000.00. Next installment \$240.00 . . . remaining balance over \$1000.00. Payments increase as does amounts owed. Decline in principal is offset by increase in fees or 'interest.' Never ending cycle.²³⁹
- [I] borrowed \$1300.00 from speedy cash and the first payment was ok (\$77.00) and after that they were \$140.00 every other week and [I] am now unable to make these ridiculous payments [because] my hours have been cut at [work]. I notified them . . . I am in default and [I] have sent emails [T]hey say to contact them if [you can't] make a payment and they will work with you. All they do is extend it 4-5 days out and [that don't] help either! I am desperate[, I] have called about filing bankruptcy and [I] may have to and [I don't know what else to do].²⁴⁰
- Speedy Cash stopped the payday loans and changed to the installment loans If your payment is due on a certain day they could move it up by 4 days but it [doesn't] help if that 4th day is not a payday. I have paid so many overdraft and bank fees until I feel ashamed[d] and stupid. I needed the money but once you get it [it's] hard to get rid of it. I [don't] understand [what's] hard about reasonable payment arrangements. Your 4 day extension is not realistic to customers.²⁴¹
- I currently have an installment loan in the amount of \$2600.00 from Speedy Cash At the same time, I also have [x] \$300.00 payday loans from [x] different storefronts in my neighborhood, including Speedy Cash. So basically, I have both a \$300.00 payday loan from Speedy Cash and a \$2600.00 installment loan. Is that legal? I am drowning in debt and I can't handle it anymore. I need some relief. This is very stressful and expensive for me, and I don't know what to do I 've been paying about \$140.00 every two weeks on the Speedy Cash installment loan, and I 've already paid \$2200.00 . . . but my total balance is still \$2600.00! How is this even possible? Are all my payments going toward interest only? I can't keep paying on all these loans. I need to prioritize my rent (\$1100.00), car payment (\$320.00), insurance (\$180.00) and my other basic needs like food and utilities. After taxes, I only bring home about \$1800.00 a month. So this is really hurting me and I 've reached my breaking point I don't want to default on the loan, but at this point I'm not seeing another alternative. I recently received XXXX

²³⁸ #2792493 (California borrower)

²³⁹ #2772146 (Utah borrower)

²⁴⁰ #3046440 (Tennessee borrower)

²⁴¹ #2718087 (Mississippi borrower)

utility disconnection notices from my gas, water and light companies[.] To make matters worse, I'm also facing being laid off from work in the next few months. I need help.²⁴²

- I could not get Speedy Cash to stop taking payments out of my bank account using my debit card. I called them, I wrote them. I tried to set up payments. I told my bank to not authorize any more payments. Didn't help. Finally I had to shut down all my accounts at my bank and go to another bank. I could not believe it when I when, at my new bank, Speedy Cash withdrew \$100.00, the next day \$60.00. I have no idea what that amount is for. I'm disputing the charges Can you help me?²⁴³

2. Particular harm to communities of color.

High-cost lending disproportionately harms communities of color, exploiting and perpetuating the racial wealth gap. A legacy of racial discrimination in housing, lending, banking, policing, employment, and otherwise, has produced dramatically inequitable outcomes that persist today. Communities of color, often largely segregated due to the history of redlining and other racially exclusionary housing policies, experience higher rates of poverty, lower wages, and higher cost burdens to pay for basic living expenses. Payday lenders peddling unaffordable loans cause particular harm to these communities,²⁴⁴ which several of the undersigned groups represent.

Storefront lenders, which often offer both short-term and longer-term loans, target borrowers of color, in part by concentrating their locations in communities of color.²⁴⁵ Indeed, the communities most affected by redlining are the same who are saturated by payday lenders today. Multiple studies have found that payday lenders are more likely to locate in more affluent communities of color than in less affluent white communities.²⁴⁶ In light of this targeting, it is unsurprising that a disproportionate share of

²⁴² #1377341 (California borrower)

²⁴³ #2158561 (Kansas borrower)

²⁴⁴ See CFPB Payday Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 54556-57.

²⁴⁵ See, e.g., Delvin Davis, et al., *Race Matters: The Concentration of Payday Lenders in African-American Communities in North Carolina*, Center for Responsible Lending (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/north-carolina/nc-payday/research-analysis/racematters/rr006-Race_Matters_Payday_in_NC-0305.pdf (finding that, even when controlling for a variety of other factors, African-American neighborhoods had three times as many payday lending stores per capita as white neighborhoods in North Carolina in 2005); Assaf Oron, *Easy Prey: Evidence for Race and Military Related Targeting in the Distribution of Payday Loan Branches in Washington State*, Department of Statistics, University of Washington (2006) (concluding based on a study of Washington State payday lenders that “payday businesses do intentionally target localities with a high percentage of African Americans.”).

²⁴⁶ Li, et al., *Predatory Profiling: The Role of Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California*, Center for Responsible Lending (2009), <http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/predatory-profiling.pdf>; Brandon Coleman and Delvin Davis, *Perfect Storm: Payday Lenders Harm Florida Consumers Despite State Law*, Center for Responsible Lending at 7, Chart 2 (March 2016); Delvin Davis and Lisa Stifler, *Power Steering: Payday Lenders Targeting Vulnerable Michigan Communities*, Center for Responsible Lending (Aug. 2018), <https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/power-steering-payday-lenders-targeting-vulnerable-michigan-communities>; Delvin Davis, *Mile High Money: Payday Stores Target Colorado Communities of Color*, Center for Responsible Lending (Aug. 2017; amended Feb. 2018),

payday borrowers come from communities of color, even after controlling for income.²⁴⁷ The disparity in payday loans is especially significant given that African Americans and Latinos are much less likely to have checking accounts, typically a requirement for a payday loan, than whites.²⁴⁸

Online high-cost lenders may focus more on subprime credit score than geography. But the historical discrimination against communities of color is also reflected in credit scores.²⁴⁹ Lenders that focus on subprime borrowers inevitably will disproportionately target borrowers of color. The algorithms and big data that “fintech” lenders use may also result in disparate impacts on these communities.²⁵⁰

Communities of color have historically been disproportionately left out of the traditional banking system, a disparity that persists today. About 17 percent of African American and 14 percent of Latino households are unbanked, compared to three percent of white households.²⁵¹ High-cost loans, with their high association with lost bank accounts,²⁵² drive borrowers out of the banking system and exacerbate this disparity. By sustaining and exacerbating an existing precarious financial situation, high-cost lending reinforces and magnifies existing income and wealth gaps—legacies of continuing discrimination—and perpetuates discrimination today.²⁵³

<https://www.responsiblelending.org/research-publication/mile-high-money-payday-stores-target-colorado-communities-color>.

²⁴⁷ CFPB Payday Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 54556. African-Americans are payday borrowers at three times the rate, and Hispanics at twice the rate, of non-Hispanic whites. 82 Fed. Reg. at 54556-57 (citing 2015 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (calculations using custom data tool)). Vehicle title borrowers are also disproportionately African-American and Hispanic. *Id.*

²⁴⁸ 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, at 3, *available at* https://www.economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2017_FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_Report.pdf.

²⁴⁹ See Chi Chi Wu, *Past Imperfect: How Credit Scores and Other Analytics “Bake In” and Perpetuate Past Discrimination*, National Consumer Law Center (May 2016), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_discrimination/Past_Imperfect050616.pdf.

²⁵⁰ See Testimony of Chi Chi Wu, National Consumer Law Center, Before the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services Task Force on Financial Technology Regarding “Examining the Use of Alternative Data in Underwriting and Credit Scoring to Expand Access to Credit” (July 25, 2019); Carol A. Evans, *Keeping Fintech Fair: Thinking about Fair Lending and UDAP Risks*, Consumer Compliance Outlook (2017), <https://consumercomplianceoutlook.org/2017/second-issue/keeping-fintech-fair-thinking-about-fair-lending-and-udap-risks/>.

²⁵¹ 2017 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, at 3, *available at* https://www.economicinclusion.gov/downloads/2017_FDIC_Unbanked_HH_Survey_Report.pdf.

²⁵² CFPB found that about half of borrowers with online payday loans paid a nonsufficient funds (NSF) or overdraft fee. These borrowers paid an average of \$185 in such fees, while 10% paid at least \$432. It further found that 36% of borrowers with a bounced payday payment later had their checking accounts closed involuntarily by the bank. CFPB Online Payday Loan Payments at 3-4, 22 (April 2016).

²⁵³ For further on the undersigned groups’ concerns about the harm payday and vehicle title loans cause communities of color, and the efforts we have long made to stop that harm, see the sampling of references cited here: <http://stopthedebttrap.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/PayDay-loans.7-2016.pdf>; http://stopthedebttrap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/lcchr_resolution_payday_deposit_advance_lending_12dec2015.pdf; http://stopthedebttrap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/naacp_letter_obama_payday_15december2014.pdf;

H. The proposal is inconsistent with the agency's obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act.

The objective of the Community Reinvestment Act, which the FDIC implements as to the banks it supervises, is to ensure that financial institutions meet the banking needs of the communities they are chartered to serve, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and individuals.²⁵⁴ This legal obligation is considered a *quid pro quo* for the valuable public benefits financial institutions receive, including federal deposit insurance and access to favorably priced borrowing through the Federal Reserve's discount window.²⁵⁵

In contradiction to this obligation, the FDIC now puts forth a proposal that would encourage banks to facilitate predatory lending. CRA requires that banks serve communities' credit needs.²⁵⁶ But the data show that high-cost, unaffordable loans to financial distressed consumers do the opposite, leading to high-cost cycles of indebtedness that not only leave borrowers' needs unmet but leave them affirmatively worse off than before the lending began.

Through rent-a-bank schemes, banks rent out their privileges to entities that spread predatory lending to other communities far and wide. Indeed, through these schemes, banks are involved in scurrilous online lending that they would not do through their own channels or in their own communities. From what we can tell, FinWise Bank, Republic Bank & Trust, and Capital Community Bank are not offering the loans that we have described in these comments through their limited number of branches or on their own websites. Yet through rent-a-bank lending, banks can profit through the operations of third parties that do not have CRA responsibilities. The proposed rule would only exacerbate this irresponsible lending that is at the core of what the CRA is designed to prevent.

While the FDIC has proposed to revise the CRA regulations, the CRA proposal would not prevent this kind of predatory bank lending.

VII. The FDIC fails to consider the risks the proposal poses to the safety and soundness of State-chartered banks, despite having long acknowledged the risks of predatory lending.

Even as the proposal claims that it will mitigate safety and soundness risks caused by potential impacts on liquidity, it does not so much as mention the clear risks the proposal poses—ignoring its historical

<http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2011/04/hilary-shelton-cfpb-testimony/>;
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/states/Letter-JBond_Rendell-012306.pdf;
<https://nalcab.org/nalcab-new-pay-day-rule-step-forward-latino-consumers-businesses/>;
<http://stopthedebttrap.org/blog/cfpb-payday-lending-rule-will-disrupt-abusive-lending-protect-families-financial-predators/>.

²⁵⁴ 12 U.S.C. 2901 *et seq.*

²⁵⁵ Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, "The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges," Speech at the Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C. (March 30, 2007), available at <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070330a.htm#f2>.

²⁵⁶ 12 U.S.C. 2901.

position that predatory lending poses “significant risks” for banks.²⁵⁷ The current proposal and other recent agency actions, by encouraging bank involvement in high-cost, predatory lending, will undoubtedly increase safety and soundness risks for banks.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, banks entered into agreements with payday lenders to help the payday lenders evade state interest rate caps. In 2005, the FDIC issued guidance addressing payday loans, emphasizing safety and soundness concerns. These included credit risk in light of limited analysis of ability-to-repay; transaction risk, should the non-bank misrepresent information; and reputation risk associated with facilitating loans with terms that a non-bank could not make directly. The guidance also expressed substantive concerns with the payday loan product, including that frequent renewals may indicate a lack of ability to repay. The guidance advised that borrowers not be kept in payday loans for more than 90 days within 12 months. And it cited the federal banking agencies’ general guidance on subprime lending, which identifies lending to a borrower with “little or no ability to repay from sources other than the collateral pledged” as a characteristic of abusive lending.²⁵⁸ The 2005 guidance also notes that the FDIC may examine the non-bank payday firms associated with state banks.²⁵⁹

The 2005 guidance had the impact of shutting down most FDIC-bank involvement in rent-a-bank schemes involving short-term payday loans. For those that remained, as noted above, the FDIC ended them through enforcement actions, citing “inherent risks associated with payday lending activities”²⁶⁰ and unsafe or unsound practices, as well as unfair or deceptive practices, involved in a supervisee’s “rent-a-BIN” arrangement.²⁶¹

The risks highlighted by the FDIC in the early-to-mid 2000s remain today. In fact, the reputation risk by bank involvement in high-cost lending is likely only higher than it was in the early 2000s. Since then, as noted in section VI above, the harms of high-cost lending, both short-term loans and longer-term loans, have become more fully documented and known. Several states have had statewide ballot initiatives that capped interest rates at 36% APR or less. And direct bank involvement in payday lending by a handful of banks, until 2013 guidance that generally led to its end,²⁶² was met with sweeping public

²⁵⁷ FDIC, 2005 Guidelines for Payday Lending (Revised Nov. 2015), <https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html>.

²⁵⁸ January 31, 2001, interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs (FIL 9-2001).

²⁵⁹ FDIC, 2005 Guidelines for Payday Lending at 2 (Revised Nov. 2015), <https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html>.

²⁶⁰ See SEC Form 8-K (Feb. 24, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/921557/000110465906011951/a06-5812_18k.htm (where Republic Bancorp discloses that its Indiana bank has exited the payday loan arrangement after the FDIC cited “inherent risks associated with payday lending activities”); see also, Robert Schoenberger, *Republic to Get Out of Payday Loans; FDIC Urged Bank to Exit Business*, The Courier-Journal, Mar. 3, 2006.

²⁶¹ See *In the Matter of First Bank of Delaware, and CompuCredit Corporation*, Notice of Charges for an Order to Cease and Desist and For Restitution, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC-07-256b, FDIC-07-257k, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/FBD_Notice_of_Charges.pdf (finding that the bank had operated in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act (unfair or deceptive practices) and “without effective oversight” of third-party lending programs and ordering the termination of the “rent-a-BIN” . . . arrangement).

²⁶² The OCC rescinded that guidance in 2017.

condemnation from virtually every sphere—the military community,²⁶³ community organizations,²⁶⁴ civil rights leaders,²⁶⁵ faith leaders,²⁶⁶ socially responsible investors,²⁶⁷ state legislators,²⁶⁸ and members of Congress.²⁶⁹ Moreover, the rise of online and social media make it faster and easier to garner outrage at

²⁶³ See, e.g., Testimony of Steve Abbot, former President of the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society, Before the U.S. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Nov. 3, 2011) (noting bank payday loans among the “most egregious trends”); Comments of Michael Archer, Director of Military Legal Assistance, Marine Corps Installations East, to CFPB (April 4, 2012): “Most ominously, a few large banks have gotten into the business of payday loans through the artifice of calling the loans open ended credit,” <http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2012-0009-0056>.

²⁶⁴ Hundreds of groups urged the prudential regulators to stop banks from trapping borrowers in payday loans. Letters from approximately 250 groups to FDIC, OCC, FRB and CFPB, March 13, 2013 (<http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/blogs/wp-content/ourfinancialsecurity.org/uploads/2013/03/Bank-Payday-Sign-On-Letter-3-13-13-Final.pdf>) and February 22, 2012 (<http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/Dear-Regulators.pdf>). Thousands of individuals and many community groups filed comments with the OCC urging that Wells Fargo’s Community Reinvestment Act rating be negatively impacted because it makes payday loans, including CRL and NCLC (http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/cra-comment_wells-nov-29-2012_final.pdf).

²⁶⁵ See, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Todd Jealous, President and Chief Executive Officer, NAACP, to FDIC, OCC, FRB, and CFPB opposing bank payday lending (Feb. 21, 2013), <http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/NAACP-redatory-Pay-Day-Loans-to-regulators-BTJ.pdf>.

²⁶⁶ See, e.g., Elaina Ramsey, Faith Groups Take On Payday Lenders, Sojourners, <https://sojo.net/magazine/stub/faith-groups-take-payday-lenders> (discussing a National Day of Action among faith leaders in early 2013 to address payday lending). In connection with this National Day of Action, Rev. DeForest B. Soaries, jointly with other nationally prominent African American ministers, called for “an end to enslavement to both payday lenders and the banks now offering equally dangerous products” in *An Emancipation Proclamation from Payday Lending*. Center for Responsible Lending, *Bank Payday Lending: Overview of Media Coverage and Public Concerns*, CRL Issue Brief, March 7, 2013, <http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/tools-resources/BPD-media-coverage-3-7-13.pdf>

²⁶⁷ For proxy year 2013, investors filed shareholder resolutions with the four largest banks making payday loans expressing concern about the product and requesting data, which none of the banks agreed to provide. Wells Fargo (<https://trilliuminvest.com/shareholder-proposal/payday-lending-wells-fargo-2013/>); Fifth Third Bank (<http://www.trilliuminvest.com/resolutions/payday-lending-fifth-third-bancorp-2013/>); U.S. Bank; (<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2013/dominisocial012513-14a8.pdf>); and Regions (<https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2013/congregationsisters011413-14a8.pdf>).

²⁶⁸ See, e.g., “Legislative Black Caucus slams Regions Bank over payday-style loans,” Raleigh News and Observer “Under the Dome,” Oct. 11, 2012, <http://www.cashcowadvances.com/paydayblog/legislative-black-caucus-slams-regions-bank-over-payday-style-loans.html> (quoting letter from N.C. Senator Floyd McKissick, Jr., chairman of the N.C. Legislative Black Caucus, to Regions Bank, which stated: “We are deeply concerned about recent reports of Regions Bank offering its ‘Ready Advance’ payday loans in North Carolina . . . High-cost, short-term balloon loans like these sharply increase the financial distress of families under economic . . . strain”); Letter from Arizona Democratic Caucus to the prudential banking regulators, February 2012 (noting that Arizona “has spent countless state resources to study and understand the effects of [payday lending], and ultimately outlaw payday lending entirely” and calling on federal regulators to “take immediate action so that meaningful reforms taking place in Arizona and throughout the country in the name of consumer protection will not be undermined.”).

²⁶⁹ In January 2013, several Senators wrote the FRB, OCC, and FDIC urging action to address bank payday lending (<http://www.blumenthal.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/blumenthal-calls-on-regulators-to-act-to-stop-abusive-bank-payday-lending>). In April 2013, House members did the same. For further documentation of

a bank that is facilitating predatory lending.

In addition, credit risk may be even greater today, as banks may retain some ongoing interest in the loans (though nowhere near the predominant one) as lenders try out more sophisticated schemes to skirt regulators or courts.

The signals the FDIC is sending, and the direct aid of the proposed rule, will pose safety risks to State-chartered banks that the FDIC has not acknowledged or considered.

VIII. The FDIC fails to consider the proposal's impact on market participants that comply with state law.

The FDIC also has failed to analyze the proposed rule's impact on other market participants. Such analysis might reveal anti-competitive impacts on other non-bank lenders—those lenders that obtain state licenses and comply with state interest rate limits. Such lenders might face greater difficulty in raising capital if forced to compete for investors with growing numbers of non-bank lenders who can offer outsized returns by exceeding state interest rate limits. The FDIC has not analyzed the extent to which eliminating rent-a-bank lending would result in a more level playing field on which state-law compliant lenders could compete for investors to fund their loans, thereby increasing access to credit at non-usurious rates.

IX. Conclusion

For all of the reasons discussed above, the undersigned groups urge the FDIC to withdraw its proposal. The FDIC lacks the authority to regulate the interest rates of non-banks, the proposal is unreasoned, and it is likely to open the floodgates to predatory lending, resulting in severe harm to consumers across the country. Thank you for your consideration.

Attachments: Appendix A: NCLC Fact Sheet: Stop Payday Lenders' Rent-a-Bank Schemes

Appendix B: Individual Borrower Experiences with Payday and Car Title Loans (Short- and Longer-Term Loans)

(see next page for contacts)

opposition to bank payday lending, see Center for Responsible Lending, *Bank Payday Lending: Overview of Media Coverage and Public Concerns* at 10, CRL Issue Brief, March 7, 2013, <http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/tools-resources/BPD-media-coverage-3-7-13.pdf>.

Contacts:

Center for Responsible Lending

Rebecca Borné
Senior Policy Counsel
(202) 349-1868
rebeccabo@responsiblelending.org

Ellen Harnick
Senior Policy Counsel / Western Office Director
(510) 379-5510
Ellen.harnick@responsiblelending.org

Will Corbett
Litigation Director
(919) 313-8544
will.corbett@responsiblelending.org

Mike Calhoun
President
(202) 349-1862
mike@responsiblelending.org

National Consumer Law Center

Lauren Saunders
Associate Director
(202) 595-7845
lsaunders@nclc.org

Appendix A


Fact Sheet: *Stop Payday Lenders' Rent-a-Bank Schemes*
National Consumer Law Center

STOP PAYDAY LENDERS' RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES!

Payday lenders are starting to make **usurious loans up to 160% in states where those rates are illegal** by using banks, which are not subject to state rate caps, as a fig leaf. Banks have little to do with the loans, which they immediately sell. Bank regulators shut down these schemes in the early 2000s, but two state-chartered banks, FinWise Bank and Republic Bank and Trust, both regulated by the FDIC, are again helping payday lenders evade the law in 28 states & DC.

OppLoans + FinWise Bank = **160% APR**


OppLoans ignores the interest rate cap laws of 24 states & DC
(State rate caps are shown for \$500, 9-month loan)



- OppLoans uses a rent-a-bank scheme in 24 states and DC to evade state rate caps.
- States that allow OppLoans' 160% APR loans.
- OppLoans does not lend in these states, which have a history of enforcing rate caps.

Rise (Elevate) + FinWise Bank = **99%-149% APR**

Rise ignores state interest rate caps in 18 states & DC
(State rate caps shown are for \$2,000, 2-year loan)




Elastic (Elevate) + Republic Bank & Trust = 109%

Elastic uses a rent-a-bank scheme to offer lines of credit at rates above those allowed in many states. Elastic does not disclose an APR to consumers, but its [SEC filing](#) gives an example of a \$2,500 advance with an effective **APR of 109%**. Actual APRs vary depending on the amount advanced and repayment schedule. The Elastic line of credit is offered in 14 states and DC where rate caps are far lower for lines of credit.

Maximum APR (with fees) for \$2,000 advance repaid over 2 years			
Alaska	31%	Minnesota	36%
Arizona	41%	Montana	36%
Arkansas	17%	Nebraska	30%
D.C.	25%	Nevada	42%
Florida	34%	Oregon	36%
Kentucky	35%	South Dakota	31%
Louisiana	39%	Texas	28%
Maryland	33%		

Coming soon to California

Speedy Cash (Curo), NetCredit (Enova), and Rise (Elevate) have [announced plans](#) to their investors to **use rent-a-bank schemes to evade a new California law** going into effect on January 1, 2020 that will ban their current loans above \$2,500 that go up to 135%-191% APR.



Federal and state legislators, regulators of both banks and payday lenders, and enforcement agencies must all do their part to stop payday lenders from evading state interest rate caps through rent-a-bank schemes.

Appendix B

Individual Borrower Experiences with Payday and Car Title Loans (Short- and Longer-Term Loans)

Introduction

Consumers across the country are devastated by the impacts of payday, car title, and other high-cost loans. The stories below highlight real customers' experiences with predatory lending and illustrate the harms associated with these loans. Stories were collected from a variety of sources. The Center for Responsible Lending has an established relationship with some of the victims who recounted their stories. Other stories were obtained by Freedom of Information Requests for complaints and original loan contracts that were sent to the consumer protection agencies of certain states. Borrowers' experiences were also derived from news articles and other media sources.

Coding

Following each story, one or more code is applied, indicating the following:

Type of harm experienced:

- "1"** Borrower endures long loan sequences, including frequent loan renewals, loan flipping, or long cycles of taking out one loan to pay another.
- "2"** Borrower experiences delinquency and/or default, including lender and bank fees triggered by the loan itself, aggressive debt collection, and loss of a vehicle.
- "3"** Borrower suffers collateral harms from making unaffordable payments, including defaulting on other major financial obligations or basic living expenses.

Other loan features:

- "LT"** Long-term loan
- "CT"** Car title loan
- "SL"** Small loan with principal of \$200 or less.

Asterisks following an annual percentage rate (APR) indicate approximate APR as calculated by CRL staff, based on the information provided by the borrower.

Borrower Experiences

1. Arthur, a 69-year-old warehouse worker and grandfather of seven, started with a loan of \$200 from Advance America. The loan eventually increased to \$300. Every payday, rather than defaulting or coming up short on bill money, Arthur went into the Advance America store and paid a fee of \$52.50 so Advance America would not deposit his check for the full loan amount. Advance America flipped the loan over a hundred times, until his total interest paid was an

estimated \$5,000. The clerks knew him by name and often had his paperwork ready for him when he came in. Payday lenders have a name for consumers they see every payday: “26ers” — because they pay up every two weeks, 26 times a year. In Arthur’s case, they saw him once a month rather than every two weeks, but only because his repayment came from his monthly Social Security check.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(1, 3, SL)

2. Mary is a single mother who has owned her one-story brick house in New Castle, Delaware for nearly a decade. After falling behind on the mortgage payments, she applied for and received a 135% APR payday installment loan from California-based, LoanMe. Mary, who works part-time as a dietary aid and receives disability payments, immediately put the money toward the mortgage and repaid the loan in the first month to avoid paying high interest, she said. It still wasn't enough to make her current on the mortgage, so she applied for a second loan in the spring. This time, she was approved for \$3,100 with an APR of 135%. She has up to 47 months to repay the loan – meaning that she will pay approximately \$16,500 in principal, fees and interest if it takes her the entire time. "I make monthly payments to make sure they are not coming after me, but with interest that won't do much," she said. "Now I'm left with this bill, plus my mortgage. I'm in worse shape now."

Source: <http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2016/08/26/lawmakers-eye-caps-changing-payday-lending-industry/87632062/>

(1, 2, 3, LT)

3. In September 2011, Pauline, a 96-year old widow living on Social Security income and a small pension each month, received a \$450 payday loan from Allied Cash Advance with an APR of 360%. To circumvent the Virginia’s payday lending law, the company framed its product as an open-end credit agreement rather than a payday loan. Although she made payments to Allied totaling \$597, her balance remained at \$776.20. Company representatives threatened Pauline numerous times, telling her they would deal “harshly” with her for failure to pay and falsely asserting that failure to pay the loan constituted fraud and could result in jail time. Pauline believed the criminal threats were real and suffered significant distress and anxiety as a result.

Source: *Pauline Honey v. Allied Title Lending LLC*, 12-00045, Filed 9/14/12, United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia

(2, 3, LT, OE)

4. Virginia regulations for payday and car title loans. To avoid these regulations, payday lenders encouraged consumers to enter into open-end credit agreements. Allied Title Lending offers car title loans and open-end credit agreements at the same locations where the company (previously called Allied Cash) had operated as a payday lender. James and his wife, who live solely on their Social Security income, fell on difficult times financially and entered into a “Motor Vehicle Equity Line of Credit Agreement” with Allied Title Lending to assist with their struggles. James agreed to borrow \$2,160 at an annual interest rate of 182.5%. Although James has never made a late payment in the five years that Allied Title Lending has continued to collect on the contract, the company has threatened James the entire time that if his payments were late, his vehicle would be repossessed. The company repeatedly tricked James into collecting much more than what was actually due under the contract by telling him he could pay off the loan more quickly if he paid more than the minimum payment each month. Allied Title Lending categorized

the loan as an open-end line of credit, but no money in excess of the original loan amount was ever made available to James, and he has paid back more than \$16,000 on his \$2,160 loan.

Source: *James F. Lam v. Allied Title Lending, LLC*, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

(1, 2, LT, OE)

5. Christopher received a \$500 payday loan from CashNetUSA, with a total repayment of \$625. He had to roll the loan over to the next month five subsequent times, meaning that he paid a \$125 fee each time with none of the fee going toward paying off the principal. As a result, he paid \$1250 total on his \$625 loan. A few months later, CashNetUSA told Christopher they had increased his credit line to \$1,500. He obtained the \$1,500 loan with a total repayment of \$1,875. When payment was due, Christopher did not have the money to repay the loan and contacted CashNetUSA prior to the due date to arrange a payment plan. The company debited a \$375 rollover fee from his checking account and then took the entire \$1,500 loan amount from his account anyway. Christopher did not have enough money in his account to pay the loan, so he accrued \$934.82 in NSF fees from his bank and was unable to pay any of his other bills, including child support and rent. In order to prevent eviction, he took out another payday loan from CashNetUSA for \$1,500 to pay his rent, further perpetuating the cycle of debt.

Source: Florida Attorney General's Office, 2007

(1, 2, 3)

6. Sandra, a successful professional, worked diligently to keep up with her bills. In a tough time, she turned to payday lending. After several rollovers, Sandra's first loan was due in full. She couldn't pay it off, so she took a loan from a second lender. Frantically trying to manage her bills, she eventually found herself with loans from six payday lenders including Advance America, Check Into Cash, Check 'n Go, Urgent Money Express and two on-line lenders. She paid over \$600 per month in fees, none going to pay down her debt. After writing checks to payday lenders totaling \$9,200, she was evicted and her car was repossessed. "At the time it seems like the way out, but this is not a quick fix. It's like a ton of bricks," said Sandra.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(2, 3)

7. Edith, an Asheville, North Carolina single mother, cut down on her family's groceries, stopped driving her car, and kept her lights off to save electricity as she scrambled to pay the fees on her payday loans. She took out her first \$300 payday loan, and then a second and third, trying to repay the first. Edith borrowed a total of \$900, received \$765 in cash and paid \$135 in interest (\$45 x 3) at the time she borrowed. She continued to pay \$270 in interest every month (\$135 twice a month) for well over a year because she could not afford to repay the \$900 principal owed. Though she only received cash advances totaling \$765, during the next year, she paid over \$3,500 in fees alone, and still owed the original \$900.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.

<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.

(2, 3)

8. Vanessa obtained a \$1,455 payday installment loan from The Cash Store. She was to make twelve payments over six months of \$357 each, paying a total of \$2,832 in finance charges, reflecting an APR of 581%. Although she certified that the payment on principal and interest did

not exceed 25% of her income, Vanessa could not keep up with her loan in addition to her ongoing monthly expenses. She paid \$2,100 over four months for the loan but still owed \$1,600—more than the original principal amount. She was forced to close her bank account after incurring too many overdraft fees, and she has worse credit than when she obtained the loan. She is still facing a legal debt collection action. Vanessa has testified before the Texas Legislature to tell her story, saying, “The short of it: I, like so many Texans who got payday loans, was sunk.”

Source: Loan contract on file with CRL

(1, 2, 3, LT)

9. Sherry was a struggling, working single mother who made 15 monthly payments totaling approximately \$3,000 on the \$1,000 payday installment loan she obtained from Western Sky. The loan required an automatic draft of 24 monthly payments of \$198, which carried an APR of 233%. Sherry could not afford the payments, but continued to make them despite falling further behind on her mortgage and other bills and incurring overdraft fees from her bank. When she was offered a trial loan modification to resolve her mortgage delinquency, she attempted to stop the automatic electronic payments being made to Western Sky but was initially unsuccessful. As a result, her first trial payment on her mortgage modification was returned for insufficient funds and the mortgage company cancelled the modification. Although she initially took out the loan to improve her financial situation, it deepened her financial distress and even caused her to lose her initial chance to save her home from foreclosure.

Source: Loan contract on file with CRL

(1, 2, 3, LT)

10. Oscar Wellito took out a \$100 loan American Cash Loans, LLC after he went bankrupt. He was supporting school-aged children while trying to service debt obligations with two other small loan companies. He earned about \$9 an hour at a Safeway grocery store, which was not enough money to make ends meet, yet too much money to qualify for public assistance. “That's why,” he testified, “I had no choice of getting these loans, to feed my kids, to live from one paycheck to another paycheck.” He needed money for groceries, gas, laundry soap, and “whatever we need to survive from one payday to another payday.” His loan carried a 1,147.14% APR and required repayment in twenty-six biweekly installments of \$40.16 with a final payment of \$55.34. Thus, the \$100 loan carried a total finance charge of \$999.71.

Source: *State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc.*, 2014-NMSC-024, 329 P.3d 658

(2, LT, SL)

11. Delores, a 78-year-old retiree, borrowed \$730 at an APR of 300% from Wisconsin Auto Title Loans when she needed new tires for her 1992 Buick Park Avenue. The company required her to turn over the spare key and title to her vehicle. A month later on the due date, her loan had grown to \$1,027 and she couldn't afford to pay it. The amount due was more than her entire Social Security check. Because she couldn't imagine giving up her vehicle, she began to borrow money from other sources just to pay the interest on the car title loan, never making a dent in the principal. She eventually sold her car for \$1,000 to help pay the debt.

Source: Yeoman, Barry. “Sudden Debt.” AARP Magazine September & October 2006: 108-113, 128. Print.

(2, 3, CT)

12. Jane, a 79-year-old woman, obtained a \$380 payday loan from SpeedyCash with a 259% APR to help pay for her daughter's cancer medication. She earned \$922 in social security benefits and paid a rent of \$430, the lender did not ask her about her ability to repay the loan and simply required proof of income. Despite making 16 monthly payments of between \$65 and \$95, Jane still owes \$500 on the loan. She has never made a late payment although she owes other bills because that would allow the lender to take the funds straight from her account. She reasons, "I would rather not pay my light bill than for the [payday loan company] to take all the money I need to pay my rent."

Source: Video on file with Texas Appleseed.

(3)

13. Lauren received a car title loan from TitleMax for \$817.19, with an initial APR of 66.02%. She was charged monthly for automobile insurance coverage, which the company claimed was voluntary. However, TitleMax required certain stipulations if customers wanted to use their own auto insurance, including paying the policy through the maturity date of the transaction in advance, listing the company as a lien holder on the insurance policy, and carrying a deductible of no more than \$500. Lauren could not afford to pay her insurance premium in advance, and as a result had to pay TitleMax monthly for auto insurance in addition to the loan principal and interest. As she could not afford to pay off her loan in full each month, Lauren was forced to refinance the loan 13 times. Each renewal resulted in an increase in the monthly auto insurance premium she was charged by TitleMax. She eventually surrendered her 2004 Chevy van to the company because she could not afford to repair it. At the time of surrender, her balance on the loan had ballooned to \$3,883.35 and she had been charged \$4,128.55 in fees and other charges over the course of the loan.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014

(1, 2, 3, CT)

14. Fearing she and her family would soon lose their home, Jessica obtained a \$1,900 car title loan from Instaloan in October of 2013. It was marketed as a no-credit-check collateral loan, but she did not understand what that meant. When she asked the company representative, he told her that it was a car title loan but he wasn't allowed to tell customers that. Jessica was told that she was required to purchase their auto insurance even though the contract terms indicated the insurance was voluntary. Over the next 13 months, she paid more than \$4,000 for her \$1,900 loan, and none of her payments have been applied toward the principal of her loan. Recently, she moved from Florida to Arizona. She called Instaloan to ask for their address so she could send her payment via mail and was told she could not mail a payment because the company needed to receive the payment and a signature on the loan renewal on the same day. Instaloan told her the only option was to contact another title loan company and have them buy out the loan at the payoff amount. The company representative recommended that she contact TitleMax, which she realized was the same company as Instaloan. No one from TitleMax has returned Jessica's phone calls, and she is worried that her vehicle will be taken.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014

(1, 2, CT)

15. Shirley, an elderly woman on a fixed income, received a car title loan from TitleMax for \$2,453.29. She did not understand that the loan had to be repaid in one lump sum or it would be flipped each month and she would accrue new finance charges. Because she was unable to pay the full amount of the loan at once, TitleMax flipped the loan six times. Despite the fact that

Shirley paid over twice the principal amount of the loan to the company, including \$1326.01 for the company's auto insurance, TitleMax still repossessed her vehicle when she was unable to make a monthly payment.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, 3, CT)

16. James, a 67-year-old on a fixed income, obtained a \$500 car title loan from TitleMax in May 2013. He had hoped to be able to pay the loan off in three months; however, he has paid \$957 over the past year and still owes \$603.98 – over \$100 more than the original loan principal. His loan has been flipped 14 times, and he does not understand why he is also charged a monthly auto insurance premium. After paying almost twice the original principal amount, James is now in danger of losing his vehicle as TitleMax claims he is 15 days late in making a payment.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

17. Deborah received a \$2,000 car title loan from TitleMax in July 2014. Her loan has been flipped ten times and despite paying over \$4,000 to the company, she still owes \$1,785.73 – almost as much as the original amount of her loan. Over the course of the year that she's been paying on her loan, the APR has ranged from 43.33% to 46.48% and she has been forced to pay for costly auto insurance that she does not want and did not understand she would have to pay at the time she signed the contract. Representatives from the company have called her place of employment several times a day, putting her job at risk. When she was late on her payment to TitleMax, they sent a tow truck to her place of employment to repossess her vehicle.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

18. Sam received a \$604.31 car title loan from TitleMax in July 2013, which carried an APR of 78.7%. His loan was flipped three times and he was forced to pay for auto insurance that he did not need or want. Although the loan contract indicated that the company's auto insurance was voluntary, he was told that his existing car insurance did not meet the company's requirements. The loan contract stated that the policy through TitleMax does not insure the customer against liability for bodily injury or property damage caused to others and does not suffice under Florida's law requiring all resident motorists to have auto insurance for personal injury protection and property damage. As a result, Sam paid \$246.17 over four months for TitleMax's car insurance, in addition to the coverage he paid for under his existing insurance policy. Due to the high interest rate and unwanted insurance products, over four months Sam paid a total of \$1,186.00 for a \$604 loan.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

19. Betty was 78 years old and drove very infrequently when she decided to pursue a car title loan for \$2,217.29 from TitleMax. The company required her to buy their auto insurance unless her current policy met their criteria. After realizing that she had paid \$348.48 over three months for their additional auto insurance that she did not want or need, she decided to decline TitleMax's insurance and use her current coverage with Geico instead. She believed her insurance met TitleMax's requirements, but she received a call from the company telling her that she had to list them as the payee within fifteen minutes or be forced to pay \$175.00 per month for their

policy. She believed she was being taken advantage of by TitleMax because she was elderly and did not understand what she was signing.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

20. Derek received a car title loan from TitleMax for \$1,541.06 in May 2014. After paying on his loan for three months, his fourth payment was late. As a result, the company required that he take out an auto insurance policy even though he already had full insurance coverage through another provider and had listed TitleMax as the payee on that policy. He gave them documented proof of his current insurance policy but was told that he must purchase TitleMax's additional insurance although the form he was required to sign stated that the insurance was voluntary. When he attempted to make his payment of \$98.00, Derek was told that he owed an additional \$141.82 for the additional insurance. Derek could not afford the increased monthly payment and TitleMax is now threatening to repossess his car.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

21. Diego received a car title loan from TitleMax for \$654.77 with an APR of 76.4% in September 2013. Over the next year, his loan was flipped eleven times. During this time, he was charged \$334.30 extra for auto insurance financed through the company. Although he had a current auto insurance policy, TitleMax required that his policy be current through and including the next payment date. However, Diego found that the company would not accept his insurance policy because he paid his insurance premium each month on the day after his loan payment was due and therefore could not provide proof of insurance until the next business day after he had already renewed the loan.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

22. Phyllis received a car title loan from TitleMax for \$643.73 that carried an APR as high as 115.6%. She has paid \$2,190 on the loan over 18 months and still owes \$261.64. Despite paying over three times the principal amount of the loan, the company has repossessed her vehicle twice, forcing her to pay an additional \$400 each time to receive access to her vehicle.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

23. Jane received a car title loan from TitleMax in November 2013 for \$4,335.86. Despite having paid \$3,245 over the past eight months, the company says she still owes \$3,686.73. She has paid \$272.50 for auto insurance through TitleMax even though she already possesses a current auto insurance policy.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(2, CT)

24. After her husband passed away, Rachel was short on cash and decided to obtain a car title loan from TitleMax in August 2014 for \$3,000. After paying on the loan for a year, including over \$2,000 in auto insurance she did not need or want, she had to return to her previous residence in Wisconsin to handle an issue with her husband's estate. When she called TitleMax to let them know she'd be sending her payment by money order, she was told that she had to make all payments in person because she was also required to renew the loan at the time of payment. A

company representative even told her that TitleMax sends an employee to the hospital to obtain payment and a signature on the loan renewal if a customer is hospitalized during the time a payment is due. She called several times after that to again see if she could make a payment over the phone or have a relative make a payment in person, but the company refused. Because she could not return to Florida to make a payment, TitleMax is in the process of repossessing Rachel's vehicle.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

25. Dan received a car title loan from TitleMax in October 2014 for \$1,500, with an APR ranging from 47.2% to 51.9%. Over the past year, he has paid a total of \$2,371.54, yet he still owes \$1,415.53—almost the entire original loan amount. Although Dan informed the company that he had AAA Plus coverage and did not want to purchase any additional towing services, he was told he must pay \$12.50 per month for a “tow package.” In addition, he has paid a total of \$1,357.80 in car insurance to the company.

Source: Florida Office of Financial Regulation, 2014
(1, 2, CT)

26. Shortly after a heart attack forced her to retire, Sandra was short on cash. Her ex-husband had fallen behind on his alimony payments, and she didn't receive enough income from her monthly disability checks to cover all her bills. She received a payday loan for \$150 from First Southern Cash Advance to pay her overdue telephone bill. The next month, her husband still had not paid the alimony, so she was unable to repay the loan. As a result, she borrowed money from another payday lender, then from a third and fourth just to attempt to pay off one loan and the interest. By the time she sought help from a legal aid attorney, Sandra was forced to give up her apartment and move into a trailer in her brother's backyard.

Source: Yeoman, Barry. “Sudden Debt.” AARP Magazine September & October 2006: 108-113, 128. Print.

(2, 3, SL)

27. Amy Keaton of Spring Hill, MO said during a public comment session that desperation led her to take out a \$200 payday loan a year ago. “You get into that mindset when you are struggling that tomorrow will take care of tomorrow,” Keaton said. “So I took out the loan, even though I knew that it wasn't a very good idea.” Keaton said the lenders expected a payment of \$297, and in return she would receive \$250 for her bills. The amount she actually ended up paying escalated. “I was paying almost \$100 a month just to take my own paycheck home,” she said. Keaton will have her debt paid off this September with the help of Catholic Charities.

Source: <http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article81380962.html>

(1, 2, SL)

28. Terrence Wise, who supports tighter regulation of the industry, said a \$150 payday loan ended up costing him \$400. “They were calling my job and harassing me at work,” Wise said. “My employer told me I could be disciplined if they didn't stop harassing me. I had papers brought to my home serving me to court. And all of these things, they make you feel degraded.”

Source: <http://kcur.org/post/hundreds-rally-downtown-public-hearing-proposed-payday-loan-rules#stream/0>

(2, SL)

29. Maryann Olson's monthly Social Security check wasn't enough to cover the cost of orthopedic shoes that she desperately needed so she turned to a payday lender. However, her \$150 loan quickly turned into \$1,900 in debt.
Source: http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/03/congress_must_crack_down_on_pa.html
(2, SL)
30. "We got a payday loan of about \$200," Lara said. By the time payday came around the lender wanted \$300. They were able to pay back the \$300, but they came up short on their next payment. "So we took out another loan," Lara explained. And just like that, the trap door slammed down. "It's just so easy to get. So easy! You just bring a paystub down and you tell them how much you need," Lara said. "I kid you not, we did that dance for close to six months," Lara said. "It was horrible. Just unbelievably horrible." Finally, Lara had to beg her parents to help get them out of the cycle for good.
Source: <http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/new-guidelines-nonprofits-help-curtailed-predatory-payday-loans-in-minnesota/>
(1, 2, SL)
31. Diana, a 71-year-old who lived on her Social Security income of \$1,100 per month, took out a car title installment loan from Cash America for \$1,533. The loan carried an APR of 98%, and she was required to make 13 payments of \$195 each. \$551 of the loan went to pay off an old lien. Diana subsequently obtained a Cash Plus 0% APR single-payment payday loan for \$225 while her car title loan was outstanding. Cash Plus pursued criminal charges for "theft by check", which is essentially Texas's bad check law. There is now a warrant outstanding for Diana's arrest.
Source: Loan contracts on file with CRL
(2, 3, CT, LT)
32. John lived paycheck to paycheck. In December 2013, he took out a car title installment loan with Loan Max for \$1,715, requiring 12 monthly payments of \$391 each, totaling \$2,969 (243% APR). John struggled to make the first two payments and was struggling to make the third. Two months later, in February 2014, he took out a \$700 payday installment loan from Check N Go to stay current on his car title loan. The payday loan required 11 biweekly payments of \$110 each (247% APR). Of the first payment of \$110, only \$14 went toward the loan principal. John defaulted on that loan after one payment and was incurring substantial overdraft fees as the bank threatened to close his account. He has no hope of keeping up with his loan payments, much less escaping the debt trap. The extreme stress prevents him from sleeping, and he likely will be forced into bankruptcy.
Source: Loan Max and Check N Go loan contracts on file with CRL
(1, 2, LT, CT)
33. In 2009, Pamela received a payday loan from Cash Transfer Centers for \$960 on a two-week period, plus a finance charge of \$259.20. The loan required payments of \$160 in order to be paid off. Once Pamela saw that her monthly payments stayed the same while the interest on the loan continued to grow, she knew there was something wrong.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2)

34. In 2010, Anne received a \$1,000 payday loan, which required repayment every two weeks. However, her payments were doing very little to decrease the size of the loan, and eventually, she had paid \$1,689 but still had an outstanding balance of \$1,082. Moreover, because the bi-weekly payments were being drawn directly from her bank account, she began to incur overdraft fees from her bank and was forced to close her bank account to stop the overdraft fees.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(1, 2)
35. Mary received a \$300 payday loan from Fast Cash Advance in late 2009. She repaid the \$300 loan and upon learning that Kentucky had made internet payday lenders illegal in January of 2010, Mary closed her bank account in order to stop Fast Cash Advance from continuing to withdraw funds from her bank account. Fast Cash Advance sold her remaining debt to another company who then turned the account over to a collection agency.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2)
36. Christine obtained a payday loan from US Fast Cash for \$350 in May 2007. The contract stated that she would owe a total of \$455, which reflects an APR of 496.73%. When Christine discovered that payday loans were illegal in Kentucky, she repeatedly contacted US Fast Cash to inform the company that she would instead pay a total of \$411.61, the maximum amount allowed under State law for a \$350 loan. However, US Fast Cash insisted that she owed \$560 in payments and sent her a threatening and intimidating email accusing Christine of “unreasonable demands” and trying to “set the terms” of the loan and stating that no one “twisted [her] arm” to obtain the loan.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2007
(2)
37. 500FastCash solicited Beverly via email to obtain a payday loan for \$300, and she accepted. She had an agreement with 500FastCash to debit her bank account on Fridays as she is paid on those days. Instead, the company debited her account on Thursdays before she was paid, which resulted in extensive bank overdraft fees. Beverly’s bank closed her checking account, and she has hired a bankruptcy attorney. Moreover, 500FastCash has put her employment in jeopardy. The company has harassed her at work, calling her office despite her numerous emails to the company stating that she is not allowed to receive personal calls during work hours.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2, 3)
38. Kenneth obtained a \$250 payday loan and paid a total of \$389 on the loan. Shortly thereafter, he took out another \$250 loan with an APR of 547.5%. He paid \$75 toward the new loan, but combined with the overdraft fees he had already been charged on the first loan, he had paid a total of \$500. Kenneth asked the company to mark his account paid in full as he had repaid the \$500 total principal amount of the two loans, but the company refused and continued to call him even though he requested that all correspondence be in writing.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(1, 2)

39. Doris received a \$350 payday loan from Ameriloan. She was disabled and living on Social Security, and made an arrangement with the company to debit her checking account four times on the days she received her payments. Instead, Ameriloan twice debited her account the day before she received her Social Security check and she incurred overdraft fees. Moreover, after taking out the four payments she and the company had agreed upon, Ameriloan told her she still owed \$455.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2, 3)
40. Carole received several payday loans in 2007 from different companies, including Ace Cash Express, Quik Cash, and Check 'N Go. She was on a fixed income consisting only of her disability payments, and she knew she could not afford to pay the balance of the loans. The companies never verified how many outstanding loans she had or whether she could actually pay the loans back. She notified each company that she wanted to pay the balance on her loans but could only pay \$10 a month because she needed to have enough money to purchase her medication. Carole's son received a call from a person claiming to be a lawyer who told him that his mother was engaging in check fraud due to the outstanding payday loan. The caller instructed him to tell his mother to buy a prepaid card with \$120 on it and to send her the routing number. She was collecting for a payday loan through Ace Express, which Carole could not to pay on, and the total loan price had ballooned up to \$839.93. Carole could not afford to buy the prepaid card and was concerned that she would be sued by the company.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2, 3)
41. Joseph received a \$500 payday loan from Eastside Lenders with a \$150 recurring payment every two weeks. After the company deducted \$150 from his account three times for a total of \$450, Joseph was told that he still owed \$650. He sent Eastside Lenders an email to let them know that he was revoking his ACH agreement under the Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act, but they continued to debit his account.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2)
42. Dennis received a \$300 payday loan, and was under the impression that he would owe a total of \$390 on the loan. Every payday, \$90 was debited from his bank account. The company continued to withdraw money, and by the time he was forced to close his bank account, he had paid a total of \$990 on a \$300 loan. After his account was closed, the payday lender began calling his place of employment despite Dennis's requests that all correspondence be in writing, and the company has threatened to sue him and garnish his wages.
Source: Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2010
(2)
43. In a 2012 court case initiated by the New Mexico Attorney General, Endow testified about her borrowing experience with FastBucks. She stated, "I didn't buy no TV. I didn't buy no jewelry. I didn't go on trips. It wasn't any joyous ride to go to the casino...It was basically to care of my family and put a roof over our head." She earned a mere \$18,000-\$19,000 a year, yet managers at FastBucks only asked for her pay stubs and bank statements rather than her expenses or other outstanding loans. Endow testified that eventually she had several outstanding loans and would use the proceeds of one to pay off the others. "I was starting to get stressed and

overwhelmed,” she said, becoming tearful again on the witness stand. “What am I going to do? How am I going to make it? Is it ever possible to get out of this?” Nevertheless, Endow managed to pay back her loans without going into default until her last loan.

Source: *New Mexico Attorney General v. FastBucks*, 2012

(1, 2)

44. After Joe received a payday loan, he became unemployed. He owed CashNet one more payment of \$332.22, so he explained the situation to a representative of the company. They said that they understood. He then received a call at his parents’ home, stating that a collection agency needed to speak to him concerning check fraud. CashNet had sold his account to a third party without telling him, and the collection agency attempted to charge a bank account that had been closed. Although he had previously told CashNet he closed that bank account and would need to pay with a new debit card, the collections agency accused him of committing check fraud. The accusation of check fraud has caused unnecessary tension and stress between Joe and his parents.

Source: Alabama Attorney General’s Office, 2011

(2, 3)

45. After receiving a \$250 payday loan from EZ Money, Terri was contacted by the company at her place of employment. Despite the fact that she informed EZ Money she could not receive personal correspondence at work, the company sent a letter to her job informing her that she had an outstanding balance on her loan. The letter even included the name of Terri’s supervisor, which Terri interpreted as a threat to contact her employer.

Source: Alabama Office of the Attorney General, Consumer Affairs Section, 2010

(2, 3)

46. Robyn received a payday loan from National Credit Consultants three years ago. After making three sizeable payments to the company, Robyn asked to have her due date pushed back just one day. The company refused, threatened to have her arrested, and insinuated that they would contact her place of employment. Robyn has been brought to tears several times and feels sick from the stress of the 4-5 calls she receives from National Credit Consultants each time a payment is due.

Source: Florida Attorney General’s Office, 2011

(2, 3)

47. Justin received a payday loan for \$450 from CashNet USA. Shortly thereafter, he noticed there was an additional \$250 deposit in his bank account. He discovered that the credit was for a loan that he never applied for. He called the company and was told that CashNetUSA created a new loan on top of the one he already had because he had “shown interest.” The company told him he should have declined the loan within three days if he did not want it, which he was unable to do because he had been out of town with no access to internet to check his bank account. Justin’s bank account has been debited repeatedly for payments for the two loans; as a result, he has accrued \$450 in bank overdraft fees and his bank has restricted the use of his debit card.

Source: Florida Attorney General’s Office, 2008

(2)

48. A San Antonio family requested assistance from their church in developing a household budget and becoming financially independent. In the course of developing a budget, the church deacon

discovered that the family would be able to live within their means except for one item of debt that was dragging them down: a \$700 payday loan they had taken out roughly four months earlier to help with a rent payment on their home. The terms of the loan: \$200 every two weeks was automatically deducted from the husband's bank account and timed with the deposit of his paycheck. This \$200 did not reduce the original amount of the loan. It merely allowed for the \$700 principal to roll-over until the next pay-period. In the course of the four months the family had maintained this loan, they had rolled the principal over nine times—at a cost of \$1,800. Now, as they approached the church again for help, they needed help to pay their rent or face eviction.

Source: <http://www.christianitytoday.com/local-church/2016/july/texas-pastor-payday-loan-reform-isnt-distraction-its-christ.html>

(1, 2, 3)

49. Dodie received a \$500 payday loan from National Payday. The company now says that she owes over \$1,200 on the loan but will not explain the extra fees. National Payday has called her employer, her family, and her husband's employer and has threatened to file criminal charges against Dodie. Her mother had a heart attack after one of the company's harassing phone calls. Dodie informed National Payday that she has filed bankruptcy, but the calls continue.

Source: Florida Attorney General's Office, 2006

(2, 3)

50. Over a 17-month time period, Lisa, a single mom living in North Carolina, received 35 payday loans from Urgent Money Service – roughly one loan every two weeks. She spent over \$1200 in fees for a \$255 cash loan that kept rolling over because she could never repay the loan within the two-week period. Each time, she would write a check for \$300 and receive \$255 back in cash. Urgent Money Service never took into account Lisa's income and expenses. Each of her biweekly paychecks amounted to only \$600, so she was left with only \$300 for her other bills and expenses until her next paycheck. The debt trap cycle continued as she couldn't afford to pay back the loan and couldn't stretch her remaining \$300 to cover all her bills without obtaining yet another loan. The only way she could stop the withdrawals from her bank account was to close her account. It took her two years to finally pay off the \$255 loan.

Source: Commerce Committee meeting testimony, North Carolina General Assembly, 6/17/2003

(1, 2)

51. Lenny, who made about \$600 a week, went to Advance America thinking a payday loan would help him catch up on an overdue bill. Over a year later, he had renewed his Advance America loan every two weeks, fallen deeper into debt, and taken a second payday loan to stay afloat. Lenny lost his apartment and ended up in a homeless shelter. While he lived there, Advance America continued to flip his loan, charging \$20 per \$100 every two weeks, 521% APR.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(1, 2, 3)

52. Mr. & Mrs. Anderson were unable to cure the default on their home loan because of their payday loans. A construction worker, Mr. Anderson had taken out payday loans from Advance America to help them through a bout of bad weather that slowed his work. They paid \$200 every two weeks in fees to Advance America, for loans in both his and her names. This debt disqualified the couple for their loan modification.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(3)

53. Jason, a military service member who worked on a nuclear submarine in Kings Bay, Georgia, borrowed \$300 from Advance America to make ends meet after being in a car accident. He soon found himself taking out loans from other payday lenders as he fell further and further behind. "In five months, I spent about \$7,000 in interest, and didn't even pay on the principal \$1,900. I was having marital problems because of money and didn't know what to do for Christmas for my kid," Jason told an AP reporter. The base emergency relief office finally helped Jason by paying off his triple-digit payday loans, some as high as 780% APR, and letting him repay the charity's interest-free loan over 18 months.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(1, 3)

54. Clarissa and her 15-year-old son put in more sweat equity hours than required on their Habitat for Humanity house, in joyful anticipation of living in their own home. Clarissa worked full time, but received no child support and struggled to manage her expenses, sometimes taking on a second job. When the company she worked for shut down, Clarissa borrowed from Advance America and Nationwide. Eventually, when she couldn't repay one of her loans, the payday company deposited the check they were holding as collateral. The check bounced and both her bank and the payday lender charged her additional fees for insufficient funds.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(2, 3)

55. Anita went to an Advance America store in hopes of finding a solution to a common problem -- how to delight her grandkids on Christmas. Unable to repay the loan, she had to renew her loan with Advance America every payday, paying \$45 to keep the same \$300 loan outstanding. She went to a second payday lender, Check 'n Go, to help repay Advance America. Anita could not afford the \$820 it would take to pay off the two loans in full and get out of the trap. After just four months, she had paid almost \$1,000 in fees, and still owed the \$820. "I got a promotion and a raise, but I never saw any of that money," said Anita. She finally went to her church to get help paying the rent, and to a consumer credit counseling agency to get help negotiating a repayment plan. It took her nine more months to complete these payments.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010

(1, 2, 3)

56. Danny, a forklift operator from Kannapolis, was making \$9.00 per hour. He got behind on his bills after being hospitalized from a heart attack and stroke. He went to his first payday lender in March 2000 and borrowed \$300 for a 7-day term. This was about the same as his weekly pay, so he could not afford to pay back the loan, and got caught in the debt trap. Over the course of two years, Danny used eight different lenders including Advance America, Advance Internet, Check into Cash, and First Southern Cash Advance. He paid more than \$5,000 in fees over the next two years, with over 170 check stubs for payments to these payday lenders.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010
(1, 2)

57. Stephanie paid her first payday loan back the first time when it was due on payday, but a few days later came up short again, so she took out another loan. "I was paying the fees, but still coming up short on bills. So I got a loan from another lender just to pay the fees on my other loans. I ended up with several loans from different payday lenders, struggling to pay the interest every two weeks so I wouldn't default, because if I did they would have passed my check to the bank." Stephanie had loans with Advance America, Check Into Cash, Check 'n Go and several others. Eventually she was paying \$800 every month just in interest fees, without paying down any principal. "The payday lenders were not willing to work with me, even after I talked to them about my situation following the advice of my credit counselor," she said. One payday lender threatened to send her check to the magistrate's office, and to take her to court for writing a bad check.

Source: *Caught in the Trap: The real story from payday lending borrowers* – CRL Issue Brief, June 2010
(2)

58. Betty, a senior in Durham, took out a small \$100 payday loan. She had no other debt at the time. When this loan came due a month later, she borrowed from a second payday lender to repay the first. And, then she did this four more times. Each time, it was slightly less expensive to flip a loan than to pay the bounced check fees if she defaulted. With six loans, she was paying over half of her \$564 monthly Social Security income in payday fees, never paying down a penny of principal on these loans. She lost her phone and got one-time emergency help from social services to avoid eviction. We suspect Betty was later evicted when we could no longer reach her at her apartment.

Source: CRL Issue Brief: *Why We Must Keep Payday Lenders Out of NC: North Carolinians Caught in the Debt Trap*, April 2016
(2, 3, SL)

59. With retirement and disability income, Mary, a 62-year-old African American mother and grandmother, brought in about \$1,000 per month. She took out her first payday loan because she needed "a little extra" money to go out of town. Like many borrowers, she had to take out a second loan to pay off the first. She ended up with loans from four payday lenders. "When I get a little extra money, I'm going to pay them off and I'm through with them," said Mary. "It's a rip off. There's nothing cute about it. I'm supposed to get some money, but I lose money." The fees Mary paid to keep from defaulting on her payday loans added up to over 40 percent of her monthly income.

Source: CRL Issue Brief: *Why We Must Keep Payday Lenders Out of NC: North Carolinians Caught in the Debt Trap*, April 2016
(2)

60. After her husband was laid off, Pamela borrowed \$500 from a payday lender. But the Phoenix, Arizona, woman found that she, like many other borrowers, could not manage to repay the \$588 she owed (\$500 plus \$88 in fees) when it was due in two weeks. She went to a second lender to pay the first, and a third to pay the second, getting in deeper until she had five loans of \$500. She was paying \$880 every month in payday fees, never paying down the principal owed.

By June of 2004, she had paid \$10,560 in interest on these five loans. She was afraid of going to jail if she stopped paying the fees, and had no idea how to get out of the trap.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.

<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.

(1, 2)

61. Kym, a single mother working as a temp in the Triangle area, took out a payday loan when a friend told her about how she could borrow money until her next payday. She quickly fell into the debt trap, and had to pay a high fee every payday to renew the loan and avoid default. When she had trouble keeping up this cycle, she took out a second loan to pay fees on the first. She paid on both loans for about a year, finally convincing one of the lenders to let her pay off the loan in increments. It took Kym another eight months to shake free from the debt trap.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.

<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.

(1, 2)

62. As a grad student in North Carolina's Triangle area, Allen found it very difficult to pay off the four payday loans he had accumulated. When he did manage to pay off one or two of the loans, he soon found himself strapped for cash and forced to renew the loan. Allen finally sought help from a credit counselor. He sent letters to the payday lenders asking for a payment plan he could afford. But instead of helping him work out payments, one of the lenders deposited his check upon receiving his letter, and it bounced twice before he could cancel the check. Two other lenders were internet-based companies who automatically drafted his checking account. He had to close his account to stop them. When one of these lenders received Allen's payment plan letter, they called and threatened to send a sheriff to his house and serve him court papers. Allen now realizes he has technically repaid the debt several times over in rollover fees.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.

<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.

(2)

63. Rhonda and her two daughters experienced a financial crisis last summer that sent Rhonda looking for help from payday lenders. She found not the help she needed, but disaster. Rhonda fell into the payday lending debt trap - the terms of the loans she took out required her to either pay them off in less than two weeks or have \$90 fees automatically debited from her bank account repeatedly. Those loans, at triple-digit APR, have cost her much more than the exorbitant fees. Her family's finances are in ruins and she is planning to file bankruptcy.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.

<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.

(1, 2, 3)

64. Like many borrowers, Janis went to one payday lender to get help paying the fees of another. She ended up borrowing from three different lenders. Since she could not pay the loans in installments, she paid the repeat fees until she got her tax returns. When she couldn't keep up with the fees one lender demanded, they called and left her a message saying that they would take her to court if her account was short. It was several months before Janis found her way out of the trap, and she needed help from social services during this time, once to pay her rent and twice to pay her light bill.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.
(1, 2, 3)

65. Sandy's first payday loan was for \$100, with an \$18 fee. She worked down the street from the payday shop, and since she was short on cash, she called to see what she needed to get a loan. All she needed was a source of income and a banking account, so she walked into the shop, and walked out 15 minutes later with the loan. Sandy got caught up in the payday lending debt trap, taking out multiple loans to pay the fees on each one as they became due. At one point, she was paying \$300 every two weeks for four different loans. Over a six-month period, this added up to \$3,600, but she was in the trap much longer, paying off one loan, then another, until she lost her job and could no longer keep up with the fees. She filed bankruptcy.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.
(1, 2, 3, SL)

66. Betty, a senior citizen in Durham, North Carolina, paid over half of her \$564 monthly Social Security income in payday fees, never paying down her loans. She lost her phone and needed emergency help from social services to avoid eviction.

Source: CRL website: *The Victims of Payday Lending*.
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>.
(2, 3)

67. Mr. R utilized payday loans for temporary help when he struggled to pay his bills. He ended up taking out at least 24 loans over the course of four years, becoming trapped in the payday debt cycle. His final loan was from a tribal payday lender who took \$250 out of his bank account every two weeks. Only \$50 of the payment applied to the principal of the loan, with the remaining \$200 going towards fees. Eventually Mr. R was forced to close his credit union account, and even though he had repaid the principal several times over, he was harassed with round-the-clock phone calls from the payday lender.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).
(1, 2)

68. Patricia paid half of her income every pay period to internet payday lenders. She obtained five internet payday loans, including one from a tribal lender, with a total of \$2,000 to help pay her bills after incurring unanticipated medical expenses. The APRs on the loans ranged from 620% to 990%. The lenders took close to \$600—half of her income—from her bank account every two weeks. After she had repaid more than the principal amounts of the loans, she closed her bank account to stop the lenders' debits.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).
(1, 2)

69. Ms. B is a 71-year-old whose only income is her Social Security benefits and her pension. In November 2012, she received payday loans from three different lenders to help pay her bills.

Immediately, she struggled with the payments, which caused her to fall further behind on her rent and other bills. As a result, she took out another payday loan in January 2013. Fortunately, she was able to stop the lenders' withdrawals by closing her bank account, but they continue to harass her by phone and email, even threatening to sue her on the illegal loans.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).

(2, 3)

70. Ivy, a retail worker from Brooklyn, took out six internet payday loans carrying APRs as high as 782%, to help pay her bills. The payday lenders continuously drained her bank account, often triggering overdraft fees. In a two-month period, the lenders tried to debit her account 55 times, and she was charged \$1,500 in overdraft fees as a result. Because she was unable to pay the overdraft fees, her bank closed her account and reported her to ChexSystems, a consumer reporting agency, to prevent her from opening accounts at other banks.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).

(1, 2, 3)

71. Subrina's exempt child support funds were seized by her bank after she took out three internet payday loans to help pay her bills. The lenders withdrew as much as \$168 in fees from her bank account biweekly, while her bank charged her \$800 in overdraft fees as a result of the repeated debits. Further, the bank illegally seized more than \$600 in child support funds to cover the fees. The payday lenders refused to stop debiting her account. The bank eventually closed the account, but repeatedly called her to pay the overdraft fees and reported her to ChexSystems, a consumer reporting agency, to prevent her from opening accounts at other banks.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).

(2, 3)

72. Cynthia, a New York City employee and single mother, borrowed eight payday loans over the course of several months when she fell behind on her rent. Soon, her entire paycheck was swallowed by the lenders. One company that debited money from her account never even made her a loan, but simply obtained personal and financial information from another lender and began electronically debiting her account. Cynthia's bank charged her \$1,390 in overdraft fees, seized \$721 in child support funds, closed her account, and reported her to ChexSystems so that she could not open an account at another bank. Two years later, debt collectors continue to harass Cynthia to repay the illegal loans.

Source: Brief of *Amici Curae* Nine Advocacy Organizations in Support of Defendants-Appellees Urging Confirmation, *The Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Department of Financial Services*, No. 13-3769 (2nd Cir. Nov. 13, 2013).

(2, 3)

73. Yesenia's mother was diagnosed with breast cancer and could no longer work, so Yesenia borrowed \$510 (two loans of \$255 each) to help pay the rent. She was trapped in a cycle of debt for 5 months, where she paid \$90 every two weeks in fees alone. When she became late on a

payment to the payday lenders, they debited her bank account for the full amount of the loan, wiping out all of her funds and causing her to incur overdraft fees. A non-profit charity called Season of Sharing helped her pay one month's rent and she was finally able to pay back the loans. She paid \$900 in fees to borrow \$510.

Source: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-loans-california-video>

(2, 3)

74. George, an elderly man living in California, borrowed \$1,020 (4 payday loans of \$255 each). He was stuck in a debt trap for three years and paid \$180 in fees every two weeks. Dolores Street Community Services helped him find his way out of the debt trap. He paid \$12,960 in fees to borrow \$1,020.

Source: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-loans-california-video>

(1, 2)

75. Michael borrowed approximately \$1,530 (six payday loans of about \$255). He has been stuck in the debt trap for more than two years and pays \$270 per month in fees alone. Michael's monthly fees take a quarter of his Social Security benefits. He is working with a non-profit organization called Community Housing Works to help him get out of the debt trap. So far, he has paid more than \$6,000 in fees to borrow \$1,530.

Source: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-loans-california-video>

(1, 2)

76. Kimberly borrowed \$1,550 from three different payday loan companies: one store front, one online, and one bank payday loan. She was stuck in a cycle of debt for nearly six months. She stopped paying her electric bill, went without power, and stopped buying groceries until she was able to pay back all her loans. She paid more than \$2,800 to borrow \$1,550.

Source: <http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/payday-loans-california-video>

(1, 2, 3)

77. In June 2014, Dina took out a \$4,570 installment loan from NetCredit. She was behind on her mortgage payments and other household bills and thought the loan could help her get back on track. The interest rate was advertised as 5% but in fact the loan carried an APR of 64%. The loan contract requires her to pay \$135 every two weeks for three years, which means she will have paid more than \$10,530 to borrow \$4,560. Because she is paying \$270 per month, she is having a hard time making her mortgage payments. Since obtaining the loan, Dina has been late on her mortgage every month and her credit score has dropped to 590. Instead of helping her get out of financial distress, the loan has put her in an even worse situation.

Source: CFPB complaint, NetCredit loan contract

(1, 2, 3, LT)

78. In May 2013, National Financial, LLC loaned \$200 to Gloria James, a resident of Wilmington, Delaware. James worked in the housekeeping department at a hotel, earning \$11.83 per hour. As a part-time employee, her hours varied. On average, after taxes, James took home approximately \$1,100 per month. National described the loan product as a "Flex Pay Loan." In substance, it was a one-year, non-amortizing, unsecured cash advance. The terms of the loan called for James to make twenty-six, bi-weekly, interest-only payments of \$60, followed by a twenty-seventh payment comprising both interest of \$60 and the original principal of \$200. The total repayments added up to \$1,820, including \$1,620 in fees. According to the loan document

that National provided to James, the APR for the loan was 838.45%. Before this loan, James had obtained five prior loans from National. For her first loan from National, James borrowed \$100 on September 1, 2011. She repaid a total of \$205 by making five payments over the course of two months. For her second loan, James borrowed \$100 on August 22, 2012. She again repaid a total of \$205, this time by making four payments over the course of two months. For her third loan, James borrowed \$150 on October 31, 2012, less than two weeks after repaying her second loan. She repaid a total of \$252 by making three payments over the course of two months. For her fourth loan, James borrowed \$100 on December 20, 2012, one week after repaying her third loan. She repaid it the next day by making a single payment of \$102. The prompt repayment suggests that James refinanced her loan through another provider. For her fifth loan, James borrowed \$200 on December 27, 2012, less than one week after repaying her fourth loan. James failed to make the second payment, failed to make the fourth payment, and finally repaid the loan two months later. Her repayments totaled \$393. Despite James' difficulty in repaying her fifth loan, National sent her text messages soliciting her interest in another loan. A text message on March 29, 2013, stated, "Loan Til [sic] Payday welcomes you with open arms. If you ever need a loan again we want to be your source! :)" A text message on April 5, 2013, stated, "Loan Til [sic] Payday misses you! Call NOW and receive \$20 off your first payment."

Source: *James v. National Financial, LLC*, 132 A.3d 799, 805 (Del. Ch. 2016)
(1, 2, LT, SL)

79. Realizing that her next payday was two weeks away, Leticia Ortega worried about how she was going to get enough cash to pay overdue telephone and electric bills. Then Ortega, a cashier in San Antonio, Texas, spotted an advertisement by National Money Service in a local weekly newspaper. National Money Service charged her a \$90 interest fee for a \$300 loan, due by her next payday. This fee amounts to an APR of 780%. When the loan's due date arrived, Ortega did not have sufficient cash to repay the entire loan. Consequently, for almost a year, National Money Service debited Ortega's bank account every two weeks in the amount of \$90 as interest to "roll over" the loan. Because none of the \$90 interest payments counted as principal, Ortega still owed National Money Service \$300 even though she had paid \$1,800 in interest charges. Source: Creola Johnson, *Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?*, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2002)
(1, 2)
80. When her job sorting jeans at a garment factory didn't pay the bills, 47-year-old Patricia Turner went to E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tennessee. E-Z loaned her \$300 for 30 days, and Turner secured the loan by writing a check for \$405, \$105 of which was for interest and "Other Charges." The APR on this loan was over 400%. At the end of the 30-day period, Turner was unable to repay the loan. She did not have enough money in the bank to cover the check or enough cash to pay the debt outright. She could have defaulted, but instead she chose to extend the loan by paying a cash extension fee of \$105. After she extended the loan eight times, paying \$840 over an eight-month period without reducing the principal of the loan, she was unable to pay either the balance of the loan or an additional extension fee. With full knowledge that there were insufficient funds in her account to cover it, E-Z then deposited Turner's eight-month-old check into its account. When the check bounced, Turner was forced to declare bankruptcy. Source: Charles A. Bruch, *Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders*, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1257 (2001)
(1, 2, 3)

81. On a monthly basis from March 2005 through November 2007, Wilma A. Ruby entered into a total of 33 payday-loan agreements with Cashnet, Inc., d/b/a Cash Advance Centers. The amount of each loan increased over time, starting at \$200 and reaching \$500. Typically, Wilma would pay \$575.00 in cash to Cashnet and would immediately enter into another payday loan agreement with Cashnet for \$500. Wilma was to repay the \$500.00 plus a 15% finance charge of \$75.00 (for a total of \$575.00) to Cashnet one month later. On the due date, Wilma would again pay \$575.00 in cash to Cashnet and immediately enter into another loan with the company. This cycle continued until November 2, 2007, when Ruby entered into her final payday-loan agreement with Cashnet for \$500. She could not repay this loan. With a fixed income of only \$624.00 per month, Ruby could not afford to repay in full her loan with Cashnet and meet her monthly expenses. Thus, each time she repaid in full one loan, she immediately had to obtain another, usually for the same or a greater amount.
Source: *Ruby v. Cashnet, Inc.*, 281 Va. 604, 607, 708 S.E.2d 871 (2011)
(1, 2, SL)

82. On December 14, 2010, Timothy Williams obtained a short-term personal loan from Valued Services. The loan was for \$550, and was due to be repaid approximately one month later. The APR was listed at 385.28%, with a total finance charge of \$156.75. On January 10, 2011, the day the December loan was due, Williams obtained another loan from Valued Services to repay the December loan. The January loan was for \$706, with APR of 246.51%, and a total finance charge of \$1,241.40. It required Williams to repay the loan in 12 monthly payments, beginning February 9, 2011. Valued Services made high-interest loans to Williams despite the fact that Valued Services' files showed Williams' sole source of income was a monthly social security payment of \$1,147. It also showed that in November 2010, Williams had an ending checking account balance of \$8.32.
Source: *Williams v. Valued Servs. of Wisconsin LLC*, No. 2012AP2115, 2013 WL 4016941 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2013)
(1, 2, LT)

83. In March 2012, Rodella Smith obtained a loan for \$5,000 from Western Sky Financial. The loan was subject to an APR of 116.73%, and the repayment term was set for a period of about seven years, resulting in a total payment of \$41,172.61. She made payments of \$480 for over two years, paying Western Sky approximately \$13,000 in total—more than double the original loan amount. She then refused to make any more payments, and that's when the company began calling Smith's work and home phone numbers and emailing her, demanding ongoing payments and threatening to report Smith to credit reporting companies. The company has also called Smith's granddaughter four times accusing her of owing a debt and requesting Smith's contact information. Smith has suffered emotional and mental pain and anguish and damage to her credit as the result of reporting a debt that she does not owe.
Source: Civil Action Complaint, *Smith v. Western Sky Financial, LLC*, 168 F. Supp. 3d 778 (E.D. Pa. 2016), *appeal dismissed* (Apr. 19, 2016)
(1, 2, 3, LT)

84. In June 2008, Dominginho Powell obtained a car title loan from The Payday Loan Store of Illinois (PLS) using his 1972 Oldsmobile as collateral. He had been having financial difficulties and needed a loan to make ends meet. The loan was for \$2,265 with an APR of 300% and called for two installments: one payment of \$558.49 in July and a balloon payment of \$2,842 in August.

The finance charge was listed as \$1,135.60. PLS knew that Dominginho would not be able to make the balloon payment at the time of the loan but entered into the transaction anyway. When he went in to make the first payment in July, he was told that he had to refinance the loan. He went back to PLS in August to make his second payment, and PLS took a payment for the old loan and told Dominginho that he was required to refinance the remaining balance of \$2,263, which was not yet due. PLS flipped his loan seven more times, each with terms more unfavorable than the last. Dominginho was told this is the “way loans work.” When he was told he had to refinance for the seventh time, Dominginho realized that he had paid almost \$5,000 in finance charges for a loan that was supposed to cost \$1,135. He still owes \$2,235—almost the original principal amount of the loan.

Source: Complaint, *Powell v. The Payday Loan Store of Illinois, Inc.*, No. 09 C 4146, 2010 WL 3893894, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2010)

(1, 2, CT)

85. Peter Alfeche entered into 23 payday loans with CashNet over a 10-month period, paying the company approximately \$2,000 in fees. Being short on money and unable to meet all of his monthly expenses, Peter first obtained a loan from Cash America in November 2006. He agreed to borrow \$250 for nine days for a fee of \$62.50, representing an APR of 1,013.89%. Many of his subsequent 22 loans were obtained to pay off previous loans, as he often lacked enough money on the due date to pay off the loan and still pay his recurring expenses. Once Peter had established a personal account with CashNet, he also received email invitations to take out more payday loans from other internet payday lenders. Over the 10-month period in which Peter received the 23 loans from CashNet, he also obtained additional payday loans from some of these other lenders. In addition to paying \$2,000 in fees to the payday lenders, he incurred hundreds of dollars per month in overdraft charges from his bank.

Source: Class Action Complaint, *Alfeche v. Cash America International, Inc.*, No. CIV.A. 09-0953, 2011 WL 3565078 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011)

(1, 2)

86. Cynthia Williams and her husband were facing financial difficulties, so she decided to apply for and received a payday loan of \$500 with an APR of 430% from Advance America. Over the next year, she was trapped in a cycle of debt with the company. Although the payday loans consumed over half of her monthly income, Advance America never considered Cynthia’s ability to repay. As a result, she fell behind in her mortgage payments. Cynthia and her husband were only able to save their home with the help of a nonprofit foreclosure prevention group by taking on second jobs and increasing their workload by 70 hours per week.

Source: Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, *Williams v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Centers of Missouri, Inc.*, No. 07-04187-CV-C-NKL, 2007 WL 3326899 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2007)

(1, 2, 3)

87. In order to evade the Arizona’s voter mandate sunset of payday loans, the Ohio-based payday lender CheckSmart started making an open-end line of credit linked to a prepaid card in the months preceding the sunset’s effect (and after CheckSmart unsuccessfully tried to push legislation in 2010 to repeal the voter’s mandate). While this product is no longer on the market, because it was shut down via regulatory action as an evasion of consumer protections, here is what happened to one Arizona borrower: A 71 year old gentleman was given one of these open-end line of credit loans by CheckSmart one month before the payday loan sunset in 2010. He was told by CheckSmart that it was his only option. His only income was a monthly

Social Security check of \$2,350. The line of credit was for approximately half of this amount: \$1,402. The fees then were structured as the following – 36% annual percent interest rate, but a “convenience transfer fee” that were far in excess of the actual interest. Because it was an open-end line of credit, the contract only states a 36% APR, despite all of the additional fees that would add up to an effective triple-digit APR.

Source: Contract on file with CRL

(1, LT, OE)

88. Check Into Cash, a Tennessee-based payday lender, makes open-end lines of credit to borrowers in Virginia. According to a legal services attorney in Virginia, here is one client’s story: One woman, now aged 63 and whose source of income is comprised of disability plus a small pension, took out an open-end line of credit from Check into Cash in 2011. She is still paying it off today. She has paid over \$3,000 in fees and interest alone on what has been less than \$1,000 of credit over that time. This same borrower has another open-end line of credit from California-based payday lender– Allied Cash Advance. With this loan she has paid over \$1,100 in fees after being stuck for more than a year in a \$360 loan. As further evidence of payday lenders’ disregard for the affordability of these loans, this same borrower is stuck also payday and car title loan as well. Because the monthly fees consume such a large amount of her monthly income, she forgoes purchases of the food and medicine she needs.

(1, 3, CT, LT, OE)

89. Single mother Malia Andrews lives in Tennessee, and obtained an open-end line of credit with a 279% APR. When she was short on cash, she took out one of these loans. Although it was touted as a better alternative to payday loans, it was not any better for Andrews. "I just about had a complete meltdown in the car," Andrews recalled, describing the moment she realized it would take years to pay off her flex loan. While approximately \$300 of her monthly payment went to interest and fees, only about \$20 actually paid down the principal of the loan. If she'd known how much the loan would end up costing her, she never would have taken it out.

Source: <http://www.newschannel5.com/news/newschannel-5-investigates/consumer-alert/critics-call-279-loan-a-debt-trap-for-poor>

(1, LT, OE)

90. Military veteran Joshua Hause had two existing loans for \$925 that he said more than doubled after they were converted to a flex loan, an open-end line of credit carrying a 279% APR. Suddenly, his loan payment was over \$2,000 when his original loan principal was less than half that amount. Due to the exorbitant interest and fees, Hause keeps getting farther behind. "If they're going to continue to get higher payments each month, I'll never get out of that hole," he lamented.

Source: <http://www.newschannel5.com/news/newschannel-5-investigates/consumer-alert/critics-call-279-loan-a-debt-trap-for-poor>

(1, LT, OE)

91. Jennifer Williams of Clarksdale, MS, teaches at a high school but remains in a debt trap due to payday lenders. She at one point owed thousands to nine different payday lenders in three separate towns. What started as a \$100 loan when she had just began teaching in 2006 and needed a small amount of money due to her credit cards defaulting in college, had accrued to \$4,000 in debt by 2009. She says, “It takes a toll on you, mentally. Those places are the devil. Once you get wrapped into it, it’s hard to get out”. After her son was born in 2011, she decided

to enroll in a 5-week financial boot camp, which was sponsored by the community bank, Southern Bancorp. As a result of completing the boot camp, she qualified for a savings account, as well as an affordable loan, with which she could refinance her debt. Credit counselor Charlestien Harris from Southern Bancorp states that Jennifer's situation is not uncommon.

Source: <http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2016/0903/Payday-loans-a-scourge-but-still-a-need>

(2, SL)

92. Don Miller of HopeLink, a center that assists low-income families and people in Nevada, says that most seniors who he works with are living on \$700-900 per month for utilities and rent. Some may take out \$150 in payday loans to afford food in a crisis, not realizing that it will take them at least a year or two to pay off. Miller states that many of the seniors go into debt, with at least half of them having taken out payday loans. He also states that they often default on their loans and receive an influx of phone calls from the lenders, who usually threaten to send a lawyer to their homes.

Source: <http://www.reviewjournal.com/view/seniors-often-pay-hefty-price-relying-payday-loan>

(2, SL)

93. A man confided in pastor Wes Helm about his financial hardship with payday loans. Helm looked through the man's budget and discovered one major monthly expense: a payday loan fee three times more than the loan itself. When the church conducted a further investigation, they found that dozens other families at the church had been victimized by payday lenders as well, sometimes even losing their vehicles and homes.

Source: <http://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/481558398/with-payday-loans-burying-borrowers-community-tries-alternatives>

(2, 3)

94. Candice Byrd was a payday loan borrower in 2011, when she took out a \$500 loan for a car payment. She was working in sales at the time. It was due in six weeks; however, three weeks after she took out the loan, she was advised to take out a new loan. She was told, "You're a good customer. This would be helpful for you." That second loan spurred a two-year cycle of paying off her debt. She eventually lost her car and apartment. She now only pays in cash. She said, "These places want you to keep borrowing. They don't want you to climb out of the hole."

Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/business/dealbook/payday-borrowings-debt-spiral-to-be-curtailed.html?>

(2, 3, LT)

95. J.F. from Fresno, California, stated, "About two years ago I used a payday loan to assist with monthly expenses. I thought it would be easy to pay off but then I noticed I could not afford to pay the loan without securing another! The lenders provide little to no other option to pay back the loan which lets you know they aren't concerned with helping you get through the hard spot they are more concerned with keeping you in the endless cycle to pad their pockets! Payday loans are BAD business!!!"

Source: Collected by the California Reinvestment Coalition and quote reprinted verbatim from <https://calreinvest.wordpress.com/2016/06/01/california-payday-loan-consumers-share-their-experiences/>

(1)

96. S.F. from Oakland, California, shared, "In 2006 I was working full-time but when my boyfriend moved out I had to pay the entire rent myself and had trouble making ends meet. I started to use the payday loans and soon found myself in an endless cycle of debt, having to pay off two or more in cash every two weeks in order to get two more to cover my bills. The loan rates were outrageous and some of these franchises require you pay in cash instead of depositing your personal check. It took me a couple of years to get out of this cycle of debt and it kills me to think of all the money I lost on fees over those years. I will never use those services again. These companies are absolutely predatory and should be fully regulated and restricted since they profit from the people who can least spare the financial fleecing. Thank you."
Source: Collected by the California Reinvestment Coalition and quote reprinted verbatim from <https://calreinvest.wordpress.com/2016/06/01/california-payday-loan-consumers-share-their-experiences/>
(1, 2)
97. J.J. from Lamont, California, stated that he had "[n]o work, needed money to keep afloat and the lender made it too easy to get loan, a car title loan and it has been a nightmare, do yourself a big favor don't ever get a title loan!"
Source: Collected by the California Reinvestment Coalition and quote reprinted verbatim from <https://calreinvest.wordpress.com/2016/06/01/california-payday-loan-consumers-share-their-experiences/>
(CT)
98. M. from San Diego, California, lamented, "I have been caught up in payday loan for over a year now it's taking all of my money and I don't know how to get out help."
Source: Collected by the California Reinvestment Coalition and quote reprinted verbatim from <https://calreinvest.wordpress.com/2016/06/01/california-payday-loan-consumers-share-their-experiences/>
(1)
99. D. D. from Los Angeles shared his story, explaining, "I was in a difficult financial time in my business and needed a \$2,500 loan to cover my rent that was due. I had exhausted all my other options and wasn't expecting any checks for a few weeks. I own my car and decided to go to Loanmart to get a loan. I called them up, told them what I needed and what kind of car they had. They approved me for \$3,000, even though I asked them for only \$2,500. Considering I was desperate for money, I went ahead with it, not knowing about the interest cap over \$2,500. Which I am sure they were well aware of and is why they urged me to get a higher loan. So, after 2 years of paying, I have now given them over \$4,500, that's \$1,500 more than the original loan. They say I still owe them \$3,000. For a total of \$7,500 due on a \$3000 loan. It's highway robbery. These people are awful, they harass me all the time, lie to me about payment due dates and even on one occasion sent me to collections on a missed payment even though I had already paid it for that month from their 3rd party payment site (moneygram). I went and checked and the payment never went through. Which is very suspicious. Now they are threatening to repo my vehicle. I don't know what to do, this whole experience has been horrible. I am self-employed and struggle enough getting by. I hope someone can sue them for these shady business practices. I will be more than happy to testify against them."
Source: Collected by the California Reinvestment Coalition and quote reprinted verbatim from <https://calreinvest.wordpress.com/2016/06/01/california-payday-loan-consumers-share-their-experiences/>

(2, CT)

100. An anonymous borrower reported the following story to the Pew Charitable Trusts, who shared the story with the LA Wave: "I had to come up with money [when] my husband was out of work, and I actually was up to \$900 [in storefront payday loan debt]. ... My entire check was gone the next two weeks, so that's when I went to the online ones. ... And then after I did the online ones, and got in that loop, and got stuck in there, I went back to the store again, and, yeah, it got bad. And my [checking] account ended up pretty negative. I had to close it out totally."

Source: <http://wavenewspapers.com/payday-lenders-may-face-new-regulations/>

(1, 3)

101. Raymond Chaney, now 66, is a veteran who became homeless after he took out a payday loan and spiraled into the debt trap. He needed \$400 to repair his broken-down car. Soon enough, he owed mounds of money on several loans to many different lenders. He also owed overdraft fees to banks while paying rent. The payday lenders had full access to his account and eventually took all of his Social Security money. Chaney lost his apartment as a result. The \$400 loan led to \$3,000 in additional loans, which later accumulated to \$12,000 of debt. "I'm not dumb, but I did a dumb thing," he said. He now lives in a rescue mission located in Boise, and is working with the Idaho Consumer Finance Bureau to pay off his debt. His advice to anyone considering taking out a payday loan is as follows: "I had a friend who had back surgery, and it was so painful...If the choice is between back surgery and dying, consider dying. Well, I give people the same advice about payday loans. If the alternative to a payday loan is dying, think long and hard about dying."

Source: <http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/drug-payday-loan-users-hooked-quick-cash-cycle-v18088751>

(2, 3)

102. Ann Baddour, Director of Fair Financial Services Project, spoke on behalf of an anonymous borrower at the United Way Leadership Breakfast. She said that the senior citizen, who was living on Social Security, had taken an auto title loan at a value of \$2,000 three years prior. She still owed the lender \$1,900 after paying off \$9,200 on the \$2,000 loan.

Source: http://www.tdtnews.com/news/article_fa7d0ea0-7f8f-11e6-9006-afc9a2e7f963.html

(2, CT)

103. As reported by the American Forces Press Service, one military borrower took out a \$300 loan when he was desperate for money to help him afford expenses necessary for his three children. He got trapped into the cycle of jumping from lender to lender in order to afford the original loan. The \$300 loan soon cost him \$15,000.

Source: <http://www.military.com/money/personal-finance/credit-debt-management/pay-day-loans-big-business-for-them-headache-for-you.html>

(2)

104. Joylynn M. Jossel from Columbus, OH, took out a loan of a couple hundred dollars. She could not pay off the first loan, so she took out a new loan from another payday lender, eventually owing money to four different lenders. Soon she was paying \$1,800 each month on payday loans alone. At one point, she had to let a \$600 loan she had taken out bounce to avoid dire circumstances. "It was either that or not pay my rent that month," she says. "It was horrifying. They tell you any and everything to get you to come in and pay for the check that didn't clear.

They'll tell you, 'You're a criminal, you wrote a bad check. That's against the law, it's a felony, you're going to jail.' They call all of your references and your job. It's horrifying. I felt so suffocated. It felt as if I was in this black hole that I just couldn't get out of." Soon enough, the other three loans bounced as well, as she had to afford basic living expenses as well. She faced embarrassment at work when the lender called her at work and the receptionist would say who the caller was in front of the office before turning the call over to Joylynn. "Every time the phone rang, I'd jump like I was the next one in a horror movie to be taken out. I'd fear they'd come to my house because I'd known them to go to people's houses before. I felt guilty just putting gas in my tank. I felt guilty buying food. I felt as though any money I got should be going to the payday lenders and collection agencies to get them off my back." Eventually, she was able to repay her loans after winning a civil lawsuit not affiliated with her payday loans.

Source: <http://www.aol.com/article/2010/11/02/payday-loans-how-one-woman-got-caught-in-a-vicious-cycle/19674757/>

(2, 3)

105. Donald Garrett got behind on his bills, so he took out a \$100 loan from Advance Till Payday and repaid them \$200. "And I said, 'I appreciate you loaning me the \$100. I'm sorry that I was in this bind but you helped me and I appreciate it and you won't see me anymore.' And I thought that was the end of it." Later on, he was receiving a dialysis treatment when he received another phone call from the company. "And he told me that I had a balance of \$260 outstanding because of the \$80 a month membership fee. Where did that come from? Nobody mentioned that when they gave me the \$100."

Source: <http://wvtf.org/post/federal-lawsuit-reveals-dark-underworld-payday-loans-virginia#stream/0>

(2, SL)

106. Roger Tillman, 64, took out a \$500 payday loan from The Money Center when he was tight on cash and needed to pay his bills. He was earning \$9.00 an hour working as a late-night security guard. The Money Center's website states that they charge an APR of 650%, amounting to about \$150 in interest and fees on a 2-week loan. He could not pay the loan back before the first two weeks, and renewed it as the costs accrued. He took a loan out from another payday store, falling into a debt trap. He soon lost his job. He tried to contact The Money Store two days later, and got no response. The manager finally reached out to Tillman. He recalls of the manager, "His statement was that 'I hope you don't get stopped by the police, because I'm filing a theft by check charge against you.' I didn't say anything. I was floored, because I was expecting to work out a payment plan." The Money Center filed a criminal complaint against him in November of 2009. The district attorney told Tillman that he must pay Marpast of Texas, the company through which The Money Center operates, \$1,020 within 10 days, in addition to lawyers' fees of \$140 and \$90 in merchant fees. Otherwise, he would face 2 to 20 years in jail and would be fined as much as \$10,000. This shocked him, leaving him scared - too scared to even attend his daughter's graduation from Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, fearing that there could be a warrant out to arrest him. "I'm innocent here," he said, "other than losing my job and an inability to pay. I tried to get on a payment plan. If my intention was to duck and dodge, why would I even call them?" He continued to avoid his jail by writing letters to the DA, the state Office of the Consumer Credit Commissioner, and Marpast. He mentioned that the Texas Office of Credit Commissioner submitted his debt to the DA for "collection purposes".

Source: <https://www.texasobserver.org/cash-fast-how-taking-out-a-payday-loan-could-land-you-in-jail/>

(2, 3)

107. Christina McHam took out a \$200 loan from Cash Biz, near Houston, but was unable to repay it. She was arrested in November 2012 and charged an additional \$305 for court costs and other fines. She "paid off" her debt with one night in jail.

Source: <https://www.texasobserver.org/cash-fast-how-taking-out-a-payday-loan-could-land-you-in-jail/>

(2, 3, SL)

108. An anonymous man, a veteran who had served in the military for 23 years, was being charged by the Potter County Attorney for a payday loan he could not repay. His wife wrote to the state Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner, "My husband is a good man! He has never done anything wrong, he fought for this country for 23 years ... and now the Potty [sic] County Attorney wants to prosecute him for a payday loan."

Source: <https://www.texasobserver.org/cash-fast-how-taking-out-a-payday-loan-could-land-you-in-jail/>

(2, 3)

109. An anonymous borrower repaid \$800 on his \$400 payday loan after 70 days. However, he was still in dire need of money, and took out another \$500 loan the following day. Again, the next day he took out a \$1,000 loan, as he was still struggling to afford his basic living expenses. He paid \$2,051 back on that loan 70 days later. He took out another \$1,000 loan, and a \$600 loan from another store. By this time, he had paid \$3,000 interest on these loans, in addition to the \$2,500 principal amount.

Source: <http://www.standard.net/Guest-Commentary/2016/08/07/paydaylenders-Ponzischeme-fraud-loans-column-Winward>

(1, 2)

110. "Perry Green, 30, took out a \$300 payday loan that soon cost him \$1,000 in interest and other fees. By taking out this one loan, he fell into a three-year debt trap. He took out multiple loans after the initial \$300 loan. Originally, he needed the loan to afford his rent, thinking a payday loan was the only option."

Source: <http://www.miunited.org/payday-loans-target-those-with-no-cash/>

(1, 2)

111. Leonard Abbot, a 53-year-old security officer at the Department of Public Safety at the Texas State Capitol, had been warned of the dangers of payday loans. But after he owed some unexpected medical bills, he felt his only choice was to take out a \$500 loan from a payday store. He says, "One thing that I didn't realize is, it doesn't matter how many payday loans you have, you still qualify for more." He adds, "I've always been against those things, the payday loans. I knew about them ahead of time and I knew it's easy to get caught up in their trap, but again, at the time I just felt like I didn't have any other alternative options." By May 2016, he had taken out four different payday loans totaling \$2,500 and costing him \$450 per month. He eventually converted his loans through the Predatory Loan Conversion Program, led by the Society of St. Vincent de Paul in Austin. "My favorite part about working at the Capitol is seeing the representatives coming in, and also just to see Texas law working at its best," he said. "I am hoping and will be praying that they will look at legislation to regulate this."

Source: <https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/18/federal-rules-could-tame-wild-west-texas-payday-le/>

(2)

112. An anonymous veteran reported, "I took out a loan for thirty-four hundred bucks. I was gonna pay it back as soon as I got my paycheck. But when I realized I'd have to take out another loan to pay my living expenses, I let it ride. Even though I was paying more than \$700 a month on the loan, with the high interest rate, it took forever to pay it off, and I ended up having to pay nearly double what I had borrowed." He got caught in a debt trap for several years, taking out new loans to pay off previous loans.

Source: <http://www.vietnow.com/veteran-buyout-plans-and-other-bad-ideas/>

(1, 2)

113. Jon Gomez of Hialeah, FL, received a \$400 payday loan at a Money Superstore location, due in 14 days and a \$41 service charge. "I paid back the \$441, but the next day, I took out another \$400 payday loan because I needed the money," Gomez told VICE. "I was in this vicious cycle for three months." Eventually, he didn't have enough money to cover one of his payday loan checks, and it bounced.

Source: <http://www.vice.com/read/inside-the-battle-over-floridas-rationally-charged-payday-loan-racket>

(1, 2)

114. "In 2014, hunger drove Michelle Warne, a retiree in Green Bay, Wisconsin, to take out a loan from a local Check 'n Go. 'I had no food in the house at all,' she said. 'I just couldn't take any more.' It took her two years to pay off that loan. Then she took out a second loan, which she has not paid off completely. Caught in a debt trap, she borrowed another \$401, plus \$338 to pay off the outstanding balance. According to her truth-in-lending statement, paying off this \$740 will cost Warne \$983 in interest and fees over 18 months. Warne's APR on her so-called installment loan was 143%. 'We need better laws,' said Warne, 73. 'Because when they have something like this, they will take advantage of anybody who is poor.' Warne never applied for a standard personal loan from a bank or credit union, which offer loans at a fraction of the interest rate she paid. She was positive a bank would not lend to her, she said, because her only income is her Social Security retirement. For now, Warne said she has no way to pay off her loan. She has made one payment of \$101, but does not know how she will pay off the remainder of her debt, which with principal, interest, and fees will cost her \$1,723. Warne's only income is a monthly \$763 Social Security check. Warne said she would "never" borrow from a payday lender again, adding, "I wish I would have read the fine print."

Source: <http://wisconsinwatch.org/2016/06/no-relief-from-wisconsins-565-percent-payday-loan-interest-under-new-rules/>

(2, LT)

115. Ronnette Souza-Kaawa, 46, lives in Waianae, HI and works in administrative services at an elementary school. Her family faced financial difficulty when her teenage daughter had a baby, so she simply went down the road to Easy Cash Solutions to take out a payday loan. Souza-Kaawa says she has taken out roughly a dozen payday loans in the past two years, ranging from \$150 to \$400. She says she'd always strive to pay them off before her next paycheck, but wasn't always able to do so. "If I borrowed a high (amount), I'd pay some off and re-borrow only a little," she says. Today, Souza-Kaawa owes roughly \$1,470 from two recent loans. She is learning

budgeting and financial management strategies from a nonprofit called Hawaiian Community Assets. Today, Souza-Kaawa views payday lenders as a last-ditch option for many families. "It's there when you need it," she says, adding that thanks to financial counseling, she's become savvy to what she now describes as their "hideous" interest rates. "If don't need it, don't take out a loan," she says. "Don't go borrowing \$500, just because you can."

Source: <http://www.hawaiibusiness.com/payday-lenders/>

(1, 2, SL)

116. Toniette Brown from Alabama needed her first payday loan to afford prescription medicine for her daughter. Working as a part-time librarian, she did not have health insurance coverage to cover her family, or even herself. The payday lender gave her a \$275 loan without any credit check. When she couldn't repay her loan by the next payday two weeks later, she took out another. This accrued to 12 loans across 4 different lenders, both in Alabama and online. She frequently had 3 to 5 loans at once. She was eventually in \$4,288.96 worth of debt. "I couldn't pay them because I was already living on an income that was paycheck to paycheck," she said. When the interest and fees began to grow several times the amount of the original loan, she sought help from Gateway Financial Freedom and landed a full-time job. She has since almost fully paid back her loans, interest and fees, and says that she will never make the same mistake again

Source: http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/03/lifeline_or_financial_anchor_u.html

(1, 2)

117. Yolanda Roth, of Robbinsdale, Minnesota, took out a payday loan when she lost her job. She had to accept a lower-paying job and needed some extra money to afford her rent. "My check wasn't quite enough to pay it off and still live, and I ended up racking up a lot of debt because of fees and so on," Roth said. "I eventually paid it off, but it took a very long time." Her original loan was for a couple hundred dollars, but ended up costing her a total of \$1,500 over the next six months. She describes this experience as "very unpleasant" and "extraordinarily stressful." However, she understands that there is risk associated with taking out these types of loans. "I felt like I understood what was expected and I could definitely do it," she said. "I was just in a desperate situation, or what I thought was a desperate situation."

Source: <http://post.mnsun.com/2015/10/12/faith-leaders-protest-payday-loan-practices-in-robbinsdale/>

(1, 2)

118. Reverend Stevie Wakes, a Baptist minister in Kansas City, Kansas, received a payday loan of \$500 that he thought he could pay back in two weeks. "We thought it was short-term," he said. He thought he would get a higher-paying job soon enough, but wasn't able to. He kept returning to the store to take out more loans every two weeks, and four months later had accumulated \$1,250 in debt. He says that he renewed his loans about ten times, with an APR of about 450%. As soon as he realized how quickly his debt he was racking up, he managed to save the money to pay off his debt. "I'd like to see them cap the rate so that no one has to experience that kind of robbery, which is why I support the campaign [for a 36% interest rate cap] 100 percent," he says of payday lenders. "It's a debt trap."

Source: <http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article300576/Alternative-arises-as-payday-loan-industry-comes-under-scrutiny.html>

(1, 2)

119. "Michael" of Verona, WI, had taken out payday loans from a dozen stores. He began taking out payday loans after a company mailed him an offer to take out a loan for no charge, directly after he had repaid his car title loan. Soon enough, his debt grew as he continued to take out loans to repay previous ones. He says he felt like a "gerbil on a treadmill". The payday lenders began aggressively calling his personal references, which he provided when he applied for the loans, causing him even deeper feelings of shame and desperation. "It got to be where I felt like my hair was on fire," he says. He eventually declared bankruptcy, halting the fees on the loans. Source: http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt_and_politics/wisconsin-is-one-of-few-states-with-no-ceiling-on/article_4e3585bc-cda8-5be9-8bf0-7d6b6a02dfdf.html
(1, 2, 3, CT)
120. Janet is a part-time security officer. She took out a \$300 payday loan to afford diabetes medicine, as well as her rent. She found herself in a debt cycle. She recalls, "I called and tried to set up a repayment plan with them. I was not aware that I could do that and when I found out that I could, I did talk with them. And the amount that they said I owe is \$425, and they said that I could repay in 2 payments which was over \$200. I asked them if they could stretch it out 2 more payments; something that would be a lot smaller. The lady told me that they could only stretch it out 4 for 4 payments, which a little over \$100 per payment, which is a payment I still cannot afford to pay at this time." She was still in debt 6 weeks later. "It's very frustrating because it's like I'm more on interest than the actual loan itself... it's like I'm actually paying double." Source: Texas Fair Lending Alliance, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCOwaudHr3g>
(1, 2)
121. Trudy Robideau from California received an \$800 loan from a payday loan store. She wasn't able to repay her loan right away, and renewed it for a fee. "Ka-ching," Robideau said. "You're hooked. You can feel the hook right in your mouth. And you don't know it at the time, but it gets deeper and deeper." She soon turned to other payday lenders, racking up fees totaling thousands of dollars. "I was having to get one to pay another," she said. "It's a real nightmare." Source: <http://www.npr.org/2015/03/26/395421117/payday-loans-and-endless-cycles-of-debt-targeted-by-federal-watchdog>
(1, 2)
122. Elise Robillard, a teacher and single mother, said she fell into a cycle several years ago of taking short-term, high-interest loans that ultimately played a role in her decision to file for bankruptcy. "I spent the better part of 15 years stuck in a cycle of debt because of the initial payday loan that I took out," Robillard said. Source: <http://www.koat.com/news/nm-supreme-court-exorbitant-payday-loans-violate-state-law/26688316>
(2, 3)
123. In 2008, Joy Young and her newly immigrated husband were making only \$30,000, in Woonsocket, RI. She and her husband stretched their income to cover their living expenses and their monthly payments on a home equity loan that paid for house repairs and a used vehicle. She received \$450 from Advance America, which had to be paid back in two weeks, plus a fee of \$45. Two weeks later, she paid her \$495 debt, but was forced to borrow again to meet her

monthly expenses. She was now caught in the debt trap, borrowing a third and fourth loan. Every two weeks, Young spent two hours on a Friday afternoon waiting in line to pay off her loans and borrow again. Advance America pocketed \$360 in fees each month from her alone. "Every time I got another loan, I thought it would help me in the short term," Young says. "But there was no way out. I felt like I was in prison. Any time I would talk about my story I would start to cry. It has been a horrible, horrible last few years." She was weeks away from foreclosure when she received a loan from Capital Good Fund, a microfinance institution that began extending small loans at 30% interest for a twelve-month term. She was able to pay off three of her payday loans with their help and is slowly paying off the fourth.

Source: <http://www.rimonthly.com/Rhode-Island-Monthly/October-2014/Reporter-Breaking-the-Payday-Loan-Cycle/>

(1, 2, 3)

124. Christina Sarno in Warren, OH borrowed just \$200 from a payday lender, but she quickly realized she could not pay back the principal or the interest. "After receiving constant calls and having the store manager show up at my house to try to collect the money I owed, I gave up. At this point I had developed a lot of interest on the loan and owed more than I could possibly pay back on my income," she said during a meeting at the Warren YWCA. She lost her car, but the Beatitude House of Warren helped her with housing and education to avoid falling into the payday lending trap again.

Source: Reprinted verbatim from <http://www.vindy.com/news/2016/jun/28/women-tell-of-troubles-with-payday-lendi/>

(2, 3, SL)

125. Tiffany Richardson, a resident of Houston, Texas, received a \$5,000 car title loan, using the title to the 2005 Nissan Altima she bought for her mother as collateral. She fell behind on repaying the loan. She took out another car title loan for \$2,400 using her 1999 Toyota 4Runner as collateral this time. The amount she owed skyrocketed to several times the original principal amount. "You're like a hamster on a wheel," Ms. Richardson, 43, said of repaying her ballooning debt, adding that she was "looking out the window every night" to make sure her cars had not been repossessed. One night, however, Ms. Richardson woke to see both cars being towed away.

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/thousands-in-texas-lose-cars-amid-calls-for-loan-restrictions.html?_r=0

(1, 2, 3, CT)

126. Maranda Brooks, a records coordinator at a Cleveland college in OH, took out a \$500 loan to help pay an electricity bill. Two weeks later, the full amount of the loan plus a \$50 fee were deducted from her usual \$800 paycheck. To cover expenses for herself and her four children, she took out another loan, falling into a debt trap that lasted almost a year. "It was a nightmare of going around and around," said Brooks.

Source: <http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-payday-loans-rules-20150202-story.html>

(1, 2)

127. According to her social worker, Sandra, is an illiterate 33-year old single mother in Missouri with a third-grade education. Sandra received a payday loans from King of Kash. Her only income was her Social Security disability check. Sandra took out a loan for \$300 at an APR of 342%, which cost her \$1,080 to pay off.

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2enmyz-7CQo>
(2, LT)

128. After his daughter returned from serving in Iraq and asked for financial help to relocate her family, Preston White, 63, took out a title loan on his pickup truck from a store in Killeen, Texas. The 30-day, \$4,000 loan carried a 375% APR. White had already spent his life savings on paying for treatment for his wife's pancreatic cancer and soon realized that his fixed income left him only enough money to cover the fees, not the principal. He recognized the cycle of debt: "In four months, I could have paid more than what I went to the store for in the first place, and still owe the original loan amount," he said. "Never in my wildest imagination did I think that such a loan product could even exist. You assume the system will have usury laws and protect you from such things...Everybody's got to make a profit but there should be no place for usury in the 21st century." He was ultimately able to retire the debt by taking out a loan at 16% APR through a credit union.

Source: Gogoi, P. (2010). "Costly cash: How a retiree wound up with a 375% loan." *Daily Finance*. Available at <http://aol.it/16TVtof> (viewed 5/24/13).
(1, 2, CT)

129. Alicia and Clinton Lummus of Conyers, Georgia, took out a \$525 car title loan after injuries forced them both to stop working. Over eight months, they made payments totaling \$1,056—more than twice the amount borrowed—but ultimately fell behind on payments. The lender repossessed the vehicle, worth \$14,000—and was able to keep any excess money from the sale of the vehicle, since Georgia law allows the lender to do so.

Source: Kirchhoff, S. (2006). "Some consumers run into big problems with auto title lending." *USA Today*. Available at <http://usat.ly/124EbDR> (viewed 5/25/13).
(2, CT)

130. Shanell White of Elk Grove, California, needed money to pay for rent after her expenses increased when she began to care for her niece. She took out a \$3,900 installment title loan using her car—worth \$12,000—as collateral. After having paid nearly \$10,500 over three years, she was told she still owed the full principal that she had borrowed. The lender repossessed and sold the car yet still sent her a bill for the loan after. "To me, it's just modern-day loan sharking. People are being taken advantage of," she concluded.

Source: Said, Carolyn. (2013). "'Car-title loans' a road to deep debt: Legislators weight capping high-interest 'car-title loans.'" *San Francisco Chronicle*. Available at <http://bit.ly/ZgEx6D> (viewed 5/30/13).
(1, 2, CT)

131. Sean received a \$1,500 car title loan, which he renewed over 40 times—paying over \$11,500 in interest—before receiving help from family to pay off the principal. He said, "I was too embarrassed to ask my parents for the initial loan money, [but] ended up borrowing money from them to make some of the payments and ultimately had to ask them to pay off the whole loan, after losing tons of money along the way."

Source: Martin, N. & Adams, O. (2012). "Grand theft auto: Repossession and demographic realities in title lending." *Missouri Law Review*. Available at <http://bit.ly/Z12wSX>.
(1, 2, CT)

132. Caroline O'Connor, a 30-year-old hospital lab technician, was in need of \$1,000 to cover her rent and electricity bills. When she saw a television commercial advertising how to get cash from your car in the form of a short-term loan, she believed she had found relief. The loan carried a 171% APR. Two years of being stuck in the debt cycle, the lender seized her car. "“These companies put people in a hole that they can't get out of,” Ms. O'Connor said. Source: <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/dipping-into-auto-equity-devastates-many-borrowers/> (2, CT)
133. Ken Chicosky, a 39-year-old Army veteran, received a \$4,000 car title loan from Cash America, a in his Austin, Texas, neighborhood. The loan came with an APR of 98.3%. He says he knew the loan was a bad decision when he received his first bill detailing that he would have to pay a total of \$9,346 on the \$4,000 loan over 24 months. Even though the City of Austin limits loan terms to three months, according to the New York Times investigation, Cash America made the 24-month loan term by having Mr. Chicosky filled out the paper work and pick up his loan check from a store in a nearby town. Chicosky, a college student, said the loan has sunk his credit score and he uses some of his financial aid money to pay his title-loan bill. Source: <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/dipping-into-auto-equity-devastates-many-borrowers/> (2, CT)
134. Derek Drewery was caught in the debt trap beginning in 1996, when he was stationed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. He received a payday loan of a few hundred dollars at a payday lender near the base. When he returned to the store to repay the loan, he realized that with interest and fees, he owed a lot more than he had borrowed. "I had to borrow again to pay that back, and had to borrow again to pay that back," Drewery says of getting trapped in the debt cycle. "I got into the real churning situation to borrow this week to pay for last week." To help pay off the loan, Drewery cut back on food, even sharing his last box of Cheerios with his Jack Russell terrier until his father found out and sent him grocery store gift cards. He now works as an electrician and is the pastor of a church which has joined a coalition of Christians to oppose predatory lending. Source: <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/11/us/full-faith-and-credit-christian-groups-unite-against-predatory-lending.html> (1, 2, 3)
135. Mr. Sanchez, a veteran who served in Iraq as an infantryman in 2004, returned home to his wife and two daughters but suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. When he needed a bit more cash to make ends meet, he took out a car title loan to pay for his family's monthly bills. He had already taken out a \$2,500 car title loan earlier in the year, paying \$350 per month on the loan. After 10 months of paying a total of \$3,500 in fees, he could no longer afford the loan and sold his family's second vehicle in order to continue paying on the original title loan. Unfortunately, a few months later the Sanchez family was in a similar situation, unable to make the regular monthly payment of \$350 in interest-only payments while still owing the original \$2,500 principal. He couldn't lose his second car to the predatory lenders as it was the only way his wife could get to her job. Desperate for a solution, Mr. Sanchez turned to Helping Hands Ministry, a Texas social service organization that provides opportunities for financial empowerment to veterans and working class families. The organization was able to help the Sanchez family pay off their debt.

Source: <https://medium.com/@stop paydaypreds/payday-lenders-target-veterans-fcfe91b92c86#.wl764nkqu>

(1, 2, CT)

136. Susan Fronczak, a 60-year-old woman from Florence, Arizona, secured a \$2,000 car title loan using her 2007 Nissan as collateral. Fronczak had six months to pay off the loan, at an APR of 182%. Her loan contract provided for 11 interest-only payments followed by a balloon payment of \$2,100, for a total repayment amount of \$3,860. By month five, she had paid back \$1,920 and the lender said she still owed the full \$2,000. When Fronczak could no longer afford the monthly interest-only payments, her car was repossessed. Getting it back cost her \$1,100. Fronczak continued to struggle after refinancing the loan, and it is estimated that she had paid close to \$5,000 on the \$2,000 loan by the time she got help. Not only had she paid over double the original loan amount, but she was still facing threats of repossession from the lender. The company returned Fronczak's car title and released her from the debt only after she filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

Source: <http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/mesa/2014/06/20/auto-title-lenders-give-additional-high-risk-option/11061451/>

(2, 3, CT, LT)

137. Elaine is 74 years old and lives independently in a small, one-bedroom apartment. She receives social security and a small monthly pension totaling \$1,278. She was struggling with her bills. Elaine came to one of the Catholic Charities of Northeastern Kansas' Emergency Assistance Center (EAC) for help with an electric bill. During her meeting she shared that she had payday loans totaling \$1,725. She had these payday loans for years and, unfortunately, her low income just would not cover the loans to be paid off while still trying to take care of her daily living expenses and housing. Because of the high rate, Elaine was paying \$275 per month just in interest on all of her payday loans. Elaine shared that she had not told her grown children because she was ashamed to let them know she had gotten into this situation in the first place. Catholic Charities was able to assist Elaine through its Kansas Loan Pool Project (KLPP). By converting her high-interest payday loan into a new, low-interest fixed loan, Elaine now has a manageable payment with an actual payoff date. Elaine participates in monthly financial coaching through the KLPP program. Her bills are now up to date and she has set some realistic financial goals. Elaine has newfound hope through the help of Catholic Charities and the KLPP program. "It's a relief to know that I now have enough money to pay my bills AND go to the grocery store." Elaine shared.

Source: Catholic Charities of Northeastern Kansas

(1)

138. Tiemeyer White, a 33-year-old Navy veteran from Texas, full-time electrical engineering college student, and father, took out a car title loan more than a year ago. When the federal government shut down due to a budget impasse in October 2013, White didn't get his Post-9/11 benefits or work-study pay for his Department of Veterans Affairs job for almost two months. As a result, he fell behind on his bills, and the car title lender began calling him several times a day both at work and at home, demanding loan payments. "I tell them, I understand you're doing your job, but I also understand that your job – you make your living off of making my life worse," White says. "That's how I felt that moment." Two weeks later, his 2003 Dodge pickup truck was repossessed from his school's parking lot.

Source: <https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/banking-news/car-title-payday-loans-trap-unwary-veterans/>
(2, CT, LT)

139. Homeless veteran Mel Hair hitchhiked to Sioux Falls, South Dakota, from Minnesota a few years ago. He stayed at a shelter to get back on his feet. When Hair and his girlfriend were able to get their own apartment, he received a car title loan for \$200. One title loan turned into three loans amounting to more than \$2,000. He has been making monthly payments of \$430 per month for the past two years.

Source: <http://www.keloland.com/news/article/featured-stories/the-high-price-for-small-loans->
(1, 2, CT, SL)

140. Kim Brust of South Dakota started taking out payday loans three years ago. At the time, her social security and disability checks were not enough to cover her monthly expenses for the children and other family members who had moved in with her. She fell into a cycle of debt, taking out a total of eight loans from four different lenders in Sioux Falls. The interest rates range from 247 percent to as much as 608 percent over the course of a year. "I fell into that same trap and I know better. I'm not stupid, but I was stressing about money. I was wondering sometimes where the next meal was coming from," Brust said. "It just sneaks up on you and one day I just laid out all the papers and I go, 'Oh, my Lord what have I done.'"

Source: <http://www.keloland.com/news/article/featured-stories/the-high-price-for-small-loans->
(1, 2)

141. Eddie Dorman of Duval County, Florida, has been caught in a vicious debt trap for years. He uses one payday loan to pay for another, and is currently fighting with a car title loan company in Gainesville that is trying to repossess his truck. "I would never do it again, if I ever get out from under this one." Dorman said. "Everyone has problems. I got behind on a payment, the next thing you know there is a wrecker in the front yard at 3 in the morning." With his truck title loan, the company made him take out a \$700 insurance policy to cover the company. "It covers them and yet it does not cover you," Dorman explained.

Source: <http://www.news4jax.com/news/borrower-beware-title-payday-lenders-are-back>
(1, 2, CT)

142. Lara was a young mother who stayed home to raise three children while her military husband worked full time. She worked jobs when she could, but the family still found themselves strapped for cash. They reluctantly took out a payday loan of \$200 to manage the bills until their next paycheck. When payday arrived, the lender wanted \$300. They paid the \$300 but came up short on their next payment, so they took out another loan and quickly found themselves caught in the debt trap. "I kid you not, we did that dance for close to six months," Lara said. "It was horrible. Just unbelievably horrible." Ultimately, Lara had to beg her parents to help get them out of the cycle, but she knows not everyone has a safety net to fall back on.

Source: <http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/new-guidelines-nonprofits-help-curtail-predatory-payday-loans-in-minnesota/>
(2, SL)

143. Gordon Martinez: "About 8 years ago, I was struggling financially. I had a family and was starting out a new job in sales, transitioning from being a band director. I used my most prized possession, a tuba valued at \$8,000, as a security against a \$500 pawn loan to help make ends

meet. I made payments faithfully every 2 weeks, fighting Friday rush hour traffic, trying to stay afloat. I could only ever cover interest fees, none of my payments hit the principal. In the midst of making those payments, I took out another loan from another payday storefront, and even went online to several payday loan [stores] trying to cover my bills. Avoiding pending eviction and keeping my family's finances afloat, I felt hopeless, and that I was failing to uphold my responsibilities. I was trying to do what was best for my family, only to be taken deeper and deeper into a financial mess created by products that were advertised to help. Ultimately, all of the loans and fees took too much of my paycheck and I couldn't keep up. I defaulted on the loans. We lost our residence, I lost my prized tuba, and the strain led to the loss of my marriage, destroying our family. I found myself answering an online ad to rent a couch in a one room studio apartment with all of my worldly possessions housed in two plastic storage tubs. I have never felt so low in my life. I felt isolated, ashamed and lonely. I did what I had to do to survive, but I never imagined I would hit such a low. Thankfully, in the midst of this, I found my church and they helped me get back on my feet. I started sharing my story and exposing what I feel are predatory lending practices that run counter to our faith. I felt powerless while I was trapped in payday loans, but now I work with Faith in Texas to help organize other borrowers to help them so that what happened to me, doesn't happen to them. And to advocate for an end to the debt trap I found myself in. My experience is not uncommon. In a recent Faith for Just Lending survey with Clergy and Congregations, 86% said payday loan products were more harmful than helpful. Common themes raised in interviews with Congregations included a cycle of debt, and loss of a major asset such as a home, family, stress and shame. All of which I lived."

Source: <https://vimeo.com/167331364>

(1, 2, 3)

144. Diana LaCroix, a 63-year-old widow living off of her husband's Social Security survivor's benefits, received a \$300 payday loan. It took her three or four months to pay off the small \$300 loan. Then, she found herself caught in the debt trap, borrowing \$50, \$75, or \$100 at a time. She is still borrowing money to make up for the loan payments that are eating into her fixed monthly budget, explaining, "I'll probably have to borrow a little more next month to get caught up on bills."

Source: http://www.omaha.com/money/days-of-the-payday-loan-could-be-numbered-with-new/article_0565b988-8356-5fb5-acf9-d3a076e250a0.html

(2)

145. John Miller, an attorney in Missouri, tells the story of his friend who had been struggling financially and turned to a payday loan store as a last resort before taking his own life.

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2-Ullrs95A>

(3)

146. Richard Kitterman, a retired Master Sergeant and former Chief of Consumer Affairs Office, tells the story of a soldier: "I remember one particular story, I'll never forget it. She was a young soldier, and she was a good soldier. She was a single mother, she was doing her best to meet her obligations to the Army, and to raise her child. But she was facing in some cases, some nearly insurmountable obstacles: she had to have daycare, she had to have babysitting for her kids when she worked late. And she found herself getting her first payday loan and then another, and then another... and it got down to where on payday, her entire check disappeared. It was gone to pay back payday loans. And so her payday was spent standing in line at several different payday

loan offices to get new loans or to renew existing loans. And each time paying healthy loan fees to get that money. And she eventually...and she was a responsible soldier. Most of the soldiers that get involved in this are really good, decent soldiers, good people who want to pay their bills, understand their obligations, but they just have more month left at the end of a paycheck. So they just see this as a quick fix; something they only have to do once, and that was the case with this young lady. She just got in over her head. And I remember after she got straightened out and things were going good and she continued to work to pay off those loans, even though she could have walked away and there wasn't really much the payday lender could have done, but that's not the kind of person she was. And I remember her telling me, 'Sergeant Kitterman, I felt like I was in a black hole. Every morning I woke up, every night I went to sleep, I was sick to my stomach over what am I going to do? How am I going to work this out?'"

Source: <https://vimeo.com/143323466>

(1, 2)

147. Paula, who lives in Texas with her husband and 3 children, took out some payday loans through lenders on the Internet after her husband lost his job. After he started working again, they were never able to get out of the debt trap due to excessive rollover fees. At one point, \$800 a month of the family's money was going towards payday loans.

Source: Fact Sheet: *The Victims of Payday Lending*,
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>

(2)

148. Tennessee resident Natalie has paid over \$4,000 in fees for \$800 worth of loans. Each time that she thinks she is has paid down the principal, the lender informs her of more fees that have been piled onto her already steep debt. Additional fees are added every time that she pays late.

Source: Fact Sheet: *The Victims of Payday Lending*,
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>

(1, 2)

149. Maria took out one payday loan three years ago. Now, she is struggling to handle five payday loans and is over \$3,000 in debt. Most of her budget goes to paying fees to rollover her loans, leaving little money for her to live on the rest of the month. She cannot afford to pay them off.

Source: Fact Sheet: *The Victims of Payday Lending*,
<http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/victims-payday>

(1, 2)

150. According to a 2013 *New York Times* investigation, "Johanna Pimentel said she and both of her brothers had taken out multiple title loans. They are everywhere, like liquor stores," she said. Ms. Pimentel, 32, had moved her family out of Ferguson, Mo., to a higher-priced suburb of St. Louis that promised better schools. But after a divorce, her former husband moved out, and she had trouble paying her rent. Ms. Pimentel took out a \$3,461 title loan using her 2002 Suburban as collateral. After falling behind, she woke up one morning last March to find that the car had been repossessed. Without it, she could not continue to run her day care business."

Source: <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/dipping-into-auto-equity-devastates-many-borrowers/>

(2, CT)

151. Knoye Jackson of Goodyear, Arizona received a \$700 car title loan, which then ballooned to \$7,000 in three years due to the high interest rate and additional fees. The \$80 Jackson was paying each week was only paying the interest she was accruing—none of it went toward paying down the principal. Ultimately, Jackson’s car was repossessed and she filed for bankruptcy. She wishes she had just called the utility company she owed money to and arranged a payment plan directly with them rather than taking out a loan. Of her experiences, Ms. Jackson says, “I think they trap you because they make it seem like, come and get this good money so you can get caught up on your bills, but you never get caught up. They’re getting richer by charging you all of this money. We’re getting poorer.” Those loans don’t bring you out of debt, they put you in debt.

Source: <http://www.abc15.com/news/state/woman-caught-in-flex-loan-cycle-speaks-out>

(1, 2, 3, LT)

152. A single mother in Georgia took out a \$450 loan from Atlanta Title Loans to help make her utility payments. After making four monthly interest-only payments of \$112.50, she was unable to keep up with the payments and found the firm had repossessed her car in the middle of the night. Without access to her vehicle, she could no longer get to work.

Source: <http://usa.streetsblog.org/2010/11/10/driven-to-the-poorhouse-how-car-title-lenders-prey-on-americans/>

(2, 3, CT)

153. Jamela Lott, a single mother of five, was falling behind on her rent and borrowed \$900 from Loan Max in Akron, Ohio. She used her 2001 Oldsmobile as collateral for the loan. After paying \$938 on the original \$900 loan, she was unable to keep up. Lott was told she still owed more than \$1,600 or had to face repossession of her car. Shortly thereafter, she and her children became homeless and entered the program of Family Promise of Summit County, which provides temporary shelter to homeless families and offers assistance. Harry McKeen, a local attorney, accepted Lott’s case via Legal Aid, and settled with LoanMax to write off Lott’s debt. Meanwhile, readers donated more than \$1,160 to help Lott get into a rental house in West Akron.

Source: <http://www.ohio.com/business/taking-action/akron-woman-works-through-financial-situation-involving-lender-1.470027>

(2, 3, CT)

154. Norma Poalson, 68, of Akron, Ohio, took out a \$600 car title loan from LoanMax for a now-deceased friend who needed money for a chair lift. When she fell behind on her payments, the company rolled over her loan for the same amount. Poalson says she has paid about \$2,200 on the loan and still owes another \$1,690 or faces repossession.

Source: <http://www.ohio.com/business/taking-action/akron-woman-works-through-financial-situation-involving-lender-1.470027>

155. Rasheeda Jackson of Akron, Ohio, took out a \$600 car title loan. She fell behind on the payments, and her car was repossessed a few months later. To get her car back, Jackson had to pay \$890, including \$600 to a repossession company. The company charged her storage fees and tried to ask for money to get things out of her car if she didn’t pay the full fees.

Source: <http://www.ohio.com/business/taking-action/akron-woman-works-through-financial-situation-involving-lender-1.470027>

156. Tony Williams of South Carolina was strapped for cash and took out a \$715 car title loan. He says it was easy and he was desperate. "They just ask what your income is, and whatever you tell them is what they go by," said Tony. However, there is a catch. The annual percentage rate on his loan is 360%. So, of the \$715 dollars he and his wife borrowed, they'll end up paying back nearly four times that amount, unless they're able to pay it off sooner. If they don't, their car gets repossessed. "It's like you're caught in a revolving door and you can't get out," said Tony. At Max Cash Title Loan in Spartanburg, the max APR was listed as up to 396%. At North American Title Loans, it was 372%.

Source: <http://wspa.com/2014/05/01/driven-to-debt/>
(2, CT)

157. Roger Irby of North Akron, Ohio, faced financial difficulty when he broke a bone in his neck which hindered his ability to work full time. He turned to Loan Max for a \$500 car title loan, using his 13-year-old truck as collateral. Loan Max required him to pay the loan back in 30 days, along with \$200 in interest. A month later, the only way he could pay the loan off in time and have enough money to pay his family's bills was to take out another loan—this time, for \$1,000. The loan is due in 30 days, plus \$295 in interest. Irby has paid almost \$500 to borrow \$1,500 for two months. "They are modern day loan sharks," Irby said. "Me and my wife are trying to pay this bill off and we don't ever want to mess with them again. Ever."

Source: <http://www.ohio.com/news/local/need-emergency-cash-cuyahoga-falls-group-considering-an-alternative-to-payday-lenders-1.505993>
(2, CT)

158. In July 2010, Army Staff Sergeant Jason Cox of Columbus, Georgia, faced a family emergency. He obtained a \$3,000 loan with his car title as collateral from Alabama Title Loans in Phenix City, Alabama. The loan carried an APR of 146% and was required to be paid off in 30 days, or Cox would have to pay the interest portion and renew the loan to set the due date back another 30 days. Unable to pay what eventually grew to approximately \$4,500, Cox paid between \$330 and \$417 each month. After nearly a year of monthly payments, Cox could no longer afford to pay the monthly fee, none of which went to pay down the principal of the loan. He stopped making payments and his vehicle was repossessed at his home on the Fort Benning military base. That's when Cox felt something was amiss, and visited Columbus attorney Kyle Fischer of the law firm Day Crowley. As a former JAG lieutenant in the Army, Fischer knew many of the laws pertaining to military active duty personnel and soon realized that it appeared Cox's loan was in violation of the 2007 Military Lending Act, implemented by Congress to protect active duty personnel from predatory lending. Barnes and Bevis agreed with Fischer, and in November, they filed a class-action lawsuit against Community Loans of America and Alabama Title Loans. "I definitely feel like I was taken advantage of," said Cox, who has served three tours in Iraq during his 11 years of service and earned the Purple Heart for a foot injury he received during enemy gunfire. "I had no clue this law was in place, and nothing was explained to me."

Source:
<http://www.barneslawgroup.com/Portals/0/Veteran%20challenges%20title%20loan%20company%20in%20courtdmj.pdf>
(2, 3, CT)

159. In 2012, Tammy in Colorado received a payday loan from Speedy Cash, after seeing a commercial and facing trouble paying rent. She now says, "I would be better off if I never had

one." She had a job and thought she could pay the loan back with no problem. She was approved for the loan in less than 10 minutes and given \$500 based on her income. The fee did not seem too bad added on top of the \$500 loan, and the payback terms seemed okay, until it was time to make her first installment payment. She was going to be \$50 short. She called Speedy Cash to tell them to not send her check to the bank because the total amount was not in her account. She made the request for them not to send the check for another 7 days, but the check was sent anyway. She was charged an NSF Fee from Speedy Cash and a Return Check Charge from the bank, and her bank account went into the negative. Tammy recounts, "This became my downward spiral. I then went to another payday lending company to obtain another loan and was granted." With the second payday loan, she paid the \$125 installment plus \$35 NSF from the first payday loan. She said, "However, the next payday from my job came around and I was still in the same position again. I was short now on both payday loans and I could not figure out how to settle it, then I got my third payday loan from another payday store. These loans happened all in a timeframe of less than 90 days. Then the awful phone calls began and I started to dodge all the calls. Letters began and I did not try to address them because I knew that I am now unable to pay any of them due to the all the fees applied from all the payday lending sources. The end result to my story was that since I met payday lenders my life resulted in filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy. I lost my home, car and became homeless and also my credit was damaged. Even today through my email I am now getting threats to garnish my income, and now that I am disabled I cannot afford them to be able to do this to me. This is all because the first payday lender would not honor my request to hold off for a week so I could get the 50.00 and not have to seek other lenders to rob peter to pay Paul. Even today this is a nightmare!"

Source: Story on file with CRL

(2, 3)